This research paper deals with the judgement given in the case of Dominion of India & Ors. V/S. Shrinbai A. Irani & Ors and how rules of interpretation were applied to the judgement by Justice Bhagwati. Interpretation is the process of determining the real and correct intention of the law-making bodies as expressed in statutes.

Because judges administer justice in line with the requirements of the law, some norms of interpretation are required to ensure that they give just and uniform verdicts. The most significant goal attained by statute interpretation is that it assures that the court acts in accordance with the legislature's intent. The judges' principal responsibility is to interpret the law. A government has three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.

The legislative creates the laws, but the judiciary is responsible for putting them into effect. Judges are required to determine the accurate interpretation of the law enacted by the legislature. The courts are expected to avoid acting arbitrarily and, as a result, to adhere to the principles of interpretation. We will discuss how in this particular case judiciary has interpreted the law and applied the guiding principles of interpretation.

Critical Analysis Of Shrinbai A. Irani Case

Facts of the case
The First Respondent was the owner of three stores on the bottom floor of the 'Irani Manzil' building. This property was requisitioned by the Collector of Bombay by an Order issued under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules, as well as Government Notification No. 1336/OR/1/42. The building was formerly known as Government Grain Shop No. 176.

1. 30.07.1946/17.08.1946: The Controller of Government Grain Shops, Bombay, wrote to the First Respondent, requesting permission to remain her tenant after the requisition expired on 30.09.1946.
2. On the 27th of August, 1946, the First Respondent offered them tenancy on particular terms, which were refused by the department, but they continued to occupy the premises after the 30th of September, 1946.
3. On August 29, 1947, the First Respondent submitted a letter to the collector, requesting that he evacuate the property within two months, believing that the department was considering transferring control of the property to a private entity without consulting her.
4. The Controller notified the First Respondent that possession of the premises was being transferred to the Second Respondent on October 1, 1947.
5. On January 15, 1948, the Collector informed the First Respondent that the requisition would be continued until September 30, 1946, preventing her from being awarded unoccupied possession.
6. The Department cited the need for vital supplies as the justification for subletting the shops to Second Respondent and for keeping the request open past the deadline.[1]
   Procedural History:
   
   1. Trial Court: Found in favour of the First Respondent, holding that under Clause 3 of the 1946 Ordinance, the property would not be subject to requisition after September 30, 1946. The Order of Requisition was created for a specific purpose, according to the Court, and it ceased to be effective once that purpose was met.
   2. Court of Appeal: On Clause 3 of the 1946 Ordinance, the Court of Appeal agreed with the Trial Court.

Issues of the case:
Following were the issues in front of court:

1. Did Clause 3 of the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Ordinance, 1946, allow the Government Grain Shop to be requisitioned after September 30, 1946?
2. Could the non-obstante clause in Clause 3 of the Ordinance be interpreted to mean that only those requisitioning orders that were about to expire due to the expiration of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and its rules, and not those that were about to expire due to a flaw in the orders themselves, were to be continued?

Analysis and Ratio by the Court:

1. Due to the expiration of the Defence of India Act, 1939, all requisition orders issued under its Section 75A would have expired on September 30, 1946, releasing all requisitioned immovable properties[2].
    
2. The Ordinance was passed to keep these requisitions going.
    
3. Lower Courts Accept the Wrong Argument:
   The non-obstante clause bolstered the case that Clause 3 of the Ordinance will continue to operate just those Orders that would have expired if the Act and Rules had expired. Orders that were going to expire due to their own intrinsic weakness (i.e., Orders that contained an expiry date and not solely owing to the Act's expiration) would not be continued.[3]
    
4. The non-obstante clause was viewed as an exception to the operative section in the preceding argument. The following are some of the points raised in the judgement about the non-obstante clause: The non-obstante clause and the operative part of the section should, in most cases, be closely linked; nevertheless, they do not have to be coextensive.
   
   1. If the operative part of the enactment's language is unambiguous and can be explained in only one way, the non-obstante clause cannot be used to limit its scope.
   2. In this scenario, it's safe to presume that the non-obstante phrase is meant to clarify the entire section. The legislature must have included it in the provision with great care, not only to limit the scope.[4]
       
5. The Court stated that Clause 3 of the Ordinance, when read in conjunction with Clause 2(3) of the Ordinance (definition of requisitioned property), gave it a very clear interpretation, and that it chose not to infer the legislature's objective in drafting the Ordinance.[5]
    
6. The Supreme Court ruled that the provision must be understood literally and that its plain and grammatical sense must be supplied. It must be understood in light of the Ordinance's preamble. It was decided that it made no difference whether the requisition Orders ended because of the expiration of the Defence of India Act (1939) and its restrictions or because of their own intrinsic inadequacy. Due to the Ordinance's implementation, both of these properties were to remain requisitioned.[6]
    
7. Justice Bhagwati went on to say that courts are powerless to adjudicate individual cases on their merits. Any person who is dissatisfied with the requisition's continuation may file a complaint with the competent government, which may then release the property[7].

Application Of Rules Of Interpretation
Literal Rule:
This rule of interpretation must be understood literally and grammatically, according to this criterion. If the meaning of an enactment is clear and unambiguous, it must be accorded its natural meaning[19]. Clause 3 of the Ordinance's language could only have one meaning based on its plain and grammatical reading, which would result in the continuation of all requisition Orders, despite their inherent instability.

In Municipal Board V/s. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan[8], the Supreme Court declared that it is the Court's responsibility to read the law as it stands and to give a provision its clear and grammatical sense, despite unpleasant implications. This rule mandates that courts interpret a technical term strictly and not leniently.

According to the Court, it was not their job to figure out what the legislature was thinking when they passed the law. They were unaware, however, that by interpreting the law literally, they had deduced the legislature's goal, which was to maintain as much immovable property under requisition as possible. The rigorous application of the rule resulted in a harsh result, namely that the First Respondent was denied possession of her immovable property.

Non-Obstante Clause:
The purpose of including a non-obstante clause at the start of a provision is to allow the operative part of the provision to take precedence over the Act or statute stated in the non-obstante clause in the event of a conflict[9]. The Supreme Court in Bhandarkar Sita Ratna Rao V/s. Ashalata S. Guram[10], while discussing the purpose of the non-obstante clause, stated that despite the existence of the legislation indicated in the non-obstante clause, the operative section of the provision will have full force.

It could also imply that the statute specified in the non-obstante clause will not obstruct the functioning of the following main provision. In the non-obstante clause, mentioning the Defence of India Act, 1939, would thereunder, as well as the government's requisition orders issued in accordance with the guidelines. It had the effect of continuing the requisition of all properties under the jurisdiction of the government, regardless of any inherent flaws in them.

The lower court's reading of the non-obstante clause was wrong because it attempted to give the language a different meaning. A non-obstante clause could never carve out an exception for Clause 3 to rescue those immovable properties whose requisition was coming to an end due to a flaw in the Order itself.

Construction ex visceribus actus:
When interpreting a statute's provision, one of the rules of interpretation is to keep in mind the entire context and intent of enactment, which is elaborated in the preamble[11]. This is especially true when the Section's interpretation is unclear. The preamble of the Ordinance stated specifically that it was promulgated for the continuation of certain powers granted to the Government by the Defence of India Act, 1939 in relation to requisitioned land.

Furthermore, the Court looked to the Ordinance's preamble[12]and read Clause 3 in light of the aim stated there. As a result, the main goal of the Act and the clause was to keep requisitioning properties that were already under government control going. Finally, the Court decided that anyone who was harmed by the continued requisition of lands should seek reparation from the proper governments. Clause 4 of the Ordinance specifies this.

The Court did not say that the interpretation of Clause 3 of the Ordinance was unclear, but the arguments accepted by the lower courts clearly showed that they had misread the non-obstante clause, rendering its meaning ambiguous. . Thus, the Court resorted to three of the five clauses in the judgement and read them in light of the intention and context stated in the Ordinance's preamble. The Clause was interpreted in the context of the entire Act.

Application of Golden Rule of interpretation
Using the Golden Rule, the Court could have given the provision a more liberal interpretation. They may have concurred with the lower courts' decision by expanding the interpretation of the non-obstante clause. When applying the provisions literally would lead to an illogical or unfair outcome, the golden rule is often applied. However, this decision must be viewed in the context of the political climate of 1946, which included the end of World War II and the Indian Independence Movement, which was about to bear fruit.

The government needed to preserve as much immovable property (such as the Government Grain Shop in this example) as possible to stockpile such necessities. As a result, the Court interpreted the term literally, allowing them to have the greatest quantity of storage space under their requisition.

Conclusion:
The Trial Court and the Court of Appeal interpreted the provision incorrectly. By virtue of Cause 3 of the Ordinance, the phrase was given legal significance, stating that all properties under requisition by the government will remain under requisition. The non-obstante provision prevents a distinction being formed between Orders that expire due to the Act's conclusion and Orders that expire due to their inherent defect.

The non-obstante clause was added solely to give the Ordinance precedence over the application of the Defence of India Act, 1939.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals so that it could address the other issues raised by the Court of Appeals. It's all about figuring out the genuine meaning of any given set of words, which is the meaning the author wanted to express, and allowing others to extract the same meaning from them.

In "Dominion of India & Others" the Apex Court declared in V Shrinbai A.Irani & others.1954 AIR 596,1955 SCR 205, that the provision was to be taken literally and must be accorded its plain and grammatical interpretation. It must be understood in light of the Ordinance's preamble. It was decided that it made no difference whether the requisition Orders ended because of the expiration of the Defence of India Act (1939) and its restrictions or because of their own intrinsic inadequacy. Due to the Ordinance's implementation, both of these properties were to remain requisitioned.

Bibliography
Books

1. Blacks law dictionary,17th edition.
2. Principles of Statutory Interpretation,14th edition
3. The Constitution of India, 1950

Websites:

1. http://manupatra.com/roundup/338/Articles/Literally%20interpreting%20the%20Law.pdf
2. https://www.latestlaws.com/articles/interpretation-of-statutes-case-study-dominion-of-india-ors-v-shrinbai-a-irani-ors
3. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-1730-the-literal-rule-of-interpretation-of-statute.html

End-Notes:

1. The Dominion of India & Ors. V/s. Shrinbai A. Irani & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 596
2. The Dominion of India & Ors. V/s. Shrinbai A. Irani & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 596, Para 9
3. The Dominion of India & Ors. V/s. Shrinbai A. Irani & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 596, Para 9 & 10
4. The Dominion of India & Ors. V/s. Shrinbai A. Irani & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 596, Para 10
5. Ibid, Para 11
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
8. Municipal Board V/s. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan, (1963) SCR (2) 273
9. Great Western Railway. Co. v/s. SwÑ–ndon & Cheltenham ExtensÑ–on Rly. Co., (1884) 9 AC 787
10. Chandavarker SÑ–ta Ratna Rao v/s. Ashalata S. Guram, AIR 1987 SC 117
11. Poppatlal Shah V/s. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274
12. The Dominion of India & Ors. V/s. Shrinbai A. Irani & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 596, Para 9 and 10

Written By: Shanuja Thakur