"Be Careful Whom You Vent To; A Listening Ear Could Also Be A Running Mouth. After All, Loose Lips Might Sink Ships!"- Mohammed Arafat Mujib Khan

In the context of law, an approver refers to a person who has been involved in the commission of a crime and subsequently agrees to provide evidence against their co-conspirators or accomplices in exchange for some form of leniency or immunity from prosecution. The term "approver" is primarily used in common law jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, India, and Singapore.

An approver is essentially a witness who admits their involvement in the criminal activity and agrees to cooperate with the prosecution by testifying against other individuals involved in the same offense. This cooperation usually includes providing details about the planning, execution, and participants in the crime, as well as any other relevant information that can assist in securing convictions.

In return for their cooperation, an approver may be granted various benefits, such as a reduction in charges, a lighter sentence, or even complete immunity from prosecution. The extent of the benefits depends on the jurisdiction and the specific circumstances of the case. The approver's testimony is generally considered as evidence against the other defendants and can be used to establish their guilt.

However, It is important to note that the credibility and reliability of an approver's testimony are carefully scrutinized by the court. Due to their involvement in the criminal activity, the approver's motivations and potential biases may be subject to questioning. The court will evaluate the corroborating evidence, consistency of the approver's statements, and other factors to determine the weight and credibility to be given to their testimony.

The use of an approver is aimed at encouraging individuals involved in criminal activities to come forward, disclose information, and assist in the prosecution of others involved in the same offense. This approach is often employed in cases where it may be challenging to gather sufficient evidence without the cooperation of an insider.

What are the benefits of being an approver?
The benefits of being an approver, also known as an accomplice witness or a cooperating witness, in a legal context can vary depending on the jurisdiction and the specific circumstances of the case.

Here are some potential benefits that an approver may receive:

• Immunity from Prosecution:
  In some cases, an approver may be granted complete immunity from prosecution for their involvement in the criminal activity they are cooperating to expose. This means they cannot be charged or convicted for the crimes they admit to.
   
• Reduced Charges or Sentence:
  In many situations, an approver may receive a significant reduction in charges or a lighter sentence in exchange for their cooperation. This can lead to a more favorable outcome compared to the potential punishment they would have faced if prosecuted fully.
   
• Leniency:
  Even if complete immunity is not granted, an approver may still receive leniency from the court or prosecution. This could involve a lesser punishment or a more lenient sentencing recommendation.
   
• Protection and Witness Security:
  In cases where an approver's safety may be at risk, the legal system may provide measures to protect their identity, such as anonymity or witness protection programs. This helps ensure their safety during and after the trial.
   
• Reputational Benefit:
  By cooperating and providing evidence against co-conspirators or accomplices, an approver may benefit from a restored reputation or reduced stigma associated with their involvement in the criminal activity. This can have positive social and personal consequences.
   
• Redemption and Rehabilitation:
  Becoming an approver can be seen as a step towards redemption and rehabilitation, as it demonstrates remorse and a willingness to cooperate with the justice system. This may be taken into account during sentencing or in subsequent legal proceedings.

What are the benefits of using approvers?
Using an approver, or an accomplice witness, in a legal case can provide several benefits to the prosecution and the justice system.
Here are some potential advantages of using an approver:

• Gathering Crucial Evidence:
  An approver can provide insider information and firsthand knowledge about the criminal activity, including details about the planning, execution, and participants involved. This information can be crucial in establishing the guilt of other defendants and strengthening the overall case.
   
• Corroborating Testimony:
  An approver's testimony can corroborate other evidence, such as physical evidence or witness statements, leading to a more convincing case against the accused individuals. Their cooperation adds weight and credibility to the prosecution's arguments.
   
• Unveiling the Criminal Network:
  Approver testimony can help expose the structure and hierarchy of criminal organizations or conspiracies. By revealing the roles and connections of the individuals involved, the prosecution can gain a deeper understanding of the criminal network and potentially dismantle it more effectively.
   
• Facilitating Convictions:
  The testimony of an approver can provide the necessary evidence to secure convictions against other defendants. It can help bridge gaps in the prosecution's case and strengthen the overall narrative, making it more likely to convince the judge of the defendants' guilt.
   
• Saving Time and Resources:
  Approver testimony can expedite legal proceedings by providing essential information upfront, reducing the need for extensive investigations and lengthy trials. This can result in significant time and cost savings for the justice system.
   
• Encouraging Cooperation:
  The use of an approver can create a deterrent effect and encourage others involved in criminal activities to cooperate with the authorities. Seeing the potential benefits offered to an approver, other individuals may be more inclined to come forward, provide information, and assist in the prosecution of their co-conspirators.
   
• Public Interest and Justice:
  Using an approver can contribute to the public interest and the pursuit of justice. It allows the legal system to uncover and hold accountable those responsible for crimes, leading to a greater sense of closure, deterrence, and public safety.

What are the disadvantages of being an approver?
While there are benefits associated with being an approver in a criminal case, there are also several potential disadvantages and risks that individuals may face. It is important to consider these factors when evaluating the role of an approver.

Here are some disadvantages of being an approver:

• Personal Safety Concerns:
  Becoming an approver can put the individual's safety at risk. By providing testimony against co-conspirators or accomplices, the approver may become a target for retaliation or threats from those involved in the criminal activity. Maintaining the security and well-being of the approver becomes a crucial challenge.
   
• Reputational Damage and Stigma:
  Being associated with criminal activities and admitting one's involvement can lead to severe reputational damage and societal stigma. The approver may face social consequences, such as loss of trust, damaged relationships, and difficulties in finding employment or rebuilding their life after the case concludes.
   
• Loss of Privacy:
  As an approver, one's personal life and background may be subject to intense scrutiny during the legal proceedings. Personal information, including prior criminal history or involvement in the crime at hand, may be exposed and become public knowledge, further impacting privacy and personal life.
   
• Potential Legal Consequences:
  While an approver may receive benefits such as immunity or reduced charges, there is no absolute guarantee of protection from legal consequences. The approver's cooperation is often contingent upon fulfilling certain obligations, such as providing truthful and complete information. Failure to meet these obligations or engaging in further illegal activities may result in the withdrawal of benefits and potential prosecution.
   
• Credibility Challenges:
  Approvers may face skepticism and credibility challenges during legal proceedings. Their involvement in the criminal activity raises questions about their motivations, biases, and truthfulness. Defense counsel may attempt to undermine their credibility by questioning their character, memory, or potential incentives to fabricate or exaggerate their testimony.
   
• Emotional and Psychological Impact:
  The process of being an approver and reliving the details of the criminal activity can have significant emotional and psychological consequences. Approvers may experience stress, anxiety, guilt, or trauma as they confront their own involvement and confront the repercussions of their actions.
   
• Relocation and Displacement:
  In cases where an approver's safety is at extreme risk, they may be required to relocate and live under a new identity as part of witness protection programs. This can result in upheaval, loss of personal connections, and difficulties in establishing a new life.

What are the disadvantages of using approvers?
The use of approvers in prosecutions also comes with certain disadvantages.

Here are some common drawbacks associated with relying on approvers:

• Credibility and Reliability:
  One major concern is the credibility and reliability of the approver's testimony. Since approvers are individuals who have been involved in criminal activities themselves, their motives for cooperating may be questioned. The defense may argue that the approver is providing false or exaggerated information to secure personal benefits, leading to doubts about the accuracy of their statements.
   
• Cross-Examination Challenges:
  Approver testimonies often face rigorous cross-examination by defense lawyers. The defense team may challenge the approver's credibility, memory, or inconsistencies in their statements to weaken their overall testimony. The ability of the defense to probe and scrutinize the approver's past actions and motivations can pose challenges to the prosecution's case.
   
• Witness Protection and Safety:
  Approvers may face significant risks to their safety and well-being, especially if they are testifying against powerful or dangerous criminal organizations. Despite witness protection programs, ensuring the complete safety of an approver and their family members can be challenging. The fear of retaliation or intimidation may discourage potential approvers from coming forward or cooperating fully.
   
• Public Perception and Stigma:
  Approvers may experience social stigma and negative public perception due to their involvement in criminal activities. Their cooperation may lead to reputational damage, making it difficult for them to reintegrate into society after the conclusion of the trial. The psychological and emotional toll of being labeled an approver can have long-lasting effects on their personal and professional lives.
   
• Ethical Considerations:
  Some argue that the use of approvers raises ethical concerns. Granting benefits, such as pardons or reduced sentences, in exchange for testimony may be viewed as compromising justice. Critics argue that it allows individuals who were actively involved in criminal activities to escape significant punishment, potentially undermining the principles of accountability and fairness.

Relevant Information In The Indian Legal Context
Although the term "approver" is not explicitly defined or utilized in the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), it commonly refers to an individual who is believed to be directly or indirectly involved in or aware of a criminal offense and is granted a pardon under Section 306 of the CrPC. This pardon is granted to encourage the approver to provide testimony against other individuals who are responsible for the offense. In this state, the procedure outlined in Section 306 of the CrPC is frequently employed, particularly in cases involving organized crimes such as dacoities, where independent evidence may be lacking, to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice. Here is the relevant section:

Section 306 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973
306. Tender of pardon to accomplice.

1. With a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which this section applies, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of, the offence, and the Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, at any stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof.
    
2. This section applies to:
   1. any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by the Court of a Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952);
   2. any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with a more severe sentence.
   3. Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon under subsection (1) shall record:
      •  his reasons for so doing;
      • whether the tender was or was not accepted by the person to whom it was made, and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy of such record free of cost.
   4. Every person accepting a tender of pardon made under subsection (1)-
      • shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any;
      •  shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial.
   5. Where a person has accepted a tender of pardon made under subsection (1) and has been examined under subsection (4), the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence shall, without making any further inquiry in the case-
      • commit it for trial-
      1. to the Court of Session if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court or if the Magistrate taking cognizance is the Chief Judicial Magistrate;
      2. to a Court of Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952), if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court;
   6. in any other case, make over the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate who shall try the case himself.

When pardon may be tendered and by whom?
The amendments introduced by Act No. 26 of 1955 have significantly broadened the scope of Section 306 of the CrPC. In addition to the offenses specified in subsection (1), the provision now allows for the tendering of a pardon in cases involving any offense punishable with a minimum imprisonment term of seven years or more. It is important to note that a Magistrate with inferior powers to that of a Magistrate of the first class does not have the authority to tender a pardon.

Only a Magistrate of the first class can do so, provided that the case is under their inquiry or trial, or if they have jurisdiction in the place where the offense is being investigated, with the sanction of the District Magistrate. These provisions aim to ensure that the power to grant pardons and secure testimonies through approvers is exercised by competent authorities in appropriate circumstances within the framework of the law.

The Reasons for tendering pardon should be recorded and extent of pardon explained to the intended approver:
It is imperative that the reasons for tendering a pardon to an individual are explicitly stated. When a pardon is offered, it is crucial to ensure that the intended approver fully comprehends the scope and extent of the pardon being extended to them. They should be clearly informed that they are being tendered a pardon and will not face prosecution specifically in relation to a particular case or cases, with no exceptions.

This clarity is essential to provide transparency and avoid any misunderstandings regarding the terms and limitations of the pardon being offered. By clearly communicating the extent of the pardon, the integrity of the process is upheld, and the intended approver can make an informed decision regarding their cooperation.

Only High Court or Sessions Court or a Special Judge to try cases in which pardon has been tendered:
Once a Magistrate has granted a pardon to an individual and conducted their examination, the case can only be tried by specific courts. These courts are limited to the High Court or the Court of Session.

However, in instances where the offenses are punishable under Section 161 or 165-A of the Indian Penal Code or fall under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947), the trial must be exclusively conducted by the Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (XLV of 1952). This provision ensures that the jurisdiction for the trial of such cases involving approvers remains within the designated courts, taking into consideration the nature and severity of the offenses involved.

Testimony of an approver generally requires corroboration for conviction
The testimony of an approver, being that of an accomplice, is inherently regarded as tainted and must be subjected to careful scrutiny and cautious acceptance. Legally speaking, a conviction is not invalidated merely because it relies on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, as stated in Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, it has now become almost universally practiced not to base a conviction solely on the testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in significant aspects.

The extent of corroboration required cannot be rigidly defined, as it depends on various factors such as the nature of the crime, the nature of the approver's evidence, and the degree of their involvement. However, as a general rule, corroboration is deemed essential not only for the overall account provided by the approver but also for establishing the defendant's identity and their participation in the crime. Corroboration serves the purpose of strengthening the reliability and credibility of the approver's testimony and ensures a fair and cautious assessment of the case.

If approver gives false evidence he can be tried for the offence and also for perjury
An approver, upon receiving a pardon, is obligated to provide a complete and truthful disclosure of all the circumstances within their knowledge pertaining to the offense and the involvement of every other individual, whether as a principal or abettor, in its commission. Failure to comply with this condition and the provision of false evidence exposes the approver to potential prosecution for both the offense for which the pardon was granted and for perjury.

However, the approver cannot be tried for the original offense unless a certificate is issued by the Public Prosecutor, as specified in Section 308(1) of the CrPC. Furthermore, the prosecution for providing false evidence against an approver requires the sanction of the High Court. When seeking the High Court's permission to prosecute an approver for giving false evidence, it is necessary to file an application in the form of a motion on behalf of the State, rather than through a simple letter of reference. This ensures the proper legal procedure is followed and maintains the integrity of the prosecution process.

Here is the relevant section:
Section 308 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973

308. Trial of person not complying with conditions of pardon.

1. Where, in regard to a person who has accepted a tender of pardon made under section 306 or section 307, the Public Prosecutor certifies that in his opinion such person has, either by wilfully concealing anything essential or by giving false evidence, not complied with the condition on which the tender was made, such person may be tried for the offence in respect of which the pardon was so tendered or for any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter, and also for the offence of giving false evidence:
   • Provided that such person shall not be tried jointly with any of the other accused:
   • Provided further that such person shall not be tried for the offence of giving false evidence except with the sanction of the High Court, and nothing contained in section 195 or section 340 shall apply to that offence.
2. Any statement made by such person accepting the tender of pardon and recorded by a Magistrate under section 164 or by a Court under sub-section (4) of section 306 may be given in evidence against him at such trial.
3. At such trial, the accused shall be entitled to plead that he has complied with the condition upon which such tender was made; in which case it shall be for the prosecution to prove that the condition has not been complied with.
4. At such trial, the Court shall:
   • if it is a Court of Session, before the charge is read out and explained to the accused;
   • if it is the Court of a Magistrate, before the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is taken, ask the accused whether he pleads that he has complied with the conditions on which the tender of pardon was made.
5. If the accused does so plead, the Court shall record the plea and proceed with the trial, and it shall, before passing judgment in the case, find whether or not the accused has complied with the conditions of the pardon, and if it finds that he has so complied, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, pass judgment of acquittal.

Approver should be kept in judicial custody until the closing of the trial

In order for an approver to accept a pardon under Section 306, they must remain "in custody" until the trial concludes. Although the term "custody" is not explicitly defined in Section 306(4)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, a recent ruling by the High Court has clarified that it refers specifically to judicial custody, rather than police custody. Therefore, the detention of an approver should take place in a judicial lock-up under the supervision of a court. It is incorrect to practice detaining approvers in police custody.
RELEVANT CASE LAWS/PRECEDENTS
Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 234

3. The central evidence in this case consists of the testimony of the approver Baldev Singh, PW 11, who has given a full narrative of the manner in which the deceased was hacked to death by Maghar Singh, with the aid of the approver and Smt Surjit Kaur.

The learned counsel appearing for the appellant raised two points before us. In the first place he submitted that the evidence of the approver Baldev Singh must be excluded from consideration because the provisions of Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not complied with inasmuch as the statement given by the approver on the basis of which he was granted pardon was a purely self-exculpatory statement and did not fall within the four corners of Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

On a perusal of the statement of Baldev Singh we are unable to agree with this contention. It is true that Baldev Singh did not say that he took any active part in the assault on the deceased, but his statement clearly shows that he was a privy to or an abetter in the commission of the offence. The Magistrate who granted the pardon to the approver was fully satisfied that the approver was going to make a full and complete disclosure which he undoubtedly did. In these circumstances, we do not think that the provisions of Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been violated in any way.

5. The second contention put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant was that there was no material corroboration of the statement of the approver and the High Court had convicted the appellant on the basis of the extra-judicial confession made by the two accused before some persons but that could not in law be regarded as any corroboration at all, because one tainted evidence cannot corroborate another tainted evidence.

The evidence furnished by the extra-judicial confession made by the accused to witnesses cannot be termed to be a tainted evidence and if corroboration is required it is only by way of abundant caution. If the Court believes the witnesses before whom the confession is made and it is satisfied that the confession was voluntary, then in such a case conviction can be founded on such evidence alone as was done in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. [AIR 1954 SC 322 : 1954 SCR 1098 : 1954 Cri LJ 910] where their Lordships of the Supreme Court rested the conviction of the accused on the extra-judicial confession made by him before two independent witnesses, namely, Gadkari and Perulakar.

In the instant case also, after perusing the evidence of PW 3 and PW 12 we are satisfied that they are independent witnesses before whom both the appellant and accused Surjit Kaur made confession of their guilt and this therefore forms a very important link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. In our opinion the argument proceeds on fundamentally wrong premises that the extra-judicial confession is tainted evidence.

Ranadhir Basu v. State of W.B., (2000) 3 SCC 161

7. It was contended by Mr Muralidhar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that Sudipa was not "examined as a witness" as contemplated by Section 306(4) CrPC. He submitted that Sudipa was examined by the Magistrate in his chamber and not in the open court and at that time the accused were not kept present. Her evidence was subjected to cross-examination. In support of his submission he relied upon the decision of this Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 60] . In that case this Court after pointing out the object and purpose of enacting Section 306(4) CrPC had held that since the provision had been made for the benefit of the accused it must be regarded as mandatory. It had observed therein that: (SCC p. 101, para 30)

"The object and purpose in enacting this mandatory provision is obviously intended to provide a safeguard to the accused inasmuch as the approver has to make a statement disclosing his evidence at the preliminary stage before the committal order is made and the accused not only becomes aware of the evidence against him but he is also afforded an opportunity to meet with the evidence of an approver before the committing court itself at the very threshold …."
(emphasis supplied)

From this observation it does not follow that the person who is granted pardon must be examined in the presence of the accused and that the accused has a right to appear and cross-examine him at that stage also. As pointed out by this Court in that case the object is to provide an opportunity to the accused to show to the Court that the approver's evidence at the trial is untrustworthy in view of the contradictions or improvements made by him during his evidence at the trial. Considering the object and purpose of examining the person accepting tender of pardon as a witness is thus limited.

The proceeding which takes place before the Magistrate at that stage is neither an inquiry nor a trial. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel that Sudipa should have been examined as a witness in open court and not in the chamber and that while she was examined the Magistrate should have kept the accused present and afforded to them an opportunity to cross-examine Sudipa cannot be accepted.

The phrase "examination of a witness" does not necessarily mean examination and cross-examination of that witness. What type of examination of a witness is contemplated would depend upon the object and purpose of that provision. Section 202 CrPC also contemplates examination of witness yet it has been held, considering the object and purpose of that provision, that the accused has no locus standi at that stage.

However, it is not necessary to deal with this contention any further as the facts of this case do not support the contention. The record of the Magistrate which was perused by both the courts below and which we have also scrutinised carefully discloses that on 24-2-1992 Sudipa and both the accused were produced before the Magistrate for recording her statement under Section 306 CrPC. On that day, the learned Magistrate, in the presence of the accused, passed an order for producing Sudipa on 4-11-1992 for examining her as a witness.

On 4-11-1992 both the accused were present in the chamber of the learned Magistrate and in their presence the statement of Sudipa was recorded under Section 306(4) till 5.00 p.m. and the police was directed to keep all of them present on 9-11-1992 for recording her further statement. On 9-11-1992 her further statement was recorded. Copies of the evidence of Sudipa were supplied to both the accused and that fact was ascertained by the learned Magistrate on 25-11-1992 when all of them were produced before him. The learned Magistrate had thereafter fixed 6-1-1993 as the date for cross-examination of Sudipa.

On that day, an application was given on behalf of the appellant for local inspection of the place of offence before cross-examining Sudipa. That application was granted and the accused were directed to be produced on 3-2-1993 for further cross-examination. The cross-examination of Sudipa was then for different reasons adjourned from time to time and the last date fixed for that purpose was 30-3-1993.

On that day the advocate of the appellant did not remain present. The appellant declined to cross-examine her. The lawyer representing Krishnanendu also declined to cross-examine her. Therefore, there is no justification in the grievance made by the learned counsel that Sudipa was examined by the Magistrate in the absence of the appellant and the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine her. For this reason it is also not possible to agree with the contention raised by him that the mandatory requirement of Section 306(4) was not complied with.

Dipesh Chandak v. Union of India, (2004) 8 SCC 511

a13. In our view, the High Court was not correct in concluding that until evidence has been given by the appellant the pardon could not operate. However, the fact remains that under Section 306 CrPC the pardon is granted in respect of the offence for which he had been charged as an accused. Of course, a pardon need not be only in respect of an offence under the Penal Code, 1860.

A person may be charged, in respect of the same transaction or act, under the Penal Code, 1860 and under some other Act e.g. the Prevention of Corruption Act. The pardon would operate in respect of all offences pertaining to that transaction. However, the pardon does not operate in respect of a transaction or act entirely unconnected with the offence in respect of which pardon has been granted. In this case, the pardon has been granted for the offence of misappropriation of funds.

This offence has nothing to do with filing of false returns by the appellant. The prosecution under Sections 277 and 278 is in respect of filing false return and making of false declaration. The pardon which has been granted would not cover those offences.

Sitaram Sao v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 12 SCC 630
19. Sections 133 and 114 Illustration (b) of the Evidence Act read as follows:

133. Accomplice:
An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

114. Court may presume existence of certain facts:
Illustrations

The Court may presume
(a)***accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars;"

20. "24. Section 133 of the Evidence Act is also of significance. It relates to the evidence of an accomplice. In positive terms it provides that the conviction based on the evidence of an accomplice is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, because the accomplice is a competent witness.

25. In Bhuboni Sahu v. R. [AIR 1949 PC 257] it was observed that the rule requiring corroboration for acting upon the evidence of an accomplice is a rule of prudence. But the rule of prudence assumes great significance when its reliability on the touchstone of credibility is examined. If it is found credible and cogent, the court can record a conviction even on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. On the subject of the credibility of the testimony of an accomplice, the proposition that an accomplice must be corroborated does not mean that there must be cumulative or independent testimony to the same facts to which he has testified. At the same time the presumption available under Section 114 [ Ill. (b)] of the Evidence Act is of significance. It says that the court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in 'material particulars'.

26. Section 133 of the Evidence Act expressly provides that an accomplice is a competent witness and the conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on an uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. In other words, this section renders admissible such uncorroborated testimony. But this section has to be read along with Section 114 Illustration (b). The latter section empowers the court to presume the existence of certain facts and the illustration elucidates what the court may presume and makes clear by means of examples as to what facts the court shall have regard to in considering whether or not maxims illustrated apply to a given case.

Illustration (b) in express terms says that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. The statute permits the conviction of an accused on the basis of uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice but the rule of prudence embodied in Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act strikes a note of warning cautioning the court that an accomplice does not generally deserve to be believed unless corroborated in material particulars. In other words, the rule is that the necessity of corroboration is a matter of prudence except when it is safe to dispense with such corroboration must be clearly present in the mind of the Judge. (See Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 60 : AIR 1994 SC 2420] .)

27. Although Section 114 Illustration (b) provides that the court may presume that the evidence of an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated, 'may' is not must and no decision of court can make it must. The court is not obliged to hold that he is unworthy of credit. It ultimately depends upon the court's view as to the credibility of evidence tendered by an accomplice.

28. In R. v. Baskerville [(1916) 2 KB 658 : (1916-17) All ER Rep 38 (CCA)] it was observed that the corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient if there is merely a circumstantial evidence of his connection with a crime.

29. G.S. Bakshi v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1978) 4 SCC 482 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 103 : AIR 1979 SC 569] was dealing with a converse case that if the evidence of an accomplice is inherently improbable then it cannot get strength from corroboration.

30. Taylor, in his treatise has observed that

'accomplices who are usually interested and always infamous witnesses, and whose testimony is admitted from necessity, it being often impossible, without having recourse to such evidence, to bring the principal offenders to justice'. [Taylor in A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (1931), Vol. 1, para 967.]

31. The evidence of the approver must, however, be shown to be that of a reliable witness.

32. In Jnanendra Nath Ghose v. State of W.B. [AIR 1959 SC 1199 : (1960) 1 SCR 126] this Court observed that there should be corroboration in material particulars of the approver's statement, as he is considered a self-confessed traitor. This Court in Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1963 SC 599] held that the combined effect of Sections 133 and 114 Illustration (b) of the Evidence Act was that an accomplice is competent to give evidence but it would be unsafe to convict the accused upon his testimony alone. Though the conviction of an accused on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be said to be illegal, yet the courts will, as a matter of practice, not accept the evidence of such a witness without corroboration in material particulars. In this regard the Court in Bhiva Doulu Patil case [AIR 1963 SC 599] observed (AIR pp. 600-01, para 6):

6. In coming to the above conclusion we have not been unmindful of the provisions of Section 133 of the Evidence Act which reads:
133. An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

33. It cannot be doubted that under that section a conviction based merely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may not be illegal, the courts nevertheless cannot lose sight of the rule of prudence and practice which in the words of Martin B. in R. v. Boyes [(1861-73) All ER Rep 172 : (1861) 9 Cox CC 32] , 'has become so hallowed as to be deserving of respect' and the words of Lord Abinger 'it deserves to have all the reverence of the law:'. This rule of guidance is to be found in Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act which is as follows:

'The Court may presume-

(a)***
(b) that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars;'

34. The word 'corroboration' means not mere evidence tending to confirm other evidence. In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Hester [1973 AC 296 : (1972) 3 WLR 910 : (1972) 3 All ER 1056 (HL)] Lord Morris said : (All ER p. 1065f)

'The purpose of corroboration is not to give validity or credence to evidence which is deficient or suspect or incredible but only to confirm and support that which as evidence is sufficient and satisfactory and credible; and corroborative evidence will only fill its role if it itself is completely credible….'

35. In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kilbourne [1973 AC 729 : (1973) 2 WLR 254 : (1973) 1 All ER 440 (HL)] it was observed thus : (All ER p. 456c-d)

'There is nothing technical in the idea of corroboration. When in the ordinary affairs of life one is doubtful whether or not to believe a particular statement one naturally looks to see whether it fits in with other statements or circumstances relating to the particular matter; the better it fits in the more one is inclined to believe it. The doubted statement is corroborated to a greater or lesser extent by the other statements or circumstances with which it fits in.'

36. In R. v. Baskerville [(1916) 2 KB 658 : (1916-17) All ER Rep 38 (CCA)] which is a leading case on this aspect, Lord Reading said : (All ER p. 41 D-F)

'There is no doubt that the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is admissible in law.… But it has long been a rule of practice at common law for the judge to warn the jury of the danger of convicting a prisoner on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or accomplices, and, in the discretion of the judge, to advise them not to convict upon such evidence; but the judge should point out to the jury that it is within their legal province to convict upon such unconfirmed evidence….

This rule of practice has become virtually equivalent to a rule of law, and since the Court of Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, came into operation this Court has held that, in the absence of such a warning by the judge, the conviction must be quashed…. If after the proper caution by the judge the jury nevertheless convict the prisoner, this Court will not quash the conviction merely upon the ground that the testimony of the accomplice was uncorroborated.'

37. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [1951 SCC 1213 : AIR 1952 SC 54] Bose, J., after referring to the rule laid down in Baskerville case [(1916) 2 KB 658 : (1916-17) All ER Rep 38 (CCA)] with regard to the admissibility of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, held thus : (AIR p. 57, para 18)

18. … That, in my opinion, is exactly the law in India so far as accomplices are concerned and it is certainly not any higher in the case of sexual offences. The only clarification necessary for purposes of this country is where this class of offence is sometimes tried by a judge without the aid of a jury. In these cases it is necessary that the judge should give some indication in his judgment that he has had this rule of caution in mind and should proceed to give reasons for considering it unnecessary to require corroboration on the facts of the particular case before him and show why he considers it safe to convict without corroboration in that particular case.

Justice Bose in the same judgment further observed thus : (AIR p. 57, para 20)

20. I turn next to the nature and extent of the corroboration required when it is not considered safe to dispense with it. Here, again, the rules are lucidly expounded by Lord Reading in Baskerville case [(1916) 2 KB 658 : (1916-17) All ER Rep 38 (CCA)] at pp. 664-69. It would be impossible, indeed it would be dangerous, to formulate the kind of evidence which should, or would, be regarded as corroboration. Its nature and extent must necessarily vary with the circumstances of each case and also according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged. But to this extent the rules are clear.

38. First, it is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every material circumstance in the sense that the independent evidence in the case, apart from the testimony of the complainant or the accomplice, should in itself be sufficient to sustain conviction. As Lord Reading says:

'Indeed, if it were required that the accomplice should be confirmed in every detail of the crime, his evidence would not be essential to the case; it would be merely confirmatory of other and independent testimony.' (Baskerville case [(1916) 2 KB 658 : (1916-17) All ER Rep 38 (CCA)] , All ER p. 42 B-C)

39. All that is required is that there must be some additional evidence rendering it probable that the story of the accomplice (or complainant) is true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it.

40. Secondly, the independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that the crime was committed but must in some way reasonably connect or tend to connect the accused with it by confirming in some material particular the testimony of the accomplice or complainant that the accused committed the crime. This does not mean that the corroboration as to identification must extend to all the circumstances necessary to identify the accused with the offence. Again, all that is necessary is that there should be independent evidence which will make it reasonably safe to believe the witness's story that the accused was the one, or among those, who committed the offence. The reason for this part of the rule is that:

'A man who has been guilty of a crime himself will always be able to relate the facts of the case, and if the confirmation be only on the truth of that history, without identifying the persons, that is really no corroboration at all…. It would not at all tend to show that the party accused participated in it.'

41. Thirdly, the corroboration must come from independent sources and thus ordinarily the testimony of one accomplice would not be sufficient to corroborate that of another. But of course the circumstances may be such as to make it safe to dispense with the necessity of corroboration and in those special circumstances a conviction so based would not be illegal. I say this because it was contended that the mother in this case was not an independent source.

42. Fourthly, the corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime. Were it otherwise, 'many crimes which are usually committed between accomplices in secret, such as incest, offences with females' (or unnatural offences) 'could never be brought to justice'. (See M.O. Shamsudhin v. State of Kerala [(1995) 3 SCC 351 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 509] .)"

The above position was highlighted in K. Hashim v. State of T.N. [(2005) 1 SCC 237 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 292] , SCC pp. 246-51, paras 24-42.

State (Delhi Admn.) v. Jagjit Singh, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 770
11. It has been urged with great vehemence that the appellant, Jagjit Singh was granted pardon with regard to case FIR No. 238 of 1985 whereas his name appears as an accused in the other four cases which have been directed to be tried along with above case wherein the facts are almost similar.

The appellant-approver in such circumstances should not be examined by the prosecution as a witness inasmuch as his evidence may be used in the other criminal cases wherein he figures as an accused. This is against the protection given by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. It has, therefore, been submitted that the order dated 27-4-1987 passed in Revision Petition No. 221 of 1986 directing the State not to examine the approver as a witness should not be set aside.

This contention is also not tenable inasmuch as once an accused is granted pardon under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he ceases to be an accused and becomes a witness for the prosecution. The only condition imposed by the provisions of the Act is that the approver must make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. So long as the prosecution does not certify that he has failed to do so he continues to be a witness and the prosecution is under an obligation to examine him as a witness both in the Committing Court as well as in the trial court. This has been made very clear by this Court in the case of A.J. Peiris v. State of Madras [AIR 1954 SC 616, 620 : 1954 Cri LJ 1638] wherein it has been observed that:

"We think that the moment the pardon was tendered to the accused he must be presumed to have been discharged whereupon he ceased to be an accused and became a witness."

13. Therefore, a witness is legally bound to answer any question which is relevant to the matter in issue even if the answer to such question is likely to criminate him directly or indirectly. Proviso to Section 132 expressly provides that such answer which a witness is compelled to give shall not subject him to any arrest or prosecution nor the same can be proved against him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer.

The provisions of proviso to Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act clearly protect a witness from being prosecuted on the basis of the answers given by him in a criminal proceeding which tend to criminate him directly or indirectly. In view of this provision, the apprehension of the respondent that his evidence as approver will be used against him in the other four criminal cases where he figures as an accused is without any basis. On the other hand, he is absolutely protected from criminal prosecution on the basis of the evidence to be given by him when examined by the prosecution as an approver in the said case. This submission of the respondent is, therefore, not tenable.

It is pertinent to refer in this connection the decision of this Court in Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1968 SC 938 : (1968) 2 SCR 624 : 1968 Cri LJ 1124] wherein it has been observed by Hidayatullah, J. as he then was that:

"Under Section 132 a witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any criminal proceeding (among others) upon the ground that the answer to such question will incriminate or may tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind. The safeguard to this compulsion is that no such answer which the witness is compelled to give exposes him to any arrest or prosecution or can it be proved against him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer."

Venkatesha v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 12 SCC 99
16. Section 133 of the Evidence Act makes an accomplice a competent witness against the accused person and declares that a conviction shall not be illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Even so, the established rule of practice evolved on the basis of human experience since times immemorial, is that it is unsafe to record a conviction on the testimony of an approver unless the same is corroborated in material particulars by some untainted and credible evidence. So consistent has been the commitment of the courts to that rule of practice, that the same is now treated as a rule of law. The courts, therefore, not only approach the evidence of an approver with caution, but insist on corroboration of his version before resting a verdict of guilt against the accused, on the basis of such a deposition.

The juristic basis for that requirement is the fact that the approver is by his own admission a criminal, which by itself makes him unworthy of an implicit reliance by the court, unless it is satisfied about the truthfulness of his story by evidence that is independent and supportive of the version given by him. That the approver's testimony needs corroboration cannot, therefore, be doubted as a proposition of law. The question is whether any such corroboration is forthcoming from the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the present case.

Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457

30. Learned defence counsel has then contended that conviction based upon the uncorroborated testimony of the approver is neither safe nor proper particularly in a case where extreme penalty of death is awarded. Section 133 of the Evidence Act provides that an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person and the conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice.

No distinction is made between an accomplice who is or is not an approver. As both have been treated alike, the rule of corroboration applies to both. Accomplice's evidence is taken on record as a matter of necessity in cases where it is impossible to get sufficient evidence of a heinous crime unless one of the participators in the crime is disposed to disclose the circumstances within his knowledge on account of tender of pardon.

31. Taylor, in his treatise has observed that
"accomplices who are usually interested, and always infamous witnesses, and whose testimony is admitted from necessity, it being often impossible, without having recourse to such evidence, to bring the principal offenders to justice".

[Taylor in A Treatise on the Law of Evidence - (1931), Vol. 1, para 967.]

32. This Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 60 : (1994) 2 Crimes 1027] observed that: (SCC p. 106, para 42)

"Since many a times the crime is committed in a manner for which no clue or any trace is available for its detection and, therefore, pardon is granted for apprehension of the other offenders for the recovery of the incriminating objects and the production of the evidence which otherwise is unobtainable. The dominant object is that the offenders of the heinous and grave offences do not go unpunished, the legislature in its wisdom considered it necessary to introduce this section and confine its operation to cases mentioned in Section 306 of the Code.

The object of Section 306 therefore is to allow pardon in cases where heinous offence is alleged to have been committed by several persons so that with the aid of the evidence of the person granted pardon the offence may be brought home to the rest. The basis of the tender of pardon is not the extent of the culpability of the person to whom pardon is granted, but the principle is to prevent the escape of the offenders from punishment in heinous offences for lack of evidence.

There can therefore be no objection against tender of pardon to an accomplice simply because in his confession, he does not implicate himself to the same extent as the other accused because all that Section 306 requires is that pardon may be tendered to any person believed to be involved directly or indirectly in or privy to an offence."

33. The evidence of the approver must, however, be shown to be of a reliable witness.

34. In Jnanendra Nath Ghose v. State of W.B. [AIR 1959 SC 1199 : (1960) 1 SCR 126 : 1959 Cri LJ 1492] this Court observed that there should be corroboration in material particulars of the approver's statement, as he is considered as a self-confessed traitor.

35. This Court in Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1963 SC 599 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 489] held that the combined effect of Sections 133 and 114, Illustration (b) of the Evidence Act was that an accomplice is competent to give evidence but it would be unsafe to convict the accused upon his testimony alone. Though the conviction of an accused on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be said to be illegal, yet the courts will, as a matter of practice, not accept the evidence of such a witness without corroboration in material particulars. In this regard the Court in Bhiva Doulu Patil case [AIR 1963 SC 599 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 489] observed:

"In coming to the above conclusion we have not been unmindful of the provisions of Section 133 of the Evidence Act which reads:

'133. An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.'

It cannot be doubted that under that section a conviction based merely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may not be illegal, the courts nevertheless cannot lose sight of the rule of prudence and practice which in the words of Martin B. in R. v. Boyes [(1861) 9 Cox CC 32 : 30 LJQB 301 : 5 LT 147] 'has become so hallowed as to be deserving of respect' and the words of Lord Abinger 'it deserves to have all the reverence of the law'. This rule of guidance is to be found in Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act which is as follows:

'The court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars.'

Both sections are part of one subject and have to be considered together. The Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R. [(1948-49) 76 IA 147 : AIR 1949 PC 257 : 50 Cri LJ 872] when its attention was drawn to the judgment of Madras High Court in B.K. Rajagopal, In re [ILR 1944 Mad 308 : AIR 1944 Mad 117 : 45 Cri LJ 373 (FB)] where conviction was based upon the evidence of an accomplice supported by the statement of a co-accused, said as follows:

'Their Lordships … would nevertheless observe that courts should be slow to depart from the rule of prudence, based on long experience, which requires some independent evidence implicating the particular accused. The danger of acting upon accomplice evidence is not merely that the accomplice is on his own admission a man of bad character who took part in the offence and afterwards to save himself betrayed his former associates, and who has placed himself in a position in which he can hardly fail to have a strong bias in favour of the prosecution; the real danger is that he is telling a story which in its general outline is true, and it is easy for him to work into the story-matter which is untrue.'

The combined effect of Sections 133 and 114, Illustration (b) may be stated as follows:
According to the former, which is a rule of law, an accomplice is competent to give evidence and according to the latter which is a rule of practice it is almost always unsafe to convict upon his testimony alone. Therefore though the conviction of an accused on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be said to be illegal yet the courts will, as a matter of practice, not accept the evidence of such a witness without corroboration in material particulars. The law may be stated in the words of Lord Reading, C.J. in R. v. Baskerville [(1916) 2 KB 658 : 86 LJKB 28 : 115 LT 453] as follows:

'There is no doubt that the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is admissible in law (R. v. James Atwood [(1787) 1 Leach 464 : 168 ER 334] ). But it has been long a rule of practice at common law for the Judge to warn the jury of the danger of convicting a prisoner on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, and in the discretion of the Judge, to advise them not to convict upon such evidence, but the Judge should point out to the jury that it is within their legal province to convict upon such unconfirmed evidence (R. v. Stubbs [1855 Dears CC 555 : 25 LJMC 16 : 169 ER 843] ; Meunier, In re [(1894) 2 QB 415 : 63 LJMC 198 : 71 LT 403] ).' "

36. Again in Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 3 SCC 68 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 421] this Court declared: (SCC pp. 74-76, paras 21-25)

21. There is no antithesis between Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, because the illustration only says that the court 'may' presume a certain state of affairs. It does not seek to raise a conclusive and irrefutable presumption. Reading the two together the position which emerges is that though an accomplice is a competent witness and though a conviction may lawfully rest upon his uncorroborated testimony, yet the court is entitled to presume and may indeed be justified in presuming in the generality of cases that no reliance can be placed on the evidence of an accomplice unless that evidence is corroborated in material particulars, by which is meant that there has to be some independent evidence tending to incriminate the particular accused in the commission of the crime.

It is hazardous, as a matter of prudence, to proceed upon the evidence of a self-confessed criminal, who, insofar as an approver is concerned, has to testify in terms of the pardon tendered to him. The risk involved in convicting an accused on the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated in material particulars, is so real and potent that what during the early development of law was felt to be a matter of prudence has been elevated by judicial experience into a requirement or rule of law.

All the same, it is necessary to understand that what has hardened into a rule of law is not that the conviction is illegal if it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice but that the rule of corroboration must be present to the mind of the Judge and that corroboration may be dispensed with only if the peculiar circumstances of a case make it safe to dispense with it.

22. In R. v. Baskerville [(1916) 2 KB 658 : 86 LJKB 28 : 115 LT 453] the accused was convicted for committing gross acts of indecency with two boys who were treated as accomplices since they were freely consenting parties. Dealing with their evidence Lord Reading, the Lord Chief Justice of England, observed that though there was no doubt that the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice was admissible in law it was for a long time a rule of practice at common law for the Judge to warn the jury of the danger of convicting a person on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Therefore, though the Judge was entitled to point out to the jury that it was within their legal province to convict upon the unconfirmed evidence of an accomplice, the rule of practice had become virtually equivalent to a rule of law and therefore in the absence of a proper warning by the Judge the conviction could not be permitted to stand. If after being properly cautioned by the Judge the jury nevertheless convicted the prisoner, the court would not quash the conviction merely upon the ground that the accomplice's testimony was uncorroborated.

23. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [1951 SCC 1213 : AIR 1952 SC 54 : 1952 Cri LJ 547 : 1952 SCR 377] this Court observed that the branch of law relating to accomplice evidence was the same in India as in England and that it was difficult to better the lucid exposition of it given in Baskerville case [(1916) 2 KB 658 : 86 LJKB 28 : 115 LT 453] by the Lord Chief Justice of England. The only clarification made by this Court was that in cases tried by a Judge without the aid of a jury it was necessary that the Judge should give some indication in his judgment that he had this rule of caution in mind and should proceed to give reasons for considering it unnecessary to require corroboration on the facts of the particular case before him and show why he considered it safe to convict without corroboration in the particular case.

24. In Bhuboni Sahu v. R. [(1948-49) 76 IA 147 : AIR 1949 PC 257 : 50 Cri LJ 872] the Privy Council after noticing Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act observed that whilst it is not illegal to act on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, it is a rule of prudence so universally followed as to amount almost to a rule of law that it is unsafe to act on the evidence of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material respects so as to implicate the accused; and further that the evidence of one accomplice cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of another accomplice.

The rule of prudence was based on the interpretation of the phrase 'corroborated in material particulars' in Illustration (b). Delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, Sir John Beaumont observed that the danger of acting on accomplice evidence is not merely that the accomplice is on his own admission a man of bad character who took part in the offence and afterwards to save himself betrayed his former associates, and who has placed himself in a position in which he can hardly fail to have a strong bias in favour of the prosecution; the real danger is that he is telling a story which in its general outline is true, and it is easy for him to work into the story-matter which is untrue.

He may implicate ten people in an offence and the story may be true in all its details as to eight of them but untrue as to the other two whose names may have been introduced because they are enemies of the approver. The only real safeguard therefore against the risk condemning the innocent with the guilty lies in insisting on independent evidence which in some measure implicates each accused.

25. This Court has in a series of cases expressed the same view as regards accomplice evidence. (See State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh [AIR 1958 SC 500 : 1958 Cri LJ 976 : 1959 SCR 195] ; Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344 : (1964) 6 SCR 623] ; Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1968 SC 832 : 1968 Cri LJ 1017 : (1968) 2 SCR 641] and Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana [(1975) 3 SCC 742 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 202 : (1975) 3 SCR 453] . In Haricharan [AIR 1964 SC 1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344 : (1964) 6 SCR 623] Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for a five-Judge Bench observed that the testimony of an accomplice is evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act and has to be dealt with as such. The evidence is of a tainted character and as such is very weak; but, nevertheless, it is evidence and may be acted upon, subject to the requirement which has now become virtually a part of the law that it is corroborated in material particulars."

To the same effect is the judgment in Balwant Kaur v. Union Territory of Chandigarh [(1988) 1 SCC 1 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 1] .

37. For corroborative evidence the court must look at the broad spectrum of the approver's version and then find out whether there is other evidence to corroborate and lend assurance to that version. The nature and extent of such corroboration may depend upon the facts of different cases. Corroboration need not be in the form of ocular testimony of witnesses and may even be in the form of circumstantial evidence. Corroborative evidence must be independent and not vague or unreliable.

Relying upon its earlier judgment in Suresh Chandra Bahri case [1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 60 : (1994) 2 Crimes 1027] this Court in Niranjan Singh v. State of Punjab [(1996) 9 SCC 98 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 939 : JT (1996) 5 SC 582] held that once the evidence of the approver is held to be trustworthy, it must be shown that the story given by approver so far as an accused is concerned, must implicate him in such a manner as to give rise to a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Insistence upon corroboration is based on the rule of caution and not merely a rule of law.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this research article provided a comprehensive legal overview of the use of approvers in prosecutions. The article began by defining an approver as an individual who agrees to testify against their co-accused in exchange for a pardon or a reduced sentence. It highlighted the benefits of being an approver, such as the potential for immunity from prosecution and the opportunity to cooperate with law enforcement to ensure justice is served.

Furthermore, the article discussed the advantages of utilizing an approver in prosecutions. It emphasized how approvers can provide crucial insider information, aiding in the investigation and prosecution of complex criminal cases. Their testimonies can serve as valuable evidence, leading to the conviction of other perpetrators and dismantling criminal networks.

However, the article also addressed the disadvantages of being an approver. It highlighted the risks faced by approvers, such as potential threats to their safety and reputation, as well as the psychological burden of living with the consequences of their past actions. Despite these challenges, the article emphasized that the use of approvers remains an important tool in the pursuit of justice. Moreover, the research article also examined the disadvantages of using approvers in prosecutions.

One significant drawback highlighted was the credibility and reliability of the information provided by the approvers. Since these individuals are seeking leniency or immunity, there is a possibility that they may exaggerate or fabricate facts to strengthen their case for cooperation. This presents a challenge for prosecutors and courts to carefully evaluate and corroborate the evidence provided by the approvers.

Throughout the article, relevant paragraphs of information were provided within the Indian legal context. It discussed specific provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and relevant case laws to illustrate the legal framework surrounding the use of approvers in India. By examining these provisions and cases, the article presented a comprehensive understanding of how the Indian legal system approaches the concept of approvers.

To end, this research article shed light on the various legal precedents dealing with the concept of approvers. It showcased how courts have interpreted and applied the law concerning approvers, including the conditions for granting pardons, the role of approvers in trials, and the standards for accepting their testimony as evidence. By examining these precedents, the article provided a nuanced perspective on the legal landscape surrounding the use of approvers in prosecutions.