In Indian constitutional law, judicial appointments have long been a subject of intense debate and scrutiny. The process through which judges are selected has significant implications for judicial independence, accountability, and the overall credibility of the judiciary. Historically, India's judiciary has aimed to shield itself from executive and legislative influence to preserve its impartiality. However, the methods for achieving this independence have evolved over time, particularly through the landmark "Judges' Cases" which established the collegium system.

The collegium system, first formally articulated in the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India case (1993)[1], gave senior judges exclusive control over the appointment and transfer of judges, effectively insulating the judiciary from outside influence. Yet, as the system matured, it drew criticism for lacking transparency and accountability, with no clear criteria for how judges were selected or promoted. The opacity of the collegium system fuelled concerns about favouritism and insularity, raising questions about whether a more open and representative process might better serve India's democratic principles.

The 99th Constitutional Amendment Act of 2014 and the establishment of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC)[2] marked an attempt to reform this insular system. The NJAC proposed a commission that included not only senior judges but also the Union Law Minister and two eminent persons, creating a framework intended to balance judicial autonomy with public accountability. By incorporating voices from outside the judiciary, the NJAC aimed to foster transparency, represent diversity, and democratize the process of judicial appointments.

The NJAC was, however, short-lived. In 2015, in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India[3], a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court declared the NJAC unconstitutional. The Court held that the NJAC threatened the judiciary's independence, which is enshrined as part of the Constitution's basic structure-a set of fundamental features considered essential to India's democratic framework. By reinstating the collegium system, the Court prioritized judicial primacy in appointments, underscoring the importance of a judiciary free from potential executive or legislative influence.

This judgment, widely referred to as the NJAC judgment, remains highly controversial. Proponents argue that it safeguarded judicial independence from political interference, while critics contend that it reinforced an opaque system resistant to reform. The judgment thus raises important questions about the balance between independence and accountability, the role of democratic principles in judicial governance, and the limits of judicial insulation in a democracy. This critique delves into the NJAC judgment's arguments, doctrines applied, judicial interpretations, and its broader implications, providing a comprehensive analysis of a decision that continues to shape India's legal and constitutional landscape.

Name of the Case: Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India (2015)
Judges: J.S. Khehar, Jasti Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ.

The NJAC judgment is officially known as the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India case, decided in 2015 by a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India. This case dealt with the constitutional validity of the 99th Constitutional Amendment, which introduced Article 124A[4], establishing the NJAC to replace the collegium system of judicial appointments.

the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India (2015)[5], commonly referred to as the NJAC case, has its roots in a long-standing tension between judicial independence and the demand for transparency in judicial appointments. The case arose as a challenge to the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, which were both enacted in 2014 to reform the existing system of judicial appointments. Understanding the NJAC case requires delving into the evolution of judicial appointments in India, particularly the series of landmark cases-referred to as the Judges' Cases-that shaped the structure and scope of judicial independence.

The Evolution of Judicial Appointments in India

• First Judges' Case (1982) - S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India: The First Judges' Case established that the executive held a primary role in judicial appointments, with the Chief Justice's recommendation carrying weight but not binding force. This decision affirmed that judicial appointments were a matter of executive prerogative, reflecting a less insulated judiciary that could potentially be influenced by political considerations.
   
• Second Judges' Case (1993) - Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India: In a reversal of the earlier position, the Second Judges' Case redefined judicial independence by giving primacy to the judiciary in the appointment process. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Justice's recommendation, in consultation with the two most senior judges, would have binding authority over the executive. This established the collegium system, where senior judges would nominate appointments based on internal deliberations, marking a decisive shift towards judicial autonomy.
   
• Third Judges' Case (1998): Following ambiguities about the collegium process, the President sought clarification on the system's workings. The Supreme Court expanded the collegium to include the Chief Justice and the four most senior judges, establishing the five-member collegium that would make recommendations for judicial appointments. This interpretation further insulated the judiciary from executive interference but also intensified concerns about the lack of transparency and accountability in the appointment process.

The Rise of Criticism Against the Collegium System

• Lack of Transparency: The collegium system was conducted in secrecy, with no publicly available records on the criteria for selection, the rationale for appointments, or the reasons for rejecting certain candidates. This opacity fueled criticism of favoritism and bias, leading to public perception of an "elite club" selecting its own members without accountability.
   
• Absence of Diversity: Critics argued that the collegium failed to address the need for diversity in the judiciary, particularly in terms of gender, caste, and regional representation. The self-selecting nature of the collegium system often led to appointments that did not reflect India's demographic diversity.
   
• Lack of Accountability: The judiciary's monopoly over appointments meant that it was effectively unanswerable to other branches of government or the public. This lack of accountability clashed with democratic ideals, as an institution crucial to upholding democracy and rule of law appeared isolated from public scrutiny.

The 99th Constitutional Amendment Act and the NJAC Act, 2014

The 99th Constitutional Amendment introduced Articles 124A, 124B, and 124C to establish the NJAC as a replacement for the collegium system.

The NJAC was designed as a six-member body comprising:

• The Chief Justice of India (as Chairperson),
• Two senior judges of the Supreme Court,
• The Union Minister of Law and Justice,

Two eminent persons, appointed by a committee comprising the Chief Justice, the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition.

This structure aimed to balance judicial primacy with executive and public participation. The NJAC Act laid out the procedures for appointment and transfer, as well as rules for decision-making. Importantly, any two members could veto an appointment, providing checks within the commission. By incorporating eminent persons, the NJAC Act sought to democratize appointments and encourage diversity and accountability, addressing key criticisms of the collegium system.

The Challenge to the NJAC Act
Soon after the NJAC's enactment, it was challenged by members of the legal fraternity and public interest groups. Petitioners contended that the NJAC compromised judicial independence, arguing that the inclusion of the Law Minister and eminent persons allowed for potential executive influence in judicial appointments. They contended that this setup diluted the judiciary's control over its composition and, thereby, its autonomy.

The petitioners argued that judicial independence is integral to the basic structure of the Constitution, as established by the landmark Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973)[8] case. Under the basic structure doctrine, they argued, judicial independence is non-negotiable, and any amendment compromising it would be unconstitutional. They further contended that judicial independence must encompass freedom from both direct and indirect forms of political influence, a standard they claimed the NJAC failed to meet.

The Fourth Judges' Case: Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India (2015)[9]
The NJAC case, sometimes referred to as the Fourth Judges' Case, brought the debate over judicial independence, transparency, and accountability to the forefront. The five-judge bench of the Supreme Court undertook the task of examining whether the NJAC Act violated the basic structure of the Constitution. The bench comprised Justices J.S. Khehar, J. Chelameswar, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph, and Adarsh Kumar Goel.

Throughout the hearings, the bench heard arguments on whether judicial independence could be balanced with public accountability through the NJAC. The government argued that the NJAC was a democratic measure to enhance transparency, while petitioners argued that it would allow undue executive interference. The bench deliberated on issues of separation of powers, the role of judicial primacy, and the basic structure doctrine before delivering a split 4:1 verdict in October 2015.

The Decision to Strike Down the NJAC
The Court's majority opinion, led by Justice Khehar[10], struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the NJAC Act as unconstitutional, emphasizing that judicial independence was paramount and inviolable. The Court concluded that the NJAC undermined this independence by granting executive officials and non-judicial members a voice in appointments. The judgment reinstated the collegium system, but also acknowledged its flaws, directing reforms to enhance transparency and accountability within the collegium.

Justice J. Chelameswar[11], the lone dissenting voice, argued that the NJAC was a progressive step toward transparency and inclusivity. He critiqued the collegium's "opaque" practices and highlighted that a reformed NJAC could better align with democratic principles without compromising independence.

Arguments
The NJAC case involved significant arguments from both sides, emphasizing the principles of judicial independence, constitutional interpretation, and the balance of power between different branches of the government.

Arguments in Favor of NJAC

• Enhanced Transparency and Accountability: Advocates of the NJAC argued that it would bring transparency and accountability to the process of judicial appointments. The collegium system, established through judicial precedents, lacked transparency, and was seen as an opaque, self-perpetuating mechanism.
• Reduction of Judicial Overreach: The NJAC sought to strike a balance between the judiciary, executive, and legislature in judicial appointments, arguing that such a balance is essential in a democratic setup. It would prevent the judiciary from becoming a closed institution controlled solely by judges, thereby ensuring greater public trust.
• Improved Representation and Diversity: Proponents argued that the NJAC could contribute to a more diverse judiciary, with appointments made based on merit and diverse representation rather than the perceived favoritism of the collegium.

Arguments Against NJAC

• Threat to Judicial Independence: Opponents argued that the NJAC, by including the Union Law Minister and two eminent persons, posed a threat to judicial independence. They contended that it would increase executive influence over judicial appointments, undermining the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.
• Infringement on the Basic Structure: The primary argument against the NJAC was that it violated the basic structure doctrine, particularly the principle of judicial independence. The basic structure doctrine, established in the Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973) case, holds that certain essential elements of the Constitution cannot be altered even through amendments.
• Undermining Judicial Primacy: Critics argued that the NJAC undermined judicial primacy in appointments, which had been established through the three Judges' Cases (1981, 1993, and 1998). These judgments had recognized the collegium system as a means of upholding judicial autonomy and independence.

Judgment
In a 4:1 majority verdict, the Supreme Court struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the NJAC Act[13], declaring them unconstitutional. The majority opinion held that the NJAC violated the basic structure of the Constitution, specifically the principle of judicial independence. Justice J.S. Khehar led the majority opinion, joined by Justices J. Chelameswar (dissenting on collegium reforms), Madan B. Lokur, and Kurian Joseph. Justice J. Chelameswar provided the lone dissenting opinion, emphasizing the flaws of the collegium system and supporting the need for reforms through the NJAC.

Majority Opinion (4:1)

• Judicial Independence as a Fundamental Principle: The majority opinion, led by Justice J.S. Khehar, stressed that judicial independence is an essential component of the Constitution's basic structure. The majority held that any amendment infringing on this independence would be unconstitutional. By including non-judicial members, the NJAC risked introducing political and executive influence into the judiciary, which the Court deemed a threat to its impartiality and autonomy. Judicial independence, the Court argued, is indispensable for the judiciary to act as a check on the executive and legislature, safeguarding the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution.
   
• The Basic Structure Doctrine: The judgment heavily invoked the basic structure doctrine, first established in Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973). This doctrine limits Parliament's power to amend the Constitution by protecting fundamental principles such as the rule of law, democracy, and judicial independence. The majority opinion emphasized that judicial independence has long been upheld as a crucial element of the basic structure, and any alteration to judicial appointments that could compromise this independence would be unconstitutional. This interpretation reinforced the judiciary's role as the "guardian" of the Constitution, with autonomy from political influence being necessary to maintain its integrity.
   
• Doctrine of Judicial Primacy in Appointments: The Court also underscored the doctrine of judicial primacy, which asserts that the judiciary should have the final say in judicial appointments. The NJAC, by allowing the executive a substantial role, was seen as violating this principle. According to the Court, only judges possess the requisite understanding of judicial competence and can assess candidates for judicial office with the necessary insight. Hence, the judiciary's control over appointments is critical for maintaining standards of judicial competence, integrity, and independence.
   
• Potential for Executive Influence: The majority argued that the inclusion of the Union Law Minister and two eminent persons, appointed by a panel comprising the Prime Minister, Chief Justice, and Leader of the Opposition, introduced an inherent risk of executive interference. The possibility that eminent persons could be selected based on political affiliations or other non-judicial considerations posed a threat to the independence of judicial appointments. Although the NJAC Act included a veto mechanism for two members to block an appointment, the majority expressed concern that this safeguard was insufficient to protect against subtle forms of influence that could erode judicial independence over time.
   
• Transparency and Accountability Concerns: The majority acknowledged the flaws in the collegium system but argued that the NJAC was not the appropriate solution. Justice Khehar noted that while the collegium system lacks transparency, it could be reformed internally to address these issues. The judgment emphasized that judicial independence must take precedence over transparency concerns, given the judiciary's constitutional role. The Court directed the government and judiciary to work together to make the collegium system more transparent and accountable, suggesting reforms but stopping short of prescribing specific measures.
   
• Directive for Collegium Reforms: Despite upholding the collegium system, the majority judgment recognized its shortcomings, particularly its lack of transparency and potential for opacity in decision-making. The Court thus directed the government to consult with the judiciary to devise measures that would enhance the collegium's transparency and accountability. This directive signalled the Court's acknowledgment that while judicial independence is crucial, the appointment process could benefit from procedural improvements that increase public confidence.

Justice J. Chelameswar's Dissent
Justice J. Chelameswar's dissenting opinion brought a different perspective to the table, focusing on the flaws of the collegium system and the NJAC's potential as a corrective mechanism.

• Critique of the Collegium System: Justice Chelameswar was critical of the collegium's opacity and lack of accountability. He highlighted that the collegium's decisions were often perceived as arbitrary, with no clear criteria for selection and no transparency in its deliberations. In his view, the collegium system, though well-intentioned, had failed to uphold the standards of openness and accountability expected in a democracy. He argued that judicial independence should not mean complete insulation from public and governmental input, especially in an age demanding transparency in all areas of governance.
   
• Support for a Balanced Reform: Justice Chelameswar argued that the NJAC provided a balanced approach to judicial appointments, incorporating judicial input while introducing voices from outside the judiciary. He saw the NJAC as a means to address concerns about judicial overreach and self-selection, where judges appointed judges without any external checks. By including non-judicial members, the NJAC could bring fresh perspectives to judicial appointments, potentially enhancing diversity and public trust.
   
• Call for Openness and Reform: In his dissent, Justice Chelameswar also urged for the NJAC to be seen as a step toward democratizing the judicial appointment process. He contended that transparency and accountability could coexist with judicial independence, and that a reformed NJAC could align with constitutional values. His dissent underscored the need for a more open and accountable system that reflects democratic ideals without compromising judicial integrity.
   
• Implications of Dissent: Justice Chelameswar's dissent remains significant, as it highlighted the judiciary's insularity and the need for external input in appointments. His arguments provided a basis for continuing discussions on judicial reforms, even after the NJAC's invalidation. His dissent also underscored the importance of bridging the gap between judicial independence and democratic accountability, suggesting that a compromise could be achievable with better safeguards.

Broader Implications of the Judgment
The NJAC judgment had far-reaching implications for India's judicial and constitutional landscape:

• Reinforcement of Judicial Primacy: The judgment reasserted the judiciary's exclusive authority over judicial appointments, reinforcing its independence from other branches. This decision underscored the judiciary's role as a protector of constitutional rights, free from external influence, especially given the volatile nature of political pressures.
   
• Limitations on Constitutional Amendments: The ruling reaffirmed the basic structure doctrine, emphasizing that constitutional amendments cannot compromise fundamental principles like judicial independence. By invalidating the 99th Amendment, the judgment strengthened the Court's stance that any amendment attempting to alter the balance of powers or undermine core values would face rigorous judicial scrutiny.
   
• Push for Collegium Reforms: Although the judgment invalidated the NJAC, it left open the door for improvements within the collegium system. The Court's directive to improve collegium transparency initiated discussions on reforming internal practices to enhance accountability. Following the judgment, several proposals and recommendations were made, including public disclosure of selection criteria, recording reasons for appointments, and instituting a formal application process to bring more transparency into the collegium's workings.
   
• Ongoing Debate on Judicial Accountability: The NJAC judgment sparked a broader conversation on judicial accountability and the need for a transparent, yet independent, judiciary. Legal scholars, activists, and lawmakers continue to debate potential reforms that could achieve a balance between independence and accountability, addressing public expectations for openness while preserving judicial autonomy
   
• Impact on Future Reforms: The NJAC judgment also serves as a cautionary tale for future legislative or constitutional reforms aimed at altering the judiciary's structure. It established a precedent for cautious and constitutionally sound approaches to judicial reform, warning against hasty amendments that may inadvertently erode fundamental principles. This precedent is likely to influence any subsequent attempts at reform, prompting lawmakers to carefully consider the implications of any changes to the judiciary's autonomy.

Doctrine Applied
The NJAC judgment heavily relied on the Basic Structure Doctrine, established in the landmark Kesavananda Bharati case (1973)[15]. According to this doctrine, while the Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter or destroy its fundamental features. Judicial independence, being a key element of the Constitution's basic structure, was argued to be essential for maintaining the rule of law and the democratic framework of the country.

Another significant doctrine considered was the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, which prevents any one branch of the government from encroaching upon the functions and authority of the others. The NJAC was argued to violate this doctrine by allowing the executive a greater role in judicial appointments, thereby interfering with the judiciary's independence.

Interpretation
The Supreme Court's interpretation in the NJAC judgment was rooted in the preservation of judicial independence. The majority of judges emphasized that judicial independence is not merely an institutional value but an essential aspect of the Constitution's basic structure. They interpreted judicial primacy in appointments as a necessary condition for ensuring that the judiciary remains free from executive and legislative influence.

Justice J.S. Khehar, writing the lead opinion, interpreted Article 124A[16] and the NJAC Act as infringing upon the judiciary's exclusive domain to decide its appointments. His interpretation highlighted that the collegium system, though flawed, was still preferable to the potential risk posed by executive influence in the NJAC. On the other hand, Justice Kurian Joseph emphasized the lack of judicial primacy in the NJAC, arguing that the collegium system's checks and balances were essential to maintaining judicial independence.

Judges' Verdict and Ratio
The ratio of the verdict in the NJAC case was a 4:1 majority, striking down the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the NJAC Act. The judges in the majority held that judicial independence, as part of the Constitution's basic structure, could not be compromised. The inclusion of the Law Minister and two eminent persons was viewed as a significant departure from the constitutional mandate of an independent judiciary.

Justice J. Chelameswar's dissent[17], however, presented a strong critique of the collegium system, which he described as lacking transparency and accountability. He argued that the NJAC, by including eminent persons, could democratize judicial appointments and break the judiciary's exclusivity in selecting judges. Although he supported the principle of judicial independence, he argued that the collegium system's insularity warranted reform through the NJAC.

Critical Opinion
The NJAC judgment represents a turning point in India's constitutional law, bringing to the fore the challenging balance between judicial independence and accountability. While the Supreme Court's decision to strike down the NJAC Act reflects a staunch commitment to judicial independence, it raises complex issues about transparency, checks and balances, and the democratic functioning of the judiciary.

1. The Issue of Judicial Insularity
   The NJAC judgment reaffirmed the collegium system, which has long been criticized for its lack of transparency, inclusivity, and public accountability. Although the collegium was designed to insulate the judiciary from political interference, it has become, in some respects, a closed system lacking external checks. Critics argue that this opacity is antithetical to democratic principles, as the process of judicial appointments affects the entire legal landscape of a democratic nation. Judicial appointments, which influence the highest levels of constitutional interpretation, have far-reaching implications for citizens' rights, societal justice, and state accountability. By insulating the judiciary from external checks, the collegium may foster elitism and reduce the system's ability to reflect diverse perspectives and societal needs.
   
   The judgment's defense of the collegium system overlooks some of these important critiques. Notably, Justice Chelameswar's dissent effectively captures the argument that judicial independence should not come at the expense of accountability. He observed that the closed nature of the collegium results in "judges appointing judges," which could lead to insularity, unchallenged biases, and even favoritism. Justice Chelameswar advocated for a more transparent system that includes external perspectives while safeguarding judicial independence-a perspective I find persuasive and worthy of deeper consideration.
    
2. Failure to Address Transparency Concerns
   The majority judgment acknowledged that the collegium system has flaws, particularly a lack of transparency, but fell short of proposing concrete reforms. Although the Court recommended improvements, it did not mandate specific changes to address opacity. For example, the collegium does not publicly disclose the criteria for appointments, the reasons for selections or rejections, or the outcomes of its deliberations. This secrecy can undermine public confidence in the judiciary, as citizens have no insight into how judges are chosen for one of the most powerful roles in government.
   
   The absence of a transparent mechanism may also prevent the identification of talented candidates who do not have prior connections within judicial circles. This lack of inclusivity could affect the judiciary's quality and credibility, as well as its ability to represent diverse backgrounds and perspectives. The Supreme Court in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India (2017)[18] emphasized that transparency in public appointments is a fundamental requirement, particularly in high offices. However, this principle has not yet been applied to the judicial selection process, leaving the judiciary exempt from the transparency it requires of other public institutions.
    
3. Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability
   While judicial independence is critical, absolute insulation from external checks can be problematic. Judicial independence, as defined in the basic structure doctrine, does not require that the judiciary be completely isolated from other branches. In State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977)[19], the Court held that while separation of powers is essential, collaboration among branches is necessary to uphold constitutional governance. By rejecting any form of executive involvement in appointments, the NJAC judgment risked creating an overly insulated judiciary, where unchecked authority could lead to potential inefficiencies and lack of accountability.
   
   An independent, yet accountable judiciary can be achieved by incorporating external input in a balanced manner. The NJAC Act, by allowing the Chief Justice, the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition to select eminent persons, sought to strike this balance. The NJAC provided a mechanism for executive and public input without undermining judicial primacy, as judges still formed the majority in the commission. Justice Chelameswar's dissent is, again, instructive here: he argued that the NJAC was a practical compromise that recognized the need for judicial independence but also honored democratic accountability. It is my view that a reformed version of the NJAC could have achieved this balance with enhanced safeguards against undue executive influence.
    
4. Implications for Separation of Powers
   The NJAC case also highlights tensions within India's separation of powers. While the judiciary is the guardian of the Constitution, it must coexist within a framework that enables checks and balances among branches. By emphasizing judicial primacy in appointments to the exclusion of all others, the Court reinforced its independence but arguably limited legislative and executive functions related to judicial oversight.
   
   The judgment's rigid stance against any form of executive involvement could set a restrictive precedent, limiting future attempts to involve other branches in judicial appointments. This approach differs from practices in other democracies. For instance, in the United States, the President nominates judges, and the Senate confirms them. In the United Kingdom, a Judicial Appointments Commission[20]-independent yet partially accountable to Parliament-oversees judicial appointments. These models provide a level of oversight without infringing on judicial independence. The NJAC, in its original form, represented an Indian attempt to create a similar balanced system, and dismissing it without attempting to reform or enhance its safeguards could be seen as a missed opportunity.
    
5. Recommendations for a Balanced Approach
   I believe that a reformed NJAC with stronger safeguards against political interference could have been an effective solution to the judiciary's transparency issues. The NJAC model could have incorporated clearer guidelines on the appointment process, transparency measures (such as recording and disclosing reasons for appointments), and an expanded role for legal professionals or academics in the selection process. The NJAC Act could have included an independent body to monitor the selection of eminent persons, reducing the risk of executive influence. This balanced approach would protect judicial independence while addressing concerns about transparency, inclusivity, and democratic accountability.
   
   Alternatively, the collegium system itself could undergo mandatory reforms. For instance, establishing a formalized selection process, creating an oversight body, or requiring regular public reporting on decisions could enhance transparency without compromising independence. These reforms could ensure that the judiciary remains open to public scrutiny while retaining autonomy in its decision-making.
    
6. Inadequacies in Addressing Broader Public Expectations
   The NJAC judgment, by upholding the collegium system without mandatory reforms, may not fully address the evolving expectations of the Indian public, who demand accountability from all institutions of governance. While judicial independence is crucial, modern democratic standards call for institutions, including the judiciary, to be transparent and answerable to the people they serve. Failing to adapt to these expectations could gradually erode public trust in the judiciary. As Justice Krishna Iyer famously observed in S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India (1981)[21], the judiciary must be "open, honest, and transparent" to command respect and inspire confidence. The judiciary's power and responsibility are immense, and this must be accompanied by a corresponding degree of openness to justify its role in a democracy.

Conclusion
The NJAC judgment is a pivotal moment in the history of India's judiciary and constitutional law[22], deeply engaging with the tension between judicial independence and democratic accountability. By invalidating the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the NJAC Act, the Supreme Court decisively reaffirmed its commitment to protecting judicial autonomy-a cornerstone of India's democracy and rule of law. The judgment highlights the judiciary's role as the ultimate interpreter of constitutional principles, empowered to act as a check on the executive and legislative branches. However, it also leaves unresolved questions about transparency and accountability in judicial appointments, which remain a pressing concern for those who advocate for reforms in the judiciary.

The Court's decision to uphold the collegium system reaffirms its belief in a model that has safeguarded judicial independence for decades. Yet, as the judgment itself acknowledges, the collegium system is not without flaws. The lack of transparency, potential for favoritism, and absence of clear criteria for appointments have led to widespread criticism of the collegium process. While the Court's directive for internal reforms in the collegium system is a step in the right direction, it remains to be seen if such voluntary reforms will adequately address these concerns. Public confidence in the judiciary is essential for the effective functioning of a democratic system, and any perception of opacity or elitism in judicial appointments could erode this confidence.

The NJAC case also brings to light the judiciary's complex relationship with the executive and legislature in a constitutional democracy. The Court's decision to reject any form of executive involvement in judicial appointments highlights its resolve to protect judicial autonomy. However, the complete exclusion of the executive raises questions about the balance of power and accountability in a democracy[23].

Other democracies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom[24], have systems that involve a degree of executive and parliamentary oversight in judicial appointments, aiming to balance judicial independence with accountability. The NJAC, in its original form, attempted to introduce a similar model in India by involving a balanced mix of judges, executive members, and eminent persons. By striking down the NJAC without exploring possible reforms or safeguards, the Court may have missed an opportunity to create a more inclusive and transparent appointment process.

Justice Chelameswar's dissent in the NJAC case resonates with the view that judicial independence does not necessarily require complete isolation from external checks. His dissent argued for a balanced approach, advocating a judicial appointment system that upholds independence while also incorporating elements of accountability and public trust.

This perspective reflects the need for a judiciary that is both autonomous and responsive to democratic standards. Chelameswar's opinion raises valid concerns about the risks of a closed collegium system and highlights the potential for a reformed NJAC to bridge the gap between independence and accountability. His dissent serves as a reminder that judicial independence, while essential, must evolve to meet modern expectations of transparency and inclusivity.

The NJAC judgment underscores the judiciary's fundamental role in safeguarding the Constitution and protecting citizens'[25] rights. At the same time, it prompts an urgent need for introspection within the judiciary about how best to enhance transparency and ensure public trust. As India's legal landscape evolves, the judiciary must consider reforms that preserve its independence while adapting to the expectations of an increasingly aware and engaged citizenry.

An effective solution could involve reforms within the collegium system, such as establishing transparent criteria for selection, creating a record of reasons for appointments, and involving a wider range of legal professionals in the process. Alternatively, a re-envisioned NJAC with clear safeguards against executive interference could offer a balanced approach that respects judicial autonomy while enhancing accountability.

The debate initiated by the NJAC case is far from over. As India's democratic institutions continue to mature, the need for a judiciary that is both independent and democratically accountable will remain crucial. The NJAC case has set the stage for ongoing discussions on judicial reforms, emphasizing that the judiciary, like any other institution, must adapt to uphold the values enshrined in the Constitution.

While the collegium system currently prevails, the calls for a more transparent, inclusive, and accountable appointment process are growing louder. In this light, the NJAC should be viewed not as a failed experiment but as an opportunity for the judiciary to reflect on its role within a modern democracy and to consider constructive reforms that can meet both constitutional ideals and public expectations.

In sum, the NJAC judgment reaffirms the judiciary's commitment to independence and its role as the custodian of constitutional principles. Yet, the judgment also opens a door for much-needed reforms that address transparency and accountability in judicial appointments. The pursuit of a balanced approach-one that upholds judicial independence while meeting democratic standards of openness and responsiveness-should remain a priority.

The legacy of the NJAC case will likely influence future debates on judicial reform, reminding us that a resilient democracy depends on an independent judiciary that is also answerable to the people it serves. The challenge ahead is to find a path that protects the judiciary's autonomy without sacrificing its connection to the democratic ideals of transparency, fairness, and accountability.

End Notes:

1. (1993) 4 SCC 441
2. 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014
3. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
4. 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014
5. (2015) 5 SCC 1
6. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149
7. (1993) 4 SCC 441
8. (1973) 4 SCC 225
9. (2015) 5 SCC 1
10. Justice J.S. Khehar's majority opinion in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
11. Justice J. Chelameswar's dissent in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
12. (1973) 4 SCC 225
13. 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014 – Introduced Article 124A
14. (1973) 4 SCC 225
15. (1973) 4 SCC 225
16. 99th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2014 – Introduced Article 124A, establishing the NJAC to replace the collegium system.
17. Justice J. Chelameswar's dissent in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
18. (2017) 9 SCC 766
19. AIR 1977 SC 1361
20. U.S. Judicial Appointment System – Noted as a comparative example where the President nominates judges, and the Senate confirms, adding a measure of public accountability while preserving judicial independence.
21. AIR 1982 SC 149
22. Law Commission of India, 121st Report (1987)
23. United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985) – These international guidelines advocate for judicial selection processes that ensure both independence and accountability.
24. House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (2007)
25. Venkatachaliah Commission Report (2002) – Also known as the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, suggested creating an independent judicial appointments commission to handle the selection process transparently.