In the times when questions around delegated legislation, executive overreach, and commercial speech arise almost daily, the Hamdard Dawakhana[1] case becomes more relevant and significant. The Hamdard Dawakhana v UOI stands as a landmark case contributing to the evolution of administrative law in India. This case questioned the constitutionality and the scope of delegated legislation covered under the Drug and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisement) Act, 1954[2] , by specifically analyzing the case through the debate between the delegated legislation and its power to put regulatory restrictions and the freedom of speech and expression granted under the constitution.

Facts:
The Drugs and Magic Remedies (objectionable Advertisements) Act,1954 delegated the power to the executive to add diseases to the list that prohibited advertising of drugs for certain diseases. This law aimed to discourage self-medication and safeguard public health by curbing misleading advertisements of certain drugs, especially those claiming magical or curative properties.

Hamdard Dawakhana, a prominent manufacturer of Unani medicines, received notices from the Drugs Controller for violating the aforementioned restrictions, Hamdard challenged this in the court under Art 32 on the ground that it violated their Art 19(1)(a), Art(19)(1)(g), Art 14 and Art 21 of the constitution. It was also contended in the case that the act gave unrestricted power to the state to make rules.

Issues:
The apex court discussed the following key issues:

• Constitutionality of the Act: Did the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act, 1954 violate fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, 21, and 31?
• Freedom of Speech and Commercial Advertisements: Did advertisements constitute protected speech under Article 19(1)(a), and were the restrictions imposed by the Act reasonable under Article 19(2)?
• Delegated Legislation: Did Section 3(d) and Section 16 of the Act involve excessive delegation of legislative power to the executive?
• Discrimination and Arbitrariness: Did the Act discriminate against certain advertisers, violating Article 14?

Arguments:

Petitioners' Arguments (Hamdard Dawakhana):

The petitioners argued that the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act violated their fundamental rights under the Constitution, particularly their freedom of speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a), freedom to carry on trade (Article 19(1)(g), and right to property (Article 19(1)(f), by restricting their ability to advertise and sell their products. They claimed the Act was discriminatory under Article 14, as it selectively prohibited certain advertisements without clear justification. They also argued that their Unani medicines, recognized globally, were unfairly targeted, and that the restrictions imposed were unreasonable and arbitrary, lacking evidence of an immediate public health threat.

Respondent's Arguments (Union of India):

The government defended the Act, emphasizing its role in protecting public health by preventing misleading advertisements that encouraged self-medication, which could harm consumers. It asserted that commercial advertisements are primarily for trade[3] hence receive limited protection unlike social or political speech that propagate ideas, thus do not enjoy the same level of protection under Article 19(1)(a). The Act was also seen as necessary to prevent exploitation by deceptive drug ads. The government argued that the freedom of speech could be reasonably restricted under Article 19(2) in the interest of public safety, and that the provisions of the Act were proportionate to the need to safeguard public welfare.

Judgment:
Delivered on December 18, 1959, by a five-judge bench led by Justice J.L. Kapur, the Supreme Court's ruling was a nuanced blend of upholding public welfare and protecting constitutional principles. The Court struck down Section 3(d) and parts of Section 16 for excessive delegation, as they lacked clear guidelines for the executive. However, it upheld the Act's core restrictions on misleading advertisements, finding them reasonable to protect public health.

The Court clarified that commercial advertisements were a form of speech but did not enjoy the same protection as other expressions, given their commercial motive. Claims of discrimination or violations of other rights (Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g), 21, and 31) were dismissed, as the Act was deemed fair and aligned with public interest. This decision cemented the judiciary's role in checking executive overreach while supporting well-intentioned regulations.

Interplay of Administrative Law:
The Hamdard Dawakhana case is a cornerstone in Indian administrative law, especially for the scrutiny of such delegated legislation. The argument contains that the government was delegated unrestricted power under sec 3(d) and sec 16, to decide and add diseases that are restricted to be advertised and put penalties for the same. The SC in light of this case distinguished between conditional legislation and delegated legislation[4], by establishing that conditional legislation is executive decides when or where the legislation would be applicable, on the other hand delegated legislation involves executive making rules within clear policy framework. Hence, the aforementioned provisions of the act were declared in excess of its delegation as it clearly lacked such legislative policy framework.

In addition, the bench emphasized the abdication of legislature's core law-making function, which with respect to this case was expanding the list of prohibited diseases, would also be considered as excess delegation.
Although the act aimed to protect public health from misleading advertisements such as magical cures, was found to be a reasonable restriction, under Art 19(2)[5] to freedom of speech and expression under Art 19(1)(a). It also recognized limited protection as unlike social speeches the primary purpose of this advertisement dealt with business interests.

On the issue of equality (Art 14), the court found the act to be applicable uniformly on all such drug advertisements which can mislead the public, and not targeted certain advertisers or certain systems of medicine.
Overall, the act was found to serve legitimate purpose for greater public good, solidifying its constitutional validity, but its certain flawed delegation provisions had to be struck down to ensure executive's accountability.
Cases referenced in the Hamdard Dawakhana case:

• Baxter's case (Australia) - Cited to explain conditional legislation and clearly distinguish it apart from delegated legislation.
• Valentine v Chrestensen (U.S) - Commercial advertisements do not enjoy the same protections as social or political speeches.
• Field v Clark (U.S) - Used to reinforce the need for legislative boundaries in delegated legislation.
• In re: Delhi Laws Act case (India) - Cited to critically evaluate whether the provisions were in excess and unconstitutional, further clarifying the essence of a clearly laid down legislative framework.
   

• Significance in subsequent cases:
  • Binoy Viswam v UOI (2017) - Challenged the Aadhar-PAN linkage, where the apex court relied on the Hamdard case to reinforce boundaries of delegated legislation.
  • State of Madhya Pradesh v Rakesh Kohli (2012) - The legal discussions of the Hamdard case were echoed, establishing that administrative regulations must serve legitimate purposes (e.g., public health, as in Hamdard) and operate within statutory limits.
     
• Strengths:
  • The judgment effectively distinguished between conditional and delegated legislation, provided a clear framework, and reinforced the boundaries of delegated legislation to prevent its excess.
  • It successfully struck a balance between protection of public welfare and prevention of unreasonable curtailment of fundamental rights, validating restrictions on fundamental rights for legitimate purposes.
  • The judgment did not strike down the entire act but only the unconstitutional provisions, demonstrating a measured approach.
     
• Weaknesses:
  • The judgment lacked clarity in defining 'clear legislative framework', leaving room for ambiguity and arbitrariness.
  • The protections for commercial speech were narrowed, a view later considered outdated in the case of TATA Press, where commercial speech was seen as a means of informing the public.
  • Invalidating provisions meant for safeguarding public health and preventing misleading advertisements could be seen as judicial overreach.

Conclusion:
In a nutshell, the case analysis conveys that the Hamdard Dawakhana case is a cornerstone of Indian administrative law, delivering lessons that still resonate today about delegated legislation and balancing individual rights with public welfare. It emphasizes the need for clear legislative direction, shaping how courts review executive actions.

The case's cautious stance on commercial speech ignited debates that later rulings clarified. Despite some limitations and unclear points, its impact shines through in key cases like Tata Press and Binoy Viswam, proving its lasting importance, with a combination of principle and practicality, it continues to steer India's constitutional and administrative framework.

References:

1. Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554.
2. The Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954, (Act 21 of 1954).
3. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 US 52 (1942).
4. Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554, para 13 (discussing the distinction between conditional and delegated legislation under the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954).
5. Id., para 18 (holding that the Act's restrictions on misleading advertisements were reasonable under Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India).
6. Baxter v. Ah Way, 8 CLR 626(1909).
7. Field v. Clark, 143 US 649 (1892).
8. In re Delhi Laws Act, AIR 1951 SC 332(1951).
9. Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, 7 SCC 59(2017).
10. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rakesh Kohli, 6 SCC 312(2012).
11. Tata Press Ltd. v. MTNL 5 SCC 139, (1995).

Also Read:

• Growth of Delegated Legislation in India