The inception of the concept of domicile is circled with several misconceptions. Sometimes the term is confused either with nationality or with residence. The general view about domicile is 'permanent home' but Lord Cranworth in Whicker v Hume[1] .The concept of domicile in common law is derived from the Roman law. The term domicilium is derived from domum colere, to foster or inhabit the home. There are three different classes of domicile namely, Domicile of Origin, Domicile of Choice, and Domicile of Dependence. The rules of domicile of origin quite satisfactory reflect the social factors. One acquires it at the time of his birth and because of its strong tenacity it is hard to lose and it automatically revives once domicile of choice is extinguished. It has proven to be more tenacious in a way that even if a person leaves his country of origin with an intention never to return back, his domicile of origin survives until he has acquired a domicile of choice. Corporations are the entities endowed with legal personality under municipal law, may be likened to physical persons and, on this basis, regarded as nationals of a particular State. The place of incorporation is regarded as the domicile of the corporation. Ships are governed by the law of Flag.

Since the origin of the concept of domicile, there have been several misconceptions attached to it. Sometimes the term is confused either with nationality or with residence. The general view about domicile is 'permanent home' but Lord Cranworth in Whicker v Hume[2] has defined domicile as-

"By 'domicile' we mean home, the permanent home, and if you do not understand your permanent home, I am afraid that no illustration drawn from foreign writers or foreign languages will very much help you to it. I think the best I have heard is one which describes the home as the place 'unde non sit discessurus si nihal avocet; unde cum profectus est, peregrinari videtur.' I think that it is the best illustration, and I use that word rather than definition, to describe what I mean."

A person is said to have domicile in the country where he resides permanently without any intention of relocating anywhere else. On the other hand, a person does not cease to have his domicile in a country merely due to the reason of temporary abode elsewhere.

The traditional concept of domicile, however, has received criticism from reform agencies in England as well as in other countries which follow the English common law. This is mainly due to two grounds, which were also pointed out in 1954 (First Report of the Private International Law Committee) as follows-

· The contention relates to the revival of domicile of origin when domicile of choice is abandoned without obtaining a new domicile of choice, and the fact that there is heavy burden of proof on the person who asserts the change in the domicile of origin which seems to be irrational and unjustified.

· The difficulty attached in proving the intention required to acquire a domicile of choice.

The concept of Domicile is crucial since it is the connecting factor traditionally used in common law systems. There is no uniform concept of domicile and so interpretation of its meaning is largely left open to the lex fori.

1.1) Background of Law of Domicile:
Roman law is considered to be the mother of the concept of domicile in common law. The term domicilium is derived from domum colere, to foster or inhabit the home. Domicile is not any place of residence but a place of habitual residence. In the ancient times, the ordinary man's Diocese had authority over him in the Consistory Court in England and a man's domicile in a Diocese was established by his habitual residence. The Bishop of the Diocese of the domicile had ecclesiastical jurisdiction and in England this included probate and matrimonial jurisdiction even before the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 and the Court of Probate Act, 1857. English statutes dealing with marriage characterise the place where a man dwells, of his dwelling place; and domicilium is a habitation or a dwelling.

1.2) Importance of Domicile:
· Domicile acts as a connecting factor for various legal systems.

· Domicile can be used as a jurisdictional link which is a pre-requisite for assumption of jurisdiction by the forum or for recognition and assumption of a foreign court's jurisdiction.

· Domicile determines an individual's right to vote, his right to hold public office, his entitlement to support in respect of various needs such as ill-health or unemployment and his liability to various forms of taxation.

· There is no person without a domicile because it is necessary to connect a person with some legal system to regulate his legal relationships.

1.3) Principles Governing the Law of Domicile:
There are five fundamental principles which govern the law of domicile, these are as follows-

1) Nobody shall be without a domicile- By operation of law; a domicile of origin is assigned to every person at the time of his birth, i.e. to a legitimate child, the domicile of the father is assigned, to an illegitimate child the domicile of the mother is assigned, and to a foundling the domicile of place where he is found or discovered, provided nothing is contrary to it is present. This domicile of origin continues until a new domicile i.e. domicile of choice is acquired by the person.

2) A person cannot have two domiciles simultaneously.

3) Domicile connects a person with a single system of territorial law but it does not necessarily signify a system that prescribes the same principles for all the classes of persons, like in India versatile rules apply to varied categories of population according to their religion, race or caste.

4) There is a presumption in favour of the continuance of an existing domicile.

5) Under English Common Law System, Domicile of a person is to be determined according to the English concept of domicile and not in accordance with the foreign concept of domicile, subject to certain statutory exceptions.

2) Kinds of Domicile:
There are three different classes of domicile namely-
· Domicile of Origin,
· Domicile of Choice, and
· Domicile of Dependence

2.1) Domicile of Origin:
By operation of law, every person acquires a domicile of origin at birth which can never be extinguished. Even if a person obtains a new domicile via choice or by dependence, the domicile of origin is never completely lost; it merely lies dormant in the background and revives itself if gaps in acquiring and losing domicile emerge.

The law of domicile has developed predominantly through common law rules. In English law, domicile of origin was ascribed according to the status of a child as legitimate or illegitimate in the following way-
· A legitimate child takes the fathers domicile at birth to be its domicile of origin, and
· An illegitimate (or posthumous) child takes the mothers domicile.

2.1.1) Development- Domicile of Origin:
The Domicile of origin is a domicile which is ascribed to a person when he/she is born. Lord Westbury remarked in the leading case of Udny v Udny[3], "That no man shall be without a domicile, and to secure this result the law attributes to every individual as soon as he is born the domicile of his father, if the child be legitimate, and the domicile of the mother if illegitimate."

Even if a child is born posthumously or if an illegitimate child is later legitimated, in both the scenarios, the domicile of origin will remain the same as that of the mother. An adopted child probably acquires the domicile of origin of the adoptive parents as such a child is treated as if born in lawful wedlock. The domicile of origin is conferred on the basis of origin. There are exceptional cases like Re McKenzie[4], where domicile of origin of a child is determined on the basis of the place where he was found and not on the basis of his parents' domicile.

The children under 16 and mentally disable person acquire a domicile of dependence which changes with the change of their guardian. In later life, the child can acquire a domicile of choice after becoming independent and can also abandon it without acquiring a new one. At that stage the domicile of origin will revive.

A person who has never even visited a particular country can have the domicile of origin of that place. In Grant v Grant[5] a child was born in India but his domicile of origin was held to be English following his father's domicile of origin. It illustrates that domicile of origin is the hardest to lose among all the three types of domiciles.

2.1.2) Tenacity and Revival of Domicile of Origin under English Law:
The rules of domicile of origin quite satisfactory reflect the social factors. One acquires it at the time of his birth and because of its strong tenacity it is hard to lose and it automatically revives once domicile of choice is extinguished. It has proven to be more tenacious in a way that even if a person leaves his country of origin with an intention never to return back, his domicile of origin survives until he has acquired a domicile of choice.

Case Law:
The English courts have stressed on the tenacious character of domicile of origin since centuries which can be seen in plethora of cases laws-

· In Bell v Kennedy[6], one Bell had a Jamaican domicile of origin but after leaving Jamaica, he was uncertain to make a decision as to whether he should settle in Scotland or England. Therefore, the House of Lords held that he had not lost his Jamaican domicile of origin.

· In Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary[7], the House of Lords unanimously held the view that a man of Scottish origin who spent thirty six years of his life in Liverpool had not acquired the domicile of choice of England and retained his Scottish domicile of origin despite the fact that he was proud to be called as a Glasgow man, who refused to return to Scotland on several occasions, even on the death of his mother and also arranged his burial in Liverpool. This proposition is due to the observation of the House of Lords; the honorable court observed that his prolonged residence did not show his intention to reside in England permanently.

· In IRC v Bullock[8], a man with a Canadian domicile of origin lived in England for forty years and also married an English woman, had not acquired an English domicile of choice. The Court of Appeal held that his domicile of origin sustained because he had the intention to go back to Nova Soctia (Canada) if his wife predeceased him.

2.1.3) Law of Domicile and Criticism:
The law of domicile is generally criticised for its two aspects-
· Tenacity of domicile of origin, and

· Its principle of revival
Among all the three types of domiciles, this is only the domicile of origin which has been subjected to plethora of law reform proposals since the 1950's. In 1950, Lord Chancellor asked the Private International Committee for the desirable amendments in the law of domicile. The Committee published its report in 1954, in which it criticised the domicile of origin due to attaching unnecessary importance to its rule of automatic revival on abandoning the domicile of choice without the acquisition of new one. These proposals were again taken up twice to the parliament in the form of Domicile Bills of 1958 and 1959.

But it failed to become the law because if it was legislated then many American businessmen living in United Kingdom would have become prone to double taxation. This would have discouraged the foreign businessmen to invest in England and would have affected the economy of the country. Proposals for the reform of law of domicile and in particular the abandonment of the revival rule of the domicile of origin continued till the mid 1980's. Law Commission Working Paper 88 examined the desirability of substitution of domicile with a different connecting factor. It proposed the possibility of replacing domicile by the concept of habitual residence or nationality. Nevertheless, it was concluded that domicile should continued to be used as a connecting factor.

In 1987, the Law Commission compiled its report after receiving the comments and views on the 1985 report. This proposal was an important step towards the process of improving effectiveness and fairness of the English rules of the domicile of origin. If it was adopted, it would have abolished many difficulties which propositus has to face since it eradicated the tenacity and revival of domicile of origin and also it cleared that the standard to prove the change of the domicile of origin is that of a civil standard.

2.1.4) Pros of Concept of Tenacity & Revival of Domicile of Origin:
a) Capable of dealing with absurd situations:
Revival rule of domicile of origin can deal with several odd situations. For instance, a family with English domicile of origin moves to India with an intention to settle there permanently, but after sometime they decided to shift from India to France for few years with an intention never to go back to India. Therefore, in such a situation family has not acquired a new domicile of choice of France unless they spend appreciable period of time there. In such circumstances, their English domicile of origin will revive which will fulfill its purpose in this case. But let's consider that domicile of choice will continued until they have acquired a new one then if any mishap happens with them on their way to France in the above example, the governing law will be that of India where they never wanted to set foot again. This seems to be a strange situation where legal system of a place will apply which a person has willingly abandoned. Here the concept of revival of domicile of origin seems to be more logical solution to deal with these absurd and unique situations.

b) Profound Concept:
Domicile of origin is a deep and thorough concept which helps the courts to establish a balanced and proper decision. It urges the court to see the whole life of propositus in order to determine if his domicile of origin has been displaced or not.

In Cyganik v Agulian[9], according to Mummery LJ:

"Positioned at the date of death...the court must look back at the whole of the deceased's life, at what he had done with his life, at what life had done to him and what were his inferred intentions in order to decide whether he had acquired a domicile of choice in England by the date of his death."

c) Determination of Personal Law:
Domicile of origin provides personal law for resolving the legal issues of a person. Due to its consistency and the fact that it can never be abandoned completely, therefore, its revival provides a personal law where domicile of choice or dependence is abolished. Harrison v Harrison[10] and Bell v Kennedy[11] are the valid examples where in the former case, domicile of origin revived when domicile of dependence was abandoned and in the latter case, domicile of origin revived when domicile of choice was abandoned.

2.1.5) Demerits of Tenacity and Revival Principle of Domicile of Origin:
a) Superfluous Concept:
The principle of revival of domicile of origin seems to be unnecessary according to the proposals of the Law Commission in their 1987 Report. This report proposed that the domicile of origin should be abolished and person's domicile at birth should be determined by the country with which he has most close connections or he would be considered to have the domicile of the parents with whom he is residing at that time.

b) Unsatisfactory Principle:
According to the principles observed in the leading case of Udny v Udny[12], a legitimate child would take the domicile of father, an illegitimate child and a posthumous child would take the domicile of the mother. But these rules are quite unsatisfactory in certain circumstances-

· Unless a domicile has been established, the legitimacy of a child cannot be determined while on the other hand, a domicile cannot be established unless legitimacy of a child is ascertained. Consequently it is difficult to resolve this absurd two-way debate in a rational manner. The only way to resolve it might be to consider the child as legitimate if he is regarded so by the law of either of his/her parent's domicile.

· After the enactment of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1973, there is no logical basis for the rule that a legitimate child follows the domicile of the father. Since domicile of a married woman is no longer dependent on her husband. Therefore, it's not logical that if the parents are living apart, the child will first take the domicile of origin of father then domicile of dependence of the parent with whom he is living.

c) Leads to Bizarre Results:
In Grant v Grant[13], A, with an English domicile of origin, went to France where he had a legitimate son B. B, while living in France had a legitimate son, C, who also had a legitimate son named D while residing in France. A, B and C intended to go back to England at the age of sixty-five for retirement but they all died in France before reaching that age. Despite the fact that D never visited England, it was held that D's domicile of origin was English. It is obvious from the facts of the case that even the propositus is not physically present in his country of origin, even then he is deemed to be domiciled there, which is a strong drawback of domicile of origin due to creation of bizarre results.

2.2) Domicile of Choice:
Any person not legally dependent on another (sui juris) may acquire for himself/herself a domicile of choice at any time by means of physical residence in a place, other than that of domicile of origin, and intention to reside there for the foreseeable future. However, anyone not sui juris will rely on derivative domicile which is based on the domicile of those on whom they are legally dependent, this includes children and some persons mentally incapax. (The general rule for mentally incapacitated persons is that they retain the domicile they had before becoming incapacitated).

There must be a freedom of choice of residence and not prescribed or dictated by any external necessity such as the duties of office, the demand of creditors or the relief from illness; and it must be residence fixed not for a limited period or particular purpose.

2.2.1) Capacity of acquiring domicile of choice
The capacity to acquire a domicile of choice is determined by the law of his existing domicile. Under English law, before the coming into force of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1973, a minor, a lunatic and a married woman had no capacity to acquire a domicile of choice.

2.2.2) Acquisition of a Domicile of Choice
The two requisites for a fresh domicile are:
a) Residence
b) Intention

· Residence
The requirement of residence in a country for the purposes of the law of domicile is physical presence in that country as an inhabitant of it. Residence is regarded as being a question of fact. Older cases adopted a presumption in favour of domicile that grew in strength with the length of the residence and was hard to be rebutted. However, in more recent cases less weight has been attached to the length of residence, and have taken the view that, although a material consideration, it is rarely decisive. Whatever weight is given to the length of residence it is undeniable that time is not the sole criterion of domicile.

In the English case Jopp v. Wood[14], 25 years residence in India and in the Indian case S.P. Ghosh v. Deputy Collector[15], 10 years residence in England was not considered enough.

In Michael Anthony Rodrigues v. State of Bombay[16], one Michael born in 1918 in Goa to the parents having Goan nationality relocated to Bombay in 1927 where his father had established a tailoring business for the last forty years. Since then Michael never went back to Goa. He was educated in Bombay and in 1936 joined his fathers business. In 1946, during the war, he joined the Royal Indian Armed Forces. After his discharge from the Army he gave Bombay as his permanent address. Thereafter, he lived in Bombay and in 1948 he reverted back to his fathers business. His name was also entered in the municipal rolls as a voter. On these facts, the Bombay High Court held that he had acquired a domicile of choice in Bombay and had abandoned his Goan domicile of origin.

Conversely, brevity of residence is no obstacle to the acquisition of a domicile if the necessary intention exists. For instance if a person leaves the place of his present domicile with a view to settle in another country, then the moment he sets foot in that country he acquires a domicile there. In White v. Tennant[17], after abandoning his home in state X, a man took his family to a home in state Z, about a mile from state X After depositing his belongings there, he returned to State X with a view to spend the night with a relative. He fell ill and died on that very night. It was held that he was domiciled in state Z.

· Habitual Residence
There are circumstances where it is possible for a person to be resident in several countries at the same time. In these circumstances of dual or multiple residences a domicile of choice can only be acquired if this can be shown to be the chief or habitual residence. This was observed in Plummer v. IRC[18], the taxpayer had an English domicile of origin. She spent the majority of each year in England, where she was getting her education. However, she spent more than three months of each year in Guernsey, which had become her family home. Hoffman J held that, despite the taxpayers intention of residence in England, her domicile of origin, she could acquire a domicile of choice in Guernsey if she could show that this was her chief residence. This she was unable to do. She had not yet settled in Guernsey. Accordingly she retained her English domicile.

· Intention to reside permanently
The acquisition of a domicile of choice requires an intention by the propositus to remain permanently in the territory in which he/she resides. The word permanent according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary means lasting or designed to last indefinitely without change, and this indeed is the definition that most of the judges have recognised when required to consider the nature of the intention necessary for a change of domicile. In Udny v.Udny[19], Lord Westbury described the intention as being one to reside for an unlimited time. A more modern statement to the same effect is that of Baroness Hale who referred to an intention to reside permanently or indefinitely. The essence, therefore, of these and many other similar statements is that the intended residence must not be for a limited period.

It is also clear that a conditional intention would not suffice. In Cramer v. Cramer[20], a woman with a French domicile of origin who came to England intending to remain here and marry an Englishman, who was already married, did not acquire an English domicile of choice. Her intention to remain was conditional on both herself and her proposed husband obtaining divorce and then on their relationship continuing in future.

In cases where the termination of residence is dependent on the occurrence of a contingency this will not prevent the acquisition of domicile unless the contingency is itself unambiguous and realistic.

In Re Fulds Estate[21], Scarman J. observed that if a man intends to return to the land of his birth upon a clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated contingency, e.g. the end of his job, the intention required by law is lacking; but if he has in mind only a vague possibility, such as making a fortune, such a state of mind is consistent with the intention required by law.

· Time at which intention is relevant
There must be a present intention of permanent residence means the person at the relevant time possess the requisite intention. The relevant time varies with the nature of the inquiry which may be past or present.

For instance, the inquiry relates to the domicile of a deceased person Z, it must be ascertained whether at some period in his life he had formed and retained a fixed and settled intention of residence in a given country. Once this fact is established, evidence of his subsequent fluctuations of opinion as to whether he would or would not move elsewhere will be ignored. If, on the other hand, the essential validity of a proposed marriage depends on the law of Zs domicile and if the identity of this law is in doubt, what must be examined is his immediate intention. In Mark v. Mark[22], the intention must be bona fide €œin the sense of being genuine and not pretended for some other purpose, such as getting a divorce to which one would not be entitled by the law of the true domicile.€

· Evidence of intention
The question of requisite intention is one of fact. It is impossible to lay down any positive rule with respect to the evidence necessary to prove the requisite intention. All that one can say is that every conceivable event and incident in a mans life is a relevant and an admissible indication of his state of mind. Every action be it said and done during a persons life should be considered, taking account of things said and done after & before the time when it is alleged that the chosen domicile has been acquired. Nothing must be overlooked that might possibly show the place which he regarded as his permanent home at the relevant time.

This view has been taken by Indian courts too like in the case- Kedar Pande v. Narayan Bikram Shah[23], the question before the Supreme Court was whether Narayan Bikram Shah had been domiciled in India in 1949. Narayans father was domiciled in Nepal, therefore, he had his domicile of origin there. Narayan Shah was born in Benaras (India), received his education from 1934 to 1938 in India. After 1938 he lived in Ram Nagar (India) and continued to live there after the death of his father his father, Ram Raja, had built a palace in Ram Nagar in 1938-41. Subsequently, Narayan Shah also built a mansion there. In 1982, there was a partition suit between Narayan Shah and his brother. During the suit and subsequently also he continued to manage properties. After partition, he and his wife acquired immovable property, including land in Patna and several other places. On March 23, 1949 he was issued an Indian passport in which he described himself as an Indian citizen and domicile and resident of Ram Nagar. He went to Nepal only once when he was 10 or 12 years old. After 1953 he never went to Nepal. He had married an Indian girl. All his children were educated in India. Before the establishment of the Gram Panchayat he was the president of the Union Board. His name was entered into the voters list of Ram Nagar constituency. In 1957 general elections he contested from the Ram Nagar constituency. The Supreme Court held that taking into account all the events and circumstances of Narayan Shahs life, it was clearly established that even before 1949, Narayan Shah had acquired a domicile of choice in India.

· Involuntary Residence
The Intention to settle down in a country must be free and voluntary. The Indian Succession Act, 1925, Explanation to Section-10 expresses it thus: €œA man is not deemed to have taken up his fixed habitation in India merely by reason of his residing there in his Majestys civil, military, naval or air force service in the exercise of any profession or calling.€ These are cases which cast doubt on the freedom of the intention.

· Fugitives
The fugitives fall under two categories:
a) Those who go to another country to escape from the consequences of their crime and
b) Those who escape from their civil liabilities.

In such cases one must draw the inference that they had left their country for good and, therefore, a presumption arises in their favour that they had acquired a domicile of choice in the country of their refuge; although their departure is not voluntary, yet it cant be said that they intended to settle there temporarily. In Re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan[24] , Lindley LJ observed the same. All these inferences equally apply to a fugitive who runs away from his civil liability.

· Invalids
Invalids who go to another country fall under two categories:
a) Those who go for convalescence or for a temporary stay to improve their health, and
b) Those who go there and settle down as they find the climate more congenial.

The question of acquiring domicile of choice does not arise in the case of the former but in the latter case, the natural inference will be that he has acquired a domicile of choice in that country. In Hoskins v. Mathews[25], a 60 year old English domiciled person had an injury in his spine and he went to Florence solely because he thought the warmer climate of Italy might benefit his health. He lived there throughout the rest of his life. He died there at the age of seventy. The court held that he domiciled in Florence as €œin settling there he was exercising a preference, and not acting upon a necessity.€

· Public Servants
There are several categories of public servants who are stationed in foreign countries by their governments, like- ambassadors, consuls, staff in embassies, legations or government news agencies and the like. The natural inference is that they do not acquire domicile of choice in such countries and retain their existing domicile. This has been specifically laid down in Section- 12 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. But if a public servant continues to live in that country after he has been discharged from his job, he may acquire a domicile of choice in that country. In Stone v. Stone[26], S, a member of the US Armed Force was stationed in Europe. He used to spend all his holidays in England and wanted to settle there on retirement from his post. The court held that he acquired a domicile of choice in England.

2.2.3) Abandonment of Domicile of Choice
When both conditions- factum and animus cease to exist, the domicile of choice is abandoned. Mere intention to abandon or mere residence in another country is not enough for abandonment of domicile of choice. Thus, the domicile of choice is abandoned when a person gives up residing in the country of the domicile of choice and he has no intention to reside there indefinitely. The case of the Goods of Raffene[27]l is a good illustration of the operation of these factors. One Madame Raffenel, widow of a French naval officer, had her domicile of origin in England and domicile of choice in France. She embarked at Calais on a cross- channel streamer, with the intention of leaving France for good. She was taken ill before the streamer could sail and had to spend several months in Calais, where she died. The court held that she died domiciled in France, as at the date of her death she had not abandoned her French domicile, though she had an intention to do so. However, had she sailed off the French territorial waters, her English domicile of origin would have revived.

2.3) Domicile of dependency
By operation of law the domicile of certain persons depend on the domicile of others, since these persons are incapable of choosing their own domicile, like-
· Infants
· Lunatics
· Married Women

The Law Commission in Britain during 1980s had to come to a decision concerning the issue whether the domicile of children should have domicile of dependence with respect to their parents or it should be depending on their habitual residence or the country with which they are most closely connected. It was proposed that a child should have a 'Dependent Domicile' of their parents but where the tie with the parents was weakened, he would have an independent domicile.

Three rules were suggested for ascertaining the domicile of children as follows-
· Firstly, if the child lives with both parents, his domicile would be the same as that of the parents and it will change with the change of parents' domicile. But if domicile of both parents is not same then the child will take the domicile of the mother.

· Secondly, if the child is living with single parent, he will have the domicile of that parent and it will change accordingly.

· Thirdly, the child should be domiciled in a country with which he is more closely connected.

If the domicile of father (or, where appropriate, mother) changed while a person is under the age of 16, then they acquire a domicile of dependency based on father's (or mother's) new domicile. The rules are more complicated where parents separate or die while their children are under 16.

A woman who married before 1 January 1974, have her husband's domicile (as a domicile of dependency). On 1 January 1974 the rules changed, so that women who married on or after that date no longer take their husband's domicile; they retain their own domicile of origin and can acquire their own domicile of choice. Women who were married before that date retained their husband's domicile as at that date, but this is treated as a domicile of choice, not dependency.

If a person acquired a domicile of dependency while under the age of 16 (for example, because the parents emigrated permanently to a new country, with no intention ever to return to the old country) that persons domicile of dependency will continue until that person choose to leave that country. On departure, the domicile of origin will revive until you acquire a new domicile of choice.

3) Corporations and Ships
Corporations are the entities endowed with legal personality under municipal law, may be likened to physical persons and, on this basis, regarded as nationals of a particular State. The place of incorporation is regarded as the domicile of the corporation. Ships are governed by the law of Flag.

Conclusion
There has been a lot of hue and cry and complex confusions in the meaning of the terms Domicile, Nationality and citizenship while studying either Private International Law or Public International Law. The term nationality signifies the politico-legal status of an individual belonging to a particular state while the term citizenship is often used in municipal law. Generally, the national who enjoys full political and civil rights is called a citizen. Domicile, on the other hand, is an attribute of nationality and denotes a persons place of residence and it is the relationship between the individual and locality, where that person has his permanent home. Therefore, it is quite possible that a person may be national of one State while domiciled in another state and resolving the complexities of these terms mitigate almost half of the international issues by providing the appropriate forum to deal with specific nature of the issue.

References:
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# HAYTON D J (ed.), European Succession Laws, (Jordan Publishing Ltd, 2002).
# MICHAEL PARKINSON (2010). Domicile Reform in the United Kingdom. Private Client Business, 1, pp 39-47.
# PIPPA ROGERSON (2000). Habitual Residence: The New Domicile? International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 49, pp 86-107.
# DIWAN, PARAS & PEEYUSHI DIWAN, Private International Law: Indian and English p.39 (Deep & Deep Publications 4th Edition 1977).
# J. STORY, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in regard to Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and especially in regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills, Successions, and Judgments (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1834).
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End-Notes
[1] (1858) 10 HLC 124.
[2] (1858) 10 HLC 124 .
[3] (1869) 1 LR Sc and Div 441, (1869) LR 1 HL 441.
[4] 180 U.S. 536.
[5] LC 2002 HC 30.
[6] [L. R.] 1 Sc. & Div. 307.
[7] (1930) SC (HL) 8.
[8] [1976] 1 WLR 1178 .
[9] [2006] EWCA Civ 129.
[10] [2009] All ER (D) 61 (Feb).
[11] [L. R.] 1 Sc. & Div. 307.
[12] (1869) 1 LR Sc and Div 441, (1869) LR 1 HL 441.
[13] LC 2002 HC 30.
[14] (1865) 4 De GJ &Sm. 616.
[15] 1964 All. 422.
[16] 1956 Bom. 729.
[17] 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596, 1888 W. Va. LEXIS 81 (W. Va. 1888).
[18] [1987] STC 698, [1988] 1 WLR 292
[19] (1869) 1 LR Sc and Div 441, (1869) LR 1 HL 441.
[20] 379 P.2d 95 (1963).
[21] IN THE ESTATE OF FULD, DECD. (No. 3); HARTLEY AND ANOTHER v. FULD AND OTHERS (ATTORNEY-GENERAL INTERVENING). Also reported at: [1968] P. 675
[22] [2005] UKHL 42, [2005] 3 All ER 912, [2006] 1 AC 98.
[23] AIR 1966 SC 160.
[24] [1900] P 211.
[25] (1856) 8 De GM & G 13.
[26] (1959) 1 All. ER 194.
[27] (1863) 3 SW & Tr. 49.

About The Authors:
Author- Dr. Sant Lal Nirvaan, Assistant Professor, Institute Of Law Kurukshetra University
Co- Author- Nikita Goel, B. A. Ll. B. (Hon.), Institute Of Law, Kurukshetra University