The expression international disputes covers not only disputes between states as such, but also other cases that have come within the ambit of international regulation, being certain categories of disputes between states on the one hand, and individuals, bodies corporate, and non-state entities on the other.

The range of dispute is from minor differences scarcely causing a ripple on the international surface to the other extreme of situations of prolonged friction and tension between countries, attaining such a pitch as to menace peace and security.

To settle international disputes as early as possible, and in a manner fair and just to the parties involved, has been a long standing aim of international law, and the rules and procedure in this connection are partly a matter of custom or practice, and partly due to a number of important law-making conventions such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and the United Nations Charter drawn up at San Francisco in 1945. One of the principal objects of the latter Charter in setting up the United Nations Organisation was indeed to facilitate the peaceful settlement of differences between states. This also had been the purpose of the League of Nations during the period of its activities between two world wars.

Broadly speaking, the methods of settling international disputes fall into two categories:

1. Peaceful means of settlement, that is, where the parties are agreeable to finding an amicable solution.
2. Forcible or coercive means of settlement, that is, where a solution is found and imposed by force.

Peaceful Or Amicable Means Of Settlement

The peaceful or amicable methods of settling international disputes are divisible into the following:

1. Arbitration.
2. Judicial settlement.
3. Negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation, or inquiry.
4. Settlement under the auspices of the United Nations Organization.

This classification does not mean that these processes remain in rigidly separate compartments, each appropriate for resolving one particular class of dispute. The position is otherwise in practice.

For example, the flexible machinery established by the Convention of 18 March 1965 for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and the Nationals of Other States consists of an International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), at Washington, with facilities for the arbitration and conciliation of investment disputes, and provision for Panels of Arbitrators and Conciliators.

The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law adopted on 28 April 1976 a set of arbitration rules which allow also for conciliation of disputes (the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). Similarly the Permanent Court of Arbitration, established under the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1907, provides for good offices and mediation, and for international commissions of inquiry, as well as for arbitration.

(a) Arbitration:

Ordinarily arbitration denotes exactly the same procedure as in municipal law, namely the reference of a dispute to certain persons called arbitrators, freely chosen by the parties, who make an award without being bound to pay strict regard to legal considerations. Experience of international practice has shown, however, that many disputes involving purely legal issues are referred to arbitrators for settlement on a legal basis.

Moreover, in the various treaties by which it has been agreed that disputes should be submitted to arbitration, frequently in addition to being directed to make their award according to justice or equity or ex aequo et bono, arbitral tribunals have been specially instructed to apply international law. A common formula in the nineteenth century was the direction to give a decision 'in accordance with the principles of international law and the practice and jurisprudence of similar tribunals of the highest authority'.

Arbitration is an institution of great antiquity, but its recent modern history is recognised as dating from the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great Britain, providing for the establishment of three joint mixed commissions to settle certain differences which could not otherwise be disposed of in the course of the negotiation of the Treaty. Although these commissions were not strictly speaking organs of third party adjudication, two of the three performed successfully, and the result was to stimulate a fresh interest in the process of arbitration which had fallen into desuetude for about two centuries. A further impetus to arbitration was given by the Alabama Claims Award of 1872 between the United States and Great Britain.

According to Judge Manley O. Hudson:

'The success of the Alabama Claims Arbitration stimulated a remarkable activity in the field of international arbitration. In the three decades following 1872, arbitral tribunals functioned with considerable success in almost a hundred cases; Great Britain took part in some thirty arbitrations, and the United States in twenty; European States were parties in some sixty, and Latin American States in about fifty cases.' Clauses providing for the submission of disputes to arbitration were also frequently inserted in treaties, particularly law-making conventions, and to quote Judge Hudson again, arbitration thus became the handmaiden of international legislation in as much as disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of conventions could be submitted to it for solution.

Also a number of arbitration treaties for the settlement of defined classes of disputes between the states parties were concluded. A most important step was taken in 1899 when the Hague Conference not only codified the law as to arbitration but also laid the foundations of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Hague Conference of 1907 completed the work of the 1899 Conference. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is an institution of a peculiar character.

It is neither 'permanent' nor is it a Court. The members of the 'Court' are appointed by states which are parties to one or both of the conventions adopted by the Hague Conferences. Each state may appoint four persons with qualifications in international law, and all the persons so appointed constitute a panel of competent lawyers from whom arbitrators are appointed as the need arises. Thus the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration never meet as a tribunal: 'Their sole function is to be available for service as members of tribunals which may be created when they are invited to undertake such service.'

When a dispute arises which two states desire to submit to arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the following procedure applies:
Each state appoints two arbitrators, of whom one only may be its national or chosen from among the persons nominated by it as members of the Court panel. These arbitrators then choose an umpire who is the presiding member of the arbitral tribunal.

The award is given by majority vote. Each tribunal so created will act pursuant to a special compromise or arbitration agreement, specifying the subject of the dispute and the time allowed for appointing the members of the tribunal, and defining the tribunal's jurisdiction, the procedure to be followed, and the rules of law and the principles according to which its decision is to be given. The Permanent Court of Arbitration itself has no specific jurisdiction as such.

Approximately 20 arbitral tribunals have been appointed under this system since its foundation, and several important awards have been given, including those in the Pious Fund Case of 1902 between the United States and Mexico, the Muscat Dhows Case of 1905 between Great Britain and France, the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case of 1910 between the United States and Great Britain, and the Savarkar Case of 1911 between Great Britain and France. Since 1932 resort to the Permanent Court of Arbitration has been infrequent, but the Bureau of the Court has been active in facilitating ad hoc arbitrations outside the formal framework of the Hague Convention.

Its facilities have been used, for example, by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, set up in 1981. It should be noted that the national groups of members appointed under the Convention also function as the nominating bodies for periodic elections of judges to the International Court of Justice.

Notwithstanding it's obvious defects, as Judge Hudson says it was hardly more than 'a method and a procedure, the Permanent Court of Arbitration was a relative success, and in the early years of this century influenced a more frequent recourse to arbitration as a method of settling international disputes, while it may be said to have moulded the modern law and practice of arbitration. This was reflected, too, in the great number of arbitration treaties, both multilateral and bilateral, and of special ad hoc submission agreements, concluded before and after the First World War.

Steps have been taken to revitalise the work of the Permanent Court, especially by making its facilities more attractive to litigants through the adoption in 1993 of revised Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One is a State. Following the First World War, several important arbitral tribunals operated. Among these may be mentioned the several Mexican Claims Commissions which adjudicated the claims of six different states against Mexico on behalf of their subjects, and the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals set up in Europe to deal with various claims arising out of the territorial redistribution effected by the Treaty of Versailles 1919.

Arbitration is essentially a consensual procedure. States cannot be compelled to arbitrate unless they agree to do so, either generally and in advance, or ad hoc in regard to a specific dispute. Their consent even governs the nature of the tribunal established. The structure of arbitral tribunals has accordingly in practice revealed anomalies. Sometimes a single arbitrator has adjudicated a dispute, at other times a joint commission of members appointed by the states in dispute, and very frequently a mixed commission has been created, composed of nominees of the respective states in dispute and of an additional member selected in some other way. The nominees of a state are usually its own nationals; sometimes they are treated as representing it and being under its control, a practice which is in many ways objectionable.

Disputes submitted to arbitration are of the most varied character. Arbitral tribunals have dealt with disputes primarily involving legal issues as well as disputes turning on questions of fact and requiring some appreciation of the merits of the controversy. As a rule such tribunals have not declined to deal with a matter either on the ground that no recognised legal rules were applicable or on the ground that political aspects were involved. For this reason the distinction frequently drawn by writers on international law between justiciable and nonjusticiable disputes is a little difficult to understand and does not appear to have much practical value.

In as much, however, as by special clauses in their arbitration treaties, states often exclude from arbitration disputes affecting their Vital interests, or concerning only matters of domestic jurisdiction, such reserved disputes may in a sense be non-justiciable, and open only to the procedure of conciliation. An illustration is the clause in the Anglo-French Arbitration Treaty of 1903 whereby the two states bound themselves not to arbitrate disputes which affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of the parties.

A more intelligible distinction is that between legal and non-legal disputes (e.g, article 36 of the United Nations Charter). There has arisen recently a trend towards appointing current judges of the International Court of Justice as members of arbitral tribunals. This has occurred in such cases as the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration (1977, 1978) and the Guinea - Guinea Bissau Arbitration (1985).

This trend may diminish as the caseload of the International Court of Justice, increases, and as the alternative of using chambers of that court becomes more attractive. There will always be a place for arbitration in the relations between states. Arbitral procedure is more appropriate than judicial settlement for technical disputes, and less expensive, while, if necessary, arbitrations can be conducted without publicity, even to the extent that parties can agree that awards be not published.

Moreover, the general principles governing the practice and powers of arbitral tribunals are fairly well recognised. Lastly, arbitral procedure is flexible enough to be combined with the fact-finding processes which are availed of in the case of negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation, and inquiry.

(b) Judicial settlement:

By judicial settlement is meant a settlement brought about by a properly constituted international judicial tribunal, applying rules of law. The only general organ of judicial settlement at present available in the international community is the International Court of Justice at The Hague, which succeeded to and preserves continuity with the Permanent Court of International Justice. Its inaugural sitting was held on 18 April 1946, the very date on which its predecessor, the latter Court, was dissolved by the League of Nations Assembly at its final session.

The essential difference between the Court, on the one hand, and an arbitral tribunal, on the other hand, can be seen by reference to the following points:

1. The Court is a permanently constituted tribunal, governed by a statute and its own body of rules of procedure, binding on all parties having recourse to the Court.
    
2. It possesses a permanent registry, performing all the necessary functions of receiving documents for filing, recording, and authentication, general court services, and acting as a regular channel of communication with government and other bodies.
    
3. Proceedings are public, while in due course the pleadings and records of the hearings and judgments are published.
    
4. In principle, the Court is accessible to all states for the judicial settlement of all cases which states may be able to refer to it, and of all matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force.
    
5. Article 38 of its Statute specifically sets out the different forms of law which the Court is to apply in cases and matters brought before it, without prejudice to the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono if the parties agree to that course. (Although not ex aequo et bono in the strict sense, equitable principles have been applied by the Court in the most recent cases before it in regard to maritime and territorial boundary delimitation).
    
6. The membership of the Court is representative of the greater part of the international community, and of the principal legal systems, to an extent that is not the case with any other tribunal. (Currently six of the Court's judges come from countries in Africa and Asia, whereas initially only two judges came from these countries.)
    
7. In the result, it is possible for the Court to develop a consistent practice in its proceedings, and to maintain a certain continuity of outlook to a degree that is not feasible with ad hoc tribunals.

The International Court of Justice was established pursuant to Chapter XIV (articles 92-96) of the United Nations Charter drawn up at San Francisco in 1945. Article 92 of the Charter declares that the Court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and provides that the Court is to function in accordance with a Statute, forming an integral part of the Charter.

By contrast, the Court's predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, was not an organ of the League of Nations, although in some measure linked to the League. In as much as the International Court of Justice is firmly anchored in the system of the United Nations, member states are just as much bound to the Court as to any other principal organ of the United Nations, while reciprocal duties of co-operation with each other bind the Court and United Nations organs, and indeed in 1986 on the occasion of the Court's 40th anniversary, the President (Judge Nagendra Singh) declared that in the area of peaceful settlement of disputes the Court and UN Security Council were complementary organs.

Also the Court is bound by the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as these are expressed in articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, and because the Court's Statute is annexed to the Charter and is an integral part of it, the context of the Charter is a controlling factor in the interpretation of the provisions of the Statute.

As an illustration of the fact that the Court has exercised jurisdiction over the whole range of international law, the following diverse subjects have been among those it has dealt with: maritime and territorial boundary delimitation disputes, non-use of force, non-intervention, decolonisation, treaty law and treaty interpretation, nuclear tests, diplomatic and consular law, state responsibility, treatment of aliens, the status of foreign investments, asylum, nationality and guardianship.

(c) Negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation, or inquiry Negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation, and inquiry are methods of settlement less formal than either judicial settlement or arbitration.
Little need be said concerning negotiation except that it frequently proceeds in conjunction with good offices or mediation, although reference should be made to the now growing trend of providing, by international instrument or arrangement, legal frameworks for two processes of consultation, both prior consultation and post-event consultation, and communication, without which in some circumstances negotiation cannot proceed.

Illustrations of the former are the provisions for consultation in the Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement of 31 August 1965, and of the latter, the United States-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding, Geneva, 20 June 1963 for a direct communication link-the so-called 'hot line'-between Washington and Moscow in case of crisis.

The value of continued negotiation was illustrated by the conclusion of the US-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Agreement (INF) in December 1987 after the earlier unsuccessful talks between the two countries at Reykjavik, Iceland; the latter talks although abortive had nonetheless clarified some overhanging issues. Both good offices and mediation are methods of settlement in which, usually, a friendly third state assists in bringing about an amicable solution of the dispute.

But the party tendering good offices or mediating may also, in certain cases, be an individual or an international organ (of the tender of good offices by the United Nations Security Council in 1947 in the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia). The distinction between good offices and mediation is to a large extent a matter of degree. In the case of good offices, a third party tenders its services in order to bring the disputing parties together, and to suggest (in general terms) the making of a settlement, without itself actually participating in the negotiations or conducting an exhaustive inquiry into the various aspects of the dispute.

Hence, once the parties have been brought together for the purpose of working out a solution of their controversies, strictly speaking the state or party tendering good offices has no further active duties to perform (article X of the Pact of Bogota, i.e. the Inter-American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of 30 April 1948). In the case of mediation, on the other hand, the mediating party has a more active role, and participates in the negotiations and directs them in such a way that a peaceful solution may be reached, although any suggestions made by it are of no binding effect upon the parties.

The initiative of the Soviet Government at the end of 1965 and early in 1966 in bringing representatives of India and Pakistan together at Tashkent to settle the conflict between them, and in creating a propitious atmosphere, for a settlement, seems to have lain somewhere between good offices and mediation.

It is likewise difficult to fit into the traditional third party roles in the settlement of disputes the part played by the Government of Algeria in procuring a resolution in January 1981 of the United States-Iranian dispute-perhaps better described as a 'crisis' in the relations of the United States and Iran-over the detention of American nationals (diplomatic and consular staff in particular) in Iran.

In the relevant documents it was stated that the Algerian Government had been requested by the disputant parties to serve as an intermediary in seeking a mutually acceptable resolution, and that it had consulted extensively with the two governments as to the commitments which each is willing to make in order to resolve the crisis.

Moreover, the Algerian Government made two Declarations, attesting the commitments and agreements of the disputant parties, including an agreement for the establishment of an International Arbitral Tribunal, designated as the Iran-United States Arbitral Tribunal, to decide claims of American nationals against Iran, and claims of Iranian nationals against the United States.

If the Algerian Government's part cannot be categorised as pertaining entirely to conciliation, or good offices, or mediation, it was nevertheless effective in achieving a settlement involving, among other points, the release of the detained American nationals. The scope of both good offices and mediation is limited; there is a lack of any procedure in both methods for conducting a thorough investigation into the facts or the law.

Hence, in the future, the greatest possibilities for both methods lie as steps preliminary or ancillary to the more specialised techniques of conciliation, of inquiry, and of settlement through the United Nations. The term conciliation has both a broad and a narrow meaning. In its more general sense, it covers the great variety of methods whereby a dispute is amicably settled with the aid of other states or of impartial bodies of inquiry or advisory committees.

In the narrow sense, 'conciliation' signifies the reference of a dispute to a commission or committee to make a report with proposals to the parties for settlement, such proposals not being of a binding character.

According to Judge Manley O. Hudson:

Conciliation is a process of formulating proposals of settlement after an investigation of the facts and an effort to reconcile opposing contentions, the parties to the dispute being left free to accept or reject the proposals formulated.

The fact that the parties are perfectly free to decide whether or not to adopt the proposed terms of settlement distinguishes conciliation from arbitration, and has the consequence that conciliation can be used to settle any kind of dispute or situation. Conciliation Commissions were provided for in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Title III and Part III of these conventions).

Such Commissions could be set up by special agreement between the parties, and were to investigate and report on situations of fact with the proviso that the report in no way bound the parties to the dispute. The actual provisions in the conventions avoid any words suggesting compulsion on the parties to accept a Commission's report. Similar Commissions were also set up under a series of treaties negotiated by the United States in 1913 and the following years, known as the 'Bryan Treaties'. Other treaties providing for conciliation are the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948, and the Pact of Bogota of 1948.

The value of Conciliation Commissions as such has been doubted by several authorities, but the procedure of conciliation itself proved most useful and important when employed by the League of Nations Council to settle international disputes. The Council's use of conciliation was extremely flexible; generally a small committee, or a person known as a rapporteur, was appointed to make tactful investigations and suggest a method of composing the differences between the parties. States do attach great value to the procedure of conciliation, as reflected in the provision made for it in the Convention of 18 March 1965, on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States.

The object of an inquiry is, without making specific recommendations, to establish the facts, which may be in dispute, and thereby prepare the way for a negotiated adjustment. Thus, frequently, in cases of disputed boundaries, a commission may be appointed to inquire into the historical and geographical facts which are the subject of controversy and thus clarify the issues for a boundary agreement.

Also, sometimes an expert fact-finding committee is necessary to inquire into certain special facts for the purposes of preliminary elucidation. Obviously one or more of the above methods, negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation, inquiry, and fact-finding may be used in combination with the other or others. Various endeavours have been made to improve processes of settlement, and render them even more flexible.

The proposals have included the extension of fact-finding methods, and the creation of a fact-finding organ or fact-finding centre. On 18 December 1967, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution, upholding the usefulness of the method of impartial fact finding as a mode of peaceful settlement, and in which it urged member states to make more effective use of fact-finding methods, and requested the Secretary-General to prepare a register of experts whose services could be used by agreement for fact-finding in relation to a dispute. Subsequently, in accordance with the Resolution, nominations of experts were received for the purposes of the register (Note by Secretary-General, Document A/7240), and each year the Secretary- General has transmitted to member states lists of experts so nominated. Existing facilities for fact-finding include those provided by the Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation set up by the General Assembly in April 1949.

Special mention should also be made of the provisions for inquiries into alleged violations of international humanitarian law under the Geneva Conventions, 1949 (First Convention, art 52, Second Convention, art 53, Third Convention, art 132, Fourth Convention, art 149), and of the International Fact-Finding Commission established under Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977), art 90. Reference should be made to the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, approved by consensus by the General Assembly in 1982, and which may be regarded partly as a code of rules on the subject, partly as a manifesto of guidelines and desiderata, and partly as an elaborate hortatory instrument.

In more vigorous language, many of the principles contained in that connection in the United Nations Charter are reaffirmed, states are required to have recourse to the traditional techniques of dispute-settlement already mentioned, and their attention is drawn to all the available options for peaceful resolution of their differences.

Some special points are made in the Manila Declaration, as follows:

1. States should bear in mind that direct negotiations are a flexible and effective means of peaceful settlement of disputes, and if they choose to resort to direct negotiations, they should negotiate meaningfully.
2. States are enjoined to consider making greater use of the fact-finding capacity of the Security Council in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
3. Recourse to judicial settlement of legal disputes, particularly by way of referral to the International Court of Justice, should not be considered as an unfriendly act between states.
4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations should make full use of the provisions of the Charter concerning his special responsibilities, e.g, bringing to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Although it may be felt-that there is little that is novel in the Manila Declaration, the reaffirmation of established precepts in more elaborate and categorical language can be of value.

(d) Settlement under Auspices of United Nations Organisation

As successor to the League of Nations, the United Nations Organisation, created in 1945, has taken over the bulk of the responsibility for adjusting international disputes. One of the fundamental objects of the Organisation is the peaceful settlement of differences between states, and by article 2 of the United Nations Charter, Members of the Organisation have undertaken to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from threats of war or the use of force. In this connection, important responsibilities devolve on the General Assembly and on the Security Council, corresponding to which wide powers are entrusted to both bodies.

The General Assembly is given authority, subject to the peace enforcement powers of the Security Council, to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation which is likely to impair general welfare or friendly relations among nations (article 14 of the Charter). The more extensive powers, however, have been conferred on the Security Council in order that it should execute swiftly and decisively the policy of the United Nations.

The Council acts, broadly speaking, in two kinds of disputes:

1. disputes which may endanger international peace and security;
2. cases of threats to the peace, or breaches of peace, or acts of aggression.
   

In the former case, the Council, when necessary, may call on the parties to settle their disputes by the methods considered above, viz, arbitration, judicial settlement, negotiation, inquiry, mediation, and conciliation. Also the Council may at any stage recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment for settling such disputes. In the latter case, (ii) above, the Council is empowered to make recommendations or decide what measures are to be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security, and it may call on the parties concerned to comply with certain provisional measures.

There is no restriction or qualification on the recommendations which the Council may make, or on the measures, final or provisional, which it may decide are necessary. It may propose a basis of settlement, it may appoint a commission of inquiry, it may authorise a reference to the International Court of Justice, and so on. Under articles 41 to 47 of the Charter, the Security Council has also the right to give effect to its decisions not only by coercive measures such as economic sanctions, but also by the use of armed force against states which decline to be bound by these decisions.

With the exception of disputes of an exclusively legal character which are usually submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement, it is purely a matter of policy or expediency which of the above different methods is to be adopted for composing a particular difference between states. Certain treaties have endeavoured to define the kind of dispute which should be submitted to arbitration, judicial settlement, or conciliation, or the order in which recourse should be had to these methods, but experience has shown the dubious value of any such pre-established definitions or procedure.

Any one method may be appropriate, and the greater the flexibility permitted, the more chance there is of an amicable solution. The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes adopted by the League of Nations Assembly in 1928 was a type of instrument in which a maximum of flexibility and freedom of choice was sought to be achieved.

It provided separate procedures, a procedure of conciliation (before Conciliation Commissions) for all disputes, a procedure of judicial settlement or arbitration for disputes of a legal character, and a procedure of arbitration for other disputes. States could accede to the General Act by accepting all or some of the procedures and were also allowed to make certain defined reservations (for example, as to prior disputes, as to questions within the domestic jurisdiction, etc).

The General Act was acceded to by 23 states, but accessions to it were heavily qualified by reservations. Since its machinery provisions referred to organs of the League of Nations, defunct after 1946, its utility thereafter was questioned, but the Act was-successfully relied upon, as at least a prima facie basis of invoking the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, by Australia and New Zealand in their actions against France in the Case Concerning Nuclear Tests.

The Revised General Act, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 28 April 1949, has not been acceded to by a sufficient number of states to enter into force. In this connection, there should be mentioned the problem of peaceful change or revision of treaties and the status quo which troubled publicists a good deal just before the Second World War. Many claimed that none of the above methods was suitable for settling revisionist disputes, and proposed the creation of an International Equity Tribunal which would adjudicate claims for peaceful change on a basis of fairness and justice.

The powers which would have been conferred on such a tribunal appear now to be vested, although not in a very specific or concrete manner, in the United Nations. Thus art 14 of the United Nations on the law and practice as to treaties empowers the UN General Assembly to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation 'likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations', including situations resulting from a breach of the Charter.