• Strict Liability
• Lord Atkin's principle: "the ordinary duty of a person to take care either that his animal or his chattel is not put to such a use as is likely to injure his neighbour."
• Danger of Things and the Non-natural User of Land: Rylands v Fletcher
• In the heart of Lancashire, England, during the early days of the 1860s, a tale of ambition and oversight began to unfold. John Rylands, a prosperous mill owner, decided to build a reservoir on his land to supply water to the bustling Ainsworth Mill.
• The contractors, eager to complete the project swiftly, dug deep into the earth, uncovering a labyrinth of ancient coal mines and passages. These tunnels, filled with loose soil and rubbish, connected directly to the adjacent mine owned by Thomas Fletcher.
• Despite the warning signs, the contractors left these shafts open, believing them to be of no consequence. Their negligence went unnoticed as the reservoir slowly took shape.
• As the reservoir was filled, the water pressure proved too much for the fragile ground beneath it. The reservoir burst, flooding Fletcher's mine and causing damage valued at £937 (equivalent to £111,200 in 2023).
• Fletcher attempted to pump out the water, but his pump burst again in April 1861, flooding the mine once more.
• A mines inspector identified the submerged coal shafts as the source of the flooding. Furious, Fletcher sued Rylands and the landowner, Jehu Horrocks, for damages.
• The case established that the flooding was neither a direct trespass nor a nuisance, but a one-off event. The contractors were found liable for negligence.
• The ruling established that anyone who brings onto their land something likely to cause harm and allows it to escape must keep it at their peril. If they fail, they are liable for any resulting damage, unless it was due to the claimant's fault or an act of God.
• Since Rylands used his land for an unusual purpose by bringing in large quantities of water, he was held responsible for the escape and had to compensate Fletcher.
• What We Learn:
• Storing a substantial volume of water in the reservoir constituted a non-natural use of land.
• Rylands' lack of negligence or intent to cause harm was irrelevant as he introduced an element that, if it escaped, would cause damage.
• Elements of Rylands v. Fletcher:
1. Rylands brought something and kept it on his land.
2. That something was capable of escaping from Rylands' land.
3. It was a non-natural use of the land.
4. It did escape and caused damage to Fletcher.
5. Such escape was natural, foreseeable, and not too remote.

I am responsible for suffering, injury or damage if caused to my neighbour's property due to the release of dangerous substance outside the walls of my facility; without having to prove fault on my part. Anything kept on my land such as water, gas, electricity, chemicals, plants, animals, fire, explosive substances, oil, fumes, rusty wire, poisonous vegetation, vibrations, a flag-pole and even dwellers in caravans etc., has the potential for doing harm, if it escapes.

If the thing is already on the land or is there naturally, then there will be no liability. The things which are by nature or naturally on land include vegetation which has naturally grown on my land. Here a tree which spread its branches across my fence to my neighbour's land, he cannot make the me to be liable in any claim by him against me. This includes weeds, grass and trees of different types. 

Giles vs. Walker, (1890) 24 QBD 656- In the defendant's land, there was spontaneous growth of thistle plants. The defendant did not check the growth of this undesired vegetation which was extending to the plaintiff's land also only to cause him annoyance and damage. However, the defendant was able to prove that growing of plants is a natural use of land and therefore he won the case against the plaintiff.

Nichols v Marsland: CA 1 Dec 1876
Flood following heavy rain was not negligent
The defendant was the owner of a series of artificial ornamental lakes, which had existed for a great number of years, and had never previous to 18th June, 1872 caused any damage. On that day, however, after a most unusual fall of rain, the lakes overflowed, the dams at their end gave way, and the water out of the lakes carried away the county bridges lower downstream.

Held: The jury found no negligence. An exceptionally heavy rainstorm was a sufficient excuse as an act of God, to escape liability under the rule in Rylands -v- Fletcher. Act of God is not, and never was, the same as inevitable accident or the absence of negligence. The defendant could not have anticipated the exceptional flood which caused her dam to break; no conduct of hers was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damage.
Mellish LJ distinguished Ryland v Fletcher:
'But the present case is distinguished from that of Rylands -v- Fletcher in this, that it is not the act of the defendant in keeping this reservoir, an act in itself lawful, which alone leads to the escape of the water, and so renders wrongful that which but for such escape would have been lawful. It is the supervening vis major of the water caused by the flood, which, superadded to the water in the reservoir (which of itself would have been innocuous), causes the disaster.'

'The remaining question is, did the defendant make out that the escape of the water was owing to the act of God? Now the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great that it could not reasonably have been anticipated, although, if it had been anticipated the effect might have been prevented; and this seems to us in substance a finding that the escape of the water was owing to the act of God.

However great the flood had been, if it had not been greater than floods that had happened before and might be expected to occur again, the defendant might not have made out that she was free from fault; but we think she ought not to be held liable because she did not prevent the effect of an extraordinary act of nature, which she could not anticipate. 

Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co (Leicestershire) Ltd (1918) 34 TLD 500
Escape of something naturally occurring on the premises through non-natural use of land
 The defendant had brought some explosives onto his land and used them to blast rocks which had already been naturally occurring on his land. As a result of this blasting, some of the rock fragments flew onto nearby land below, more specifically on the nearby highway, where they hit and injured the claimant. The claimant brought an action under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, which had established strict liability for damage done as a result of an escape of a thing from one's land which was brought onto the land by the defendant and which could be expected to cause such damage.

The issue in this case was whether the fact pattern fit the rule in Ryland v Flecther which related to damage done by things not naturally occurring on the defendant's premises, whereas in this case the damage was done by rocks which had been naturally occurring and which the defendant had not brought onto his premises.

The court held that there was strict liability here as per Rylands v Flecther, since there had been an escape of a sorts, namely the blast. While the rocks were not brought onto the land, the defendant had brought the explosives onto his land which caused the rocks to fly out through the blasting. A non-natural use of the land could in effect extend the rule to damage done by naturally occurring objects.

Hale v Jennings Bros [1948] 1 All ER 579 A car from a 'chair- o-plane' ride on a fairground became detached from the main assembly while it was in motion and injured a stallholder as it crashed to the ground. The owner of the ride was held liable. Risk of injury was foreseeable if the car came loose. The Defendant erected in a public amusement park an apparatus similar to a roundabout called a Chair- O-plane.

While this was in the process of rotation, one of the chair-o-plane raid on the fairground became detached from the main assembly and injured Jenning who was the proprietor of a neighbouring shooting-gallery as it crashed to the ground. Held that the defendants were responsible for Jenning because my usage of land was non natural and the injury was foreseeable. Since the chair -o- plan came loose, became detached and did cause injury by escaping from the main assembly. Actually, there was no escape of the chair-o-place from the land since the entire land was within the fair ground premises, yet the thing did escape and caused injuiy therefore, responsible for the injury caused to Jenning. Here that the thing itself is not inherently hazardous, yet, it need only be a thing likely to cause deamage if it escapes.

In the case of Read v J Lyons & Co [1947] A.C. 156, it was held that a person is not, in absence of negligence, liable in respect of things, whether dangerous or not, which they have brought, collected, or manufactured on their premises (barring certain specific exceptions).

In 1942, D entered into an agreement with the Ministry of Defence to manufacture high explosive shells for the government.

To fulfil this agreement, D took control, management and operations of a government factory in Bedfordshire.

C, an agent registered under the National Services Act, was told at the Labour Exchange that she must work as an inspector for the Armaments Inspection Department and inspect the filling of the shell cases.
C was not given a statutory direction mandating her to act in this way, but it would have been served on her if she refused.

On 31st August, an explosion occurred in the shell-filling shop. This injured C among others and resulted in one death. Despite there being no evidence of D being negligent in their operations, C sued D for damages for personal injury.

Was D strictly liable for injuries resulting from their business of manufacturing clearly dangerous things?
Finding for D, that without any proof of negligence on behalf of D or the shells escaping from a place D occupies controls, there was no cause of action on which C could succeed. The inherently dangerous nature of the shells did not impose strict liability on D.

Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2004] 2 AC 1
Water damage caused by leaking pipe, natural use of land by Council
The Claimant was the owner of a gas pipe which passed under the surface of an old railway between Stockport and Denton. The Defendant was the local council which was responsible for a water pipe which supplied water to a block of flats in the nearby Brinnington Estate. In 1992, a leak developed in that water pipe, which was eventually fixed but which had not been immediately detected. In that time the water had been leaking considerably (as the pipe was large) and had saturated at the embankment where the Claimant's gas pipe was. The embankment eventually collapsed due to the saturation, which meant that the gas pipe was left unsupported. This caused a grave risk which necessitated immediate remedial work, which was costly. The Claimant argued that the Defendant council was liable without proof of negligence (strict liability) under Rylands v Fletcher

The issue in the case was whether the rule in Rylands v Fletcher could be applied to this set of facts and specifically whether it could be held that the council's use of the land (to deliver water to the housing estate) was a non-natural use. The court held that the council was not liable for the damage as the council's use was a natural use of the land. The rule in Rylands v Flecther has limits and it is not possible to apply it to a burst pipe on council property. Supplying water was neither an unnatural nor specifically dangerous endeavour.

Rainham Chemical Works Ltd (in liquidation) and others v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd: HL 1921
At a time of war, a process was invented where picric acid was manufactured from dinitrophenol (DNP) and nitrate of soda. DNP had been used mainly for the manufacture of dyes, and was a stable compound which did not explode easily. It was not in itself dangerous. Nitrate of soda was not an explosive but wood or bags impregnated with moist nitrate of soda will, when dry, burn fiercely if ignited. A hot flame is needed to ignite it and when ignited, large quantities of DNP become a dangerous explosive.

While neither DNP nor nitrate of soda was, in itself, dangerous, they became a source of danger if stored in quantities and in close proximity to one another. It was proved that that was the cause of a massive explosion which caused damage to neighbouring property. On the evidence the manufacture of picric acid from DNP and nitrate of soda might or might not be dangerous in its character, but in that case it was being manufactured under dangerous conditions, and those dangerous conditions caused the accident. Accordingly the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher became applicable. It was not, per Lord Carson, 'seriously argued' that the defendant company was not liable for the damages caused by the explosion. Before Scrutton LJ, the trial judge, it was admitted that the person in possession of the DNP was liable under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher for the consequences of the explosion.

Held: The disputed question was whether responsibility lay at the door of the defendant company or the personal defendants who had a licence from the inventor to manufacture the required picric acid.

Lord Buckmaster said: 'Now, the foundation of the action was a claim based upon the familiar doctrine established by the case of Fletcher v. Rylands, which depends upon this – that even apart from negligence the use of land by one person in an exceptional manner that causes damage to another, and not necessarily an adjacent owner, is actionable: . .In the present case the use complained of was that for the purpose of making munitions, which was certainly not the common and ordinary use of the land, two substances, namely, nitrate of soda and dinitrophenol, were stored in close proximity, with the result that on a fire breaking out they exploded with terrific violence.

It may be accepted that it was not known to either of the defendants that this danger existed, but that in itself affords no excuse, and the result is that the plaintiffs' cause of action is well founded and the only matter for determination is against whom the action should be brought.' . . and 'If the company was really trading independently on its own account, the fact that it was directed by M/s Feldman and Partridge would not render them responsible for its tortious acts unless, indeed, they were acts expressly directed by them. If a company is formed for the express purpose of doing a wrongful act or if, when formed, those in control expressly direct that a wrongful thing be done, the individuals as well as the company are responsible for the consequences, but there is no evidence in the present case to establish liability under either of these heads.'

House of Lords (now The Supreme Court) ruled that:
"Those in control expressly direct that a wrongful thing be done, individuals as well as the company are responsible for the consequences."
"Procure" simply means to get someone else to do one's dirty work! However, the courts have said that it must be something more than mere facilitation.
In essence, a director is liable if he or she ordered the infringing acts to be done.

Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43 
The Claimant rented rooms above a domestic garage in which the Defendant kept a car. The Defendant's employee (his chauffeur) was instructed to clean the car and attempted to move it in order to carry out that instruction. In order to do so, he turned on the petrol tap as to facilitate the petrol flow from the tank to the carburettor. He then started the engine. However, there was an explosion and the car caught fire, specifically the carburettor.

It was found by the court that if the Defendant's employee had not panicked and had instead immediately turned off the tap, the petrol would have stopped flowing to the carburettor and the fire would have died out quickly. He did panic however and wasted time looking for a cloth, which meant that by the time he decided to turn off the tap it was not possible to contain the fire. The fire spread to the rest of the car and from there to the garage and eventually to the whole building, which destroyed the whole building. The claimant's property above the garage was also destroyed, including his furniture.

The issues in this case were whether the car constituted a dangerous thing for the purposes of Rylands v Fletcher, whether what had been done constituted non-natural use of the land for the same purposes and whether the Defendant could rely on s.86 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 which stipulated that a person will not be liable (without more) for damage caused by a fire which he started accidently.

It was held first that s.86 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 did not apply as this was a case under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and in any event the fire was not accidental but rather due to negligence. The court held further that the car with the petrol tank was a dangerous thing for the purposes of Rylands v Fletcher and therefore found liability, inter alia, because the fundamental principle was held to be that the Defendant should not use his property in such a way as to injure his neighbour.

In Mason v Levy Auto Parts of England Ltd [1967] 2 Q.B. 530, applying Musgrove, it was held that since the defendants had brought into their yard combustible materials which were kept in such conditions that if they ignited the fire would be likely to spread to the plaintiff's land, and the defendants' use of the land was non-natural, they were liable to the plaintiff in damages. 

Defendants had a store of machinery in inflammable packings, together with a quantity of petroleum, acetylene and paints on his land. A severe fire of unknown cause started on his land and, fuelled by the large quantities of combustible materials kept there, spread to my land. There was no escape of inflammable things from my neighbour's store, yet my neighbour was liable for the damage when fire broke out and escaped to my property. The circumstances of the storage amounted to a non-natural user and that consequently my neighbour was liable due to the escape of 'non-natural user'.

His liability depended on (a) the quantities of materials stored; (b) the way in which they were stored; and (c) the character of the neighbourhood which would also justify a finding of negligence. The "dangerous thing" brought onto the neighbour's land was the main cause of fuelling the fire. In so-called fire cases, where fire escapes but the "dangerous thing" does not exist, then my neighbour will not be liable.

Stannard (T/A Wyvern Tyres) v Gore. Stannard, operated his tyre fitting and supply business, known as Wyvern Tyres, from a trading estate in Hereford. I occupied an adjoining unit. On 4 February 2008, an electrical fire started at the Stannard's premises, which developed and ignited some 3,000 tyres. As a result, the fire spread rapidly, destroying his premises, my unit and other adjoining units. The tyres had a special fire risk quality, although they were not in themselves flammable, and would not ignite unless there was a sufficient flame or heat source. Once alight, they burn rapidly and intensively, such that they are difficult to put out. Further, the tyres were stored in a haphazard manner and in a large quantity for the size of the premises.

The storage of tyres presented an exceptionally high risk of danger and was a non-natural use of land. Here, the "thing" (the tyres) did not escape. The fire fuelled by the tyres had escaped, but Stannard had not brought the fire onto his land.  Further, the tyres were not exceptionally dangerous or mischievous and his commercial activity as a motor tyre supplier was a perfectly ordinary and reasonable activity to be carried on in a light industrial estate, and was not therefore a non-natural use of the land and the fire was not deliberately started. 

Shiffman v Grand Priory. 
The defendant, at the request of the local constabulary, erected a casualty tent. Nearby, he erected a flag-pole which was supported by four guy ropes. A man was left in charge of the tent; it also being his duty to prevent interference with the flagpole. Children who came to play around the pole and to swing on the ropes were repeatedly ordered by the defendant to keep away. While the attendant was assisting a casualty inside the tent the children caused the pole to fall and injured a person on land, who was not in occupation of the land. However, this was not known to the defendant. 

There had been an escape from land within the physical control of the defendant. While a flag pole is not inherently dangerous, still, it is likely to do mischief if it escapes. In this example, it did escape and caused foreseeable damage. Therefore, the defendant is responsible for the injury caused.

British Celanese v Hunt. Metal foil had been blown from the defendant's factory premises on to an electricity sub-station, which in turn brought the plaintiff's machines to a halt. Held: The meaning Lawton J would give to the phrase 'direct victim' was a person whose 'property was injured by the operation of the laws of nature without any human intervention'.

Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Property.
A fire, caused by an independent contractor's employee welding negligently, began on the defendant's premises and spread to a nearby property. The property was burnt causing A$2.5M of damages. The plaintiff sued under ignis suus, nuisance, negligence and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (a rule of strict liability), interpreted in part through the duty of occupier to invitee.

The defendant was Burnie Port Authority (Burnie), located in Burnie, Tasmania, who provided storage facilities, and the plaintiff was General Jones, who stored a large quantity of frozen vegetables. General Jones suffered damage when the vegetables were ruined by fire which destroyed Burnie property.

The incident occurred on March 21, 1983, at a warehouse owned by General Jones Pty Ltd and leased from the Burnie Port Authority. A subcontractor employed by the Burnie Port Authority was using an oxy-acetylene torch to cut steel in a neighboring area of the warehouse. The subcontractor's work caused a fire that spread to General Jones' warehouse, resulting in substantial damage to the stored goods. The fire was caused by sparks from the oxy-acetylene torch igniting nearby combustible materials. The subcontractor failed to take adequate precautions to prevent the fire, such as using fire-resistant blankets or having firefighting equipment readily available.

General Jones Pty Ltd said that Burnie Port Authority allowed a dangerous activity (cutting steel with an oxy-acetylene torch) to be conducted on its premises. Whether the subcontractor was negligent in failing to take appropriate safety measures to prevent the fire?

Clearly, Burnie Port Authority was negligent in allowing the dangerous activity to be carried out without adequate safety precautions. The subcontractors were also negligent in their failure to prevent the fire, which contributed to the fire. 

Exceptions:

1. Statutory Authority: Public authorities may escape liability when relying on the statutory authority immunity conferred on them by statutes. They may accumulate any of the non-natural things listed above which may cause damage but will not be held liable for its escape as far as such public authority was not negligent in the discharge of its duties such as to lead to the escape and subsequent damage.
   • Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Company:
   • Birmingham Waterworks Company, were the supplier of water for Birmingham under the statute which provided that:
   • The company should, upon the laying down of any main-pipe or other pipe in any street, fix, at the time of laying down such pipe, a proper and sufficient fire-plug in each such street, and should deliver the key or keys of such fire-plug to the persons having the care of the engine-house in or near to the said street, and cause another key to be hung up in the watch-house in or near to the said street.
   • By Section 87, pipes were to be eighteen inches beneath the surface of the soil.
   • By the 89th section, the mains were at all times to be kept charged with water.
   • The defendants derived no profit from the maintenance of the plugs distinct from the general profits of the whole business, but such maintenance was one of the conditions under which they were permitted to exercise the privileges given by the Act.
   • The main-pipe opposite to my house was more than eighteen inches below the surface. The fire-plug was constructed according to the best-known system, and the materials of it were at the time of the accident sound and in good order.
   • The Company had installed a fireplug into the hydrant near my house. That winter, during a severe frost, the plug failed causing a flood and damage to my house. Here, severe frost could not have been in the contemplation of the Water Works. They could only have been negligent if they had failed to do what a reasonable person would do in the circumstances. Birmingham had not seen such cold in such a long time, and it would be unreasonable for the Water Works to anticipate such a rare occurrence.
      
2. Contributory Negligence:
   • I was not wearing a seatbelt whilst driving because I did not like seatbelts and because I had seen drivers being trapped after a crash because they wore a seatbelt.
   • After a crash, I suffered head and chest injuries and a broken finger. Had I worn a seatbelt, the head and chest injuries would have been avoided. The crash was entirely my fault.
      
3. Act of God: These events are considered unforeseeable and unavoidable, and they are not caused by the negligence or intentional actions of any party. Some common examples of acts of God include earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, lightning strikes, and other natural disasters.
   • The essential ingredients of an act of God are:
   • Natural Cause: The event must be caused by natural forces, such as weather conditions, seismic activity, or other natural phenomena.
   • Unforeseeable: The event must be something that could not have been reasonably anticipated or predicted by the parties involved.
   • Irresistible Force: The event must be of such magnitude and force that it cannot be prevented or avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and caution.
   • No Human Involvement: The event must not be caused by the negligence, intentional actions, or misconduct of any party involved.
   • Nichols v Marsland:
   • In this case, the defendants formed ornamental pools by damming a stream on their land.
   • In June 1872, there was unprecedented and extraordinary rainfall, which led to the water in the pool swelling beyond the normal levels. The water pressure rose and breached the artificial banks of the pool, which resulted in a sudden release of downstream water, causing damage to my neighbour's property.
   • My neighbour claimed for the loss and the harm caused to him.
   • The core issues encompass liability for water escape, the applicability of the "act of God" defence, and the defendant's duty of care.
   • The plaintiff argued that the defendant's voluntary water storage created a hazard, while the defendant maintained no negligence and cited the exceptional rainfall as an "act of God."
   • The court in Nichols v Marsland ruled in favour of the defendant, finding the rainfall constituted an "act of God," absolving them from liability due to their lack of duty comparable to precedent cases.
      
4. Act of a Stranger or third party:  
    Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 Natural versus non-natural use of land, domestic water supply, malicious act of third party
    
   1. The claimant rented premises on the second floor of a building which was used for commercial purposes and ran a business from the premises he was renting. The defendant was the owner of that building. He leased the building in parts to various business tenants. The case arose because someone had maliciously blocked all the sinks in the toilets on the fourth floor of the defendant's building. The same person had then turned on all the taps, clearly with the intention of causing a flood and therefore causing damage. Eventually the flooding on the fourth floor travelled down to the second floor and damaged the property of the claimant. The claimant then started the case, basing himself on the rule in Rylands v Fletcher arguing that he had suffered damage as a result of the escape of the water from the defendant's premises.
      
      The issue in this case was whether a finding of non-natural use of land and Rylands v Fletcher liability could be found where an escape (which otherwise might constitute such liability) was caused by the malicious actions of a third party, rather than of the Defendants. Also, at issue was whether water in this context could be seen as something not naturally on the land which had been brought to it by the Defendant.
      
      The court held the Defendant to not be liable. First, water supplied to a building is a natural use of the land. The rule of Rylands v Fletcher requires a special use of the land. Second, Rylands v Fletcher liability will not be found where the damage was caused by a wrongful and malicious act of a third party.
      In the case of Perry v Kendricks [1956] 1 W.L.R. 85, it was held that the Rylands v Fletcher rule may cease to be applicable if the harm done is caused by the mischievous, deliberate, and conscious acts of a stranger unless the claimant can show that the stranger's act was one which the occupier could reasonably have anticipated and guarded against.
   • D, a coach transport company, owned a piece of land used for parking their vehicles. D performed careful and regular inspections of the vehicles.
   • Before leaving a Leyland coach on this land, D emptied the petrol tank and screwed a cap on the entrance pipe.
   • Children would often play on any parked coaches, but whenever sighted were chased away by D's employees.
   • C, a boy of 10, came across two other boys on the bank of D's land when heading home from school.
   • The two boys had found the Leyland coach, with the cap removed by persons unknown. They threw a lit match into the petrol tank and jumped back.
   • C had approached the two boys when they threw in the match. The resulting explosion of the petrol tank left him seriously injured.
      
5. Key Legal Questions:
   • Was the coach a 'dangerous' object, and if so, were D negligent in leaving a coach where children could access it?
   • Was D liable for the 'escape' of the petrol fumes from the coach if this resulted from the actions of a third party?
      
6. Held by the Court of Appeal:
   • Finding for D, that D had not been negligent in leaving the coach where children could reach it.
   • Rylands v Fletcher does not apply where there had been a conscious and deliberate act by a person over whom D had no control, unless it could be shown that the dangerous thing was left by D in such a condition that it was a reasonable and probable consequence of their action which they ought to have foreseen. This does not apply in the current case.
      
   • Consent of the Plaintiff:
     • When the plaintiff has either expressly or impliedly consented to the presence of a source of danger and also there has been no negligence on the defendant's part, the defendant will not be held liable. It is basically the defence of 'Volenti non fit injuria' taken by the defendant in the court.
     • Peters vs. Prince of Wales Theatre Ltd. Birmingham, (1942) 2 ALL ER 533:
       • The plaintiff took on rent a shop in the defendant's premises after full knowledge of the fact that the defendant had a theatre and rehearsal room attached to the same premises.
       • The theatre had a water storage mechanism to douse fire in case of an emergency.
       • Unfortunately, the water container burst due to excessive frost and the water leaked into the plaintiff's shop thereby damaging his goods.
       • The court held the defendant not liable as the plaintiff had impliedly consented to the presence of the dangers of a water storage tank situated right next to his shop by taking the defendant's premises on rent.
   • Remoteness of Damage:
     • Cambridge Water Co. vs. Eastern Counties Leather, (1994) 1 ALL ER 53:
       • The defendants had a tannery in operation at Shawston near Cambridge.
       • The Cambridge Water Company provided water to Cambridge and surrounding areas, serving approximately 275,000 people by 1976.
       • Due to contamination from perchloroethene (PCE) used in the tannery, the water supply was deemed unsafe.
       • The contamination was not foreseeable, and therefore, the damage was considered too remote.
   • Fault of the Plaintiff:
     • The rule will not apply where the damage was caused entirely by the act of the plaintiff, i.e., where the plaintiff is responsible for the escape of the harmful thing, he has no cause of action.
     • Ponting v Noakes, (1984) 2 K. B. 281:
       • The plaintiff's horse died after crossing to the defendant's boundary and eating a poisonous tree.
       • The court held that the plaintiff cannot recover damages.