• Citation:
  • Common Cause (A Regd. Society) vs. Union of India and Anr.
  • (2018) 5 SCC 1, AIR 2018 SC 1665
• Jurisdiction: Supreme Court of India
• Bench Strength:
  • 5 Judges: Justice K.M. Joseph, Justice Ajay Rastogi, Justice Aniruddha Bose, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice C.T. Ravikumar
• Case Type/Origin: Civil Writ Petition
• Case Status: Not Overruled
• Brief Facts:
  • The petitioner, Common Cause, a registered society, sought a declaration that the right to die with dignity is encompassed within the right to live with dignity under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The petition also requested the State to facilitate the execution of Advance Medical Directives or living wills for individuals with deteriorated health or terminal illnesses.
  • Initially, the petition was heard by a three-Judge Bench but was referred to a Constitution Bench due to the evolving and contradictory precedents concerning the right to die in India. The issue traces back to P. Rathinam v. Union of India [(1994) 3 SCC 394], where the Supreme Court had initially invalidated Section 309 IPC (attempt to commit suicide) on the grounds of it violating fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21. However, this was overturned in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab [(1996) AIR 946], where it was held that the right to live did not include the right to die. In Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India [(2011) 4 SCC 454], passive euthanasia was permitted under strict conditions.
• Issue:
  • Whether the right to die with dignity is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and whether individuals can execute Advance Medical Directives.
• Arguments:
  • Petitioner: Argued that the right to die with dignity is intrinsic to the right to live with dignity and autonomy under Article 21. It was asserted that forcing a patient into a state of persistent vegetative existence through medical means violated their dignity and autonomy. They contended that refusing unwanted medical treatment is a common law right and that no one should be compelled to undergo treatment without consent.
  • Respondent-State: Contended that the State had considered regulating euthanasia but deemed it unsuitable. They argued that the right to live with dignity primarily refers to basic necessities such as food, shelter, and health, and does not extend to the right to die with dignity.

Decision:
The Constitution Bench reaffirmed that the right to die with dignity is a fundamental right under Article 21. It clarified that the decision in Gian Kaur did not preclude the concept of passive euthanasia. The Court delineated between active and passive euthanasia, with passive euthanasia involving the withdrawal of life support.

The Court validated the use of Advance Medical Directives, emphasizing that such directives are a manifestation of personal autonomy and dignity. It held that individuals who are incapable of making informed decisions could have a guardian make decisions on their behalf based on the “best-interest” principle.

In its decision, the Court extensively discussed the right to privacy, linking it to autonomy and liberty, as elaborated in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India [(2017) 10 SCC 1]. It examined international precedents such as In re Quinlan [(1976) 355 A.2d 647] and Pretty v. The United Kingdom (Application No. 2346/02), which affirmed the right to avoid an undignified death as part of the right to private life.

Conclusion:
The judgment in Common Cause v. Union of India is a landmark in affirming the intersection of dignity, autonomy, and privacy within the framework of fundamental rights under Article 21. By validating Advance Medical Directives and distinguishing between active and passive euthanasia, the Court addressed a significant gap in legal protection for individuals facing terminal conditions. The emphasis on privacy and bodily autonomy aligns with evolving global norms and reflects a progressive understanding of human rights.

The Court’s reliance on both Indian and international jurisprudence demonstrates a comprehensive approach to human dignity, underscoring that privacy and autonomy are central to the concept of a dignified death. This case significantly advances legal and ethical standards, acknowledging the complex interplay between individual rights and state interests in end-of-life decisions.