The Afghan War concluded precisely as it had begun, with no clear understanding of its goals or outcomes. Accordingly, the US invasion of Afghanistan was hastily devised in days. The choices that shaped the US military operation in Afghanistan in 2001, however, exhibit a remarkable degree of continuity due to a continuing pre-September 11 evolution in US foreign policy.

Twenty years ago, US military operations in Afghanistan did not start. But that was in 1979, under Jimmy Carter's administration. Former National Security Advisor to President Carter Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated US covert backing for Islamic radicals engaged in combat in Afghanistan in 1998. America's longest war in Afghanistan was founded on false pretences without any specific goal.

Prologue
The outcome has been a persistently dangerous security environment that coincides with the Taliban's rebirth as a potential replacement for Kabul's deeply corruption that is ingrained and ongoing. These activities took place as the non-Pashtun. The opposition to Karzai seemed to be in chaos and couldn't seem to establish a centre. Around which to counterbalance the harmful impact of Karzai and the company. It is difficult to believe that the simple one-year delay in the withdrawal's effective date might cause. These essential realities on the ground won't change in the event of US and NATO forces.

Main Discussion
In 2014, the United States and its partners may have concluded that it was time to drastically scale back, if not ultimately end, their presence in Afghanistan unless the regime met a set of bare requirements. Few officials have specifically mentioned the devastating repercussions following the abrupt U.S. withdrawal from the region after the Soviet Union's collapse. Pull-out in 1989, but the memories of the bloody and violent ensuing battle and the Taliban's subsequent ascendancy cannot have completely subsided. Even so, the U.S. did scale back its withdrawal, though not wholly. It increased its force to around 10,000 at the start of 2015, a level it will keep.[1]

According to the conditions of the SOFA, NATO would deploy 2,000 troops to Afghanistan in 2015. It is not unexpected that the nation's condition following the drawdown continues to be a severe concern for the central states in the region, not to mention the people of Afghanistan. These worries are primarily related to how well the new Afghan government and security forces will maintain law and order and keep the Taliban at bay as foreign soldiers leave the country.[2]

The United States has effectively withdrawn from Afghanistan after the considerable expenditure of blood and treasure. More than 2,200 American service members have perished in battle there as of January 2015, and more than 17,200 Afghan civilians had also perished. 2 Additionally, a Pentagon assessment states that the conflict is costing the United States $300 million each day. Congress's support for the war in the United States has started to dwindle, but the Obama administration does not appear unduly concerned about it. Congressional backing for the number of U.S. allies in Afghanistan has progressively decreased. They are beginning to show symptoms of growing weary of their commitment as domestic support for their troops has sharply decreased. [3]

In a book by Ahmed Rashid, the American role in Afghanistan has been well documented (2010). [4] The book Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond offers a keen understanding of the nation, its people, and the outside powers involved in the area in a new "Great Game."

The history of the movement, including its beginnings, fundamentalism, political and military leaders, internal conflicts, the opium trade, the significance of oil resources, and foreign meddling in Afghan affairs, particularly on the part of Pakistan, the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China, are all covered in the book. Rashid, who is hardly a wild-eyed extremist, has worked as the Far Eastern Economic Review and Daily Telegraph's Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia correspondent.

He contends that the US was seeking allies and stable bases in energy-rich central Eurasia but was constrained by its own embargo on Iran, which went into effect in 1980 and was compelled to explore for alternative routes into the intricate web of Eurasian politics and economics.

Sometime in 1994, as Afghanistan descended into chaos due to the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, a very covert organisation of Afghan religious professors and students known as the Taliban arose from the merry band of anti-communist militants. Its stated goals were to uphold traditional Islamic law, maintain Afghanistan's Islamic identity, and restore peace while also fighting crime and corruption. The group's assurance of security won the public's favour.

According to Rashid, the US administration's decision to help this young rebel force in its efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan's war-torn country was motivated by the US's vital energy interests in using Afghanistan as a significant oil transit route. The Taliban appeared to be the only force able to keep the masses united during the civil war as they were rapidly disintegrating. Once in power, the Taliban Movement controlled ongoing banditry, ethnic disputes, and religious strife while disarming a large portion of the countryside.

Oil and gas have always held a special position among the long-term US strategic motives, even though they are not the direct causes of the US engagement in Afghanistan.[5] A fundamental US objective was maintaining control over Central Asia's massive but landlocked oil and gas deposits, especially Turkmenistan's.

Afghanistan offers Turkmenistan's massive oil and gas deposits the quickest and most affordable export route. For the US firms to build an oil and gas pipeline through Afghanistan, there were extensive negotiations and planning.[6]

Without considering this long-term strategic objective, it is impossible to determine the reasons behind the war in Afghanistan by focusing solely on the September 11 terrorist attacks. The US administration was determined to maintain a dominant position in the heartland of Eurasia for reasons of global strategy and control over natural resources. Before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the 2001 intervention was meticulously rehearsed and well-planned.[7]

The September 11th incident gave the US government more motivation to tighten control over the area and to demonstrate to the rest of the world America's potential for political and military dominance. A few days before September 11, the US Energy Information Administration stated that:
Afghanistan's significance from an energy standpoint arises from its geographical position.[8]

The hijacked aircraft that struck the Pentagon and the World Trade Center only added another justification for the unilateral expansion of US political and military dominance over Afghanistan and the surrounding region. The so-called war on terror made it possible for the US military to enter regions where it had not before been present.[9]

The US military set up 13 new military bases in neighbouring former Soviet states during the early phases of the war in Afghanistan, with Uzbekistan becoming the first country in central Asia to host a permanent military post in early 2002. Soon after, more facilities started to arise in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the associated policy and practice of joint military drills expanded to include faraway Kazakhstan.[10]

President Bush designated Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-born former UNOCAL staffer, as a special representative to Afghanistan after the first fighting was over. Through this nomination, the significance of the financial and commercial interests at risk in the US effort in Afghanistan was brought to light. [11]Before being named ambassador, Khalilzad created a risk assessment for a planned gas pipeline from the Indian Ocean to the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Numerous financial transactions, the production of natural gas and oil, and massive multinational enterprises with solid ties to the US state. It's not a paranoid notion; instead, it's just a nexus of political and economic interests operating under the guise of the "war on terror." It is just the way things are, not a plot.

Epilogue
What can only be described as America's loss in Afghanistan is represented by this outcome in yet another way. Given China's desire to alter the global economic system, Washington must make every effort to avoid making additional errors that could provide Beijing with the lucrative chances it so tenaciously pursues. Last but not least, the withdrawal from Afghanistan has left a void China is willing to fill. A detailed examination of America's Afghan blunder would undoubtedly reveal many more lessons.

Nevertheless, Washington should not hesitate to take action as quickly as feasible since those mentioned above seem likely to stand the test of time. The difficulty that America's allies encounter is that the country seems to be undergoing a severe transformation for the worst policy towards others especially Afghanistan.

End-Notes:

1. Michael D. Shear and Mark Mazzetti, ''U.S. to Delay Pullout of Troops from Afghanistan to Aid Strikes,'' ibid., March 24, 2015, p. A1.
2. Ankit Panda, ''U.S., Afghanistan Cement Long Delayed Security Agreement,'' The Diplomat, October 1, 2014, at , accessed October, 2022
3. Mihai Carp, "Building Stability in Afghanistan," NATO Review (Spring 2016); Sean Kay and Sahar Kahn, "NATO and Counter-Insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset," Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 1 (2016), 163�181.
4. Rashid, A. (2010) Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond. 2nd ed. London: I. B. Tauris.
5. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decision of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 12.
6. Cited in Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 307
7. See Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), for one of the best cri[7]tiques on how history has been abused in the United States
8. Misra, A. (2002) "The Taliban, Radical Islam and Afghanistan," Third World Quarterly, 23(3), 579.
9. Haslam, J. (2011) Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011, 326
10. Helen Cooper and Eric Schmitt, "Officials in U.S. Debate Speeding Afghan Pull-out, Commanders Opposed," The New York Times, March 13, 2012, A1; "Australia to Withdraw Troops Sooner than Expected," CNN International, April 17, 2012
11. Mihai Carp, "Building Stability in Afghanistan," NATO Review (Spring 2006); Sean Kay and Sahar Kahn, "NATO and Counter-Insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset," Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 1 (2007), 163�181.

Written By: Sayed Qudrat Hashimy