Emergence of Second-Generation Rights
In the 1980s, a legal battle commenced in the heart of Bombay that profoundly impacted the lives of not only the ones involved but also the entirety of India's citizenry. It redefined the scope of fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation was a monumental confrontation between the statutory authorities and the human rights of thousands of pavement dwellers and squatters.[1]

The Indian Constitution began with laying down the basic political rights of mankind- rights such as the right to equality, right to freedom of speech and expression, right to life, etc., also known as First Generation Rights. On the other hand, several second-generation rights were encompassed as non-binding aspirations as Directive Principles of State Policy. In the 1980s, due to strong judicial activism, the courts expanded the scope of several fundamental rights, particularly Article 21, to include Second Generation Rights within their ambit.[2]

The significance of the Olga Tellis Case extends beyond its immediate context. This case was a struggle between the right to livelihood and the public order, health and morality. It symbolised the stark realities of life faced by those living on the outskirts of society and brought their plight into the spotlight. It marks a crucial moment in Indian Jurisprudence and serves as a reminder of the judiciary's role as a protector of the vulnerable and underprivileged.

Facts: From the Streets to the Supreme Court of India

The case was set against the backdrop of rapid urbanisation and the burgeoning population of Mumbai (then Bombay). The city saw an influx of migrants seeking refuge on its streets in their makeshift homes. Justice YV Chandrachud described their plight with the following words:
"They constitute nearly half the city's population. Those who have made pavements their homes exist in the midst of filth and squalor. Rabid dogs in search of stinking meat and cats in search of hungry rats keep them company. Their daughters come of age, bathe under the nosy gaze of passers-by, unmindful of the feminine sense of bashfulness. Menfolk, without occupation, snatch chains with the connivance of the defenders of law and order."[3]

In July 1981, the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra, A.R. Antulay, declared that all those living in hutments or squatting on pavements on the streets of Bombay and did not possess photo passes would be forcibly evicted and either deported to their respective places of origin or transported to places outside Mumbai. Subsequently, the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay ordered the removal of these 'encroachments' under Sections 312–14 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (the BMC Act).

In response, the petitioners, which included two journalists, Olga Tellis being one of them, two pavement dwellers, residents of Kamraj Nagar, People's Union for Civil Liberties and the Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights, filed a Public Interest Litigation. They challenged the decision of the Bombay Municipal Corporation under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution on the grounds of violation of their rights under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The petitioners seek a declaration that sections 312, 313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act were invalid as they violated Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. In addition, they urged that the respondent should be directed to withdraw their decision to demolish the pavement dwellings and to restore possession of the sites to former occupants where they were already demolished.

Issues: Right To Life v. Public Order and Health

The court had to take up the following key legal issues to give a ruling in the Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation case:

1. Whether the right to life as laid down under Article 21 includes within its ambit the right to livelihood and if the eviction of the slum dwellers by the BMC without alternative accommodation violated this right?
2. Whether the eviction of the slum dwellers infringed upon the right to reside in any part of India as under Article 19 of the Constitution?
3. Whether the eviction could have been an exception to the infringement of the fundamental rights on the grounds of Public Health and Civic Order?
4. Whether the eviction process followed the procedure established by law and the due process necessary under Article 21?

Petitioner's Arguments: Livelihood As The Lifeline

The petitions put forth by Olga Tellis and the pavement dwellers raised crucial Constitutional debate. The cornerstone of the petitioners' arguments was that the right to life, as under Article 21, also includes the right to livelihood within its ambit. They contended that depriving them of their means of livelihood would directly violate their right to life since this livelihood was intrinsically tied to their residence on the pavement due to its proximity to their workplace. For the pavement dwellers, such an eviction therefore, meant not only a loss of their home but also their means of living, putting their lives at stake.[4]

The petitioners' second argument was that their presence on the pavement was not a matter of choice but a compulsion driven by their socio-economic circumstances. Many of the slum dwellers were migrant workers who had come to Bombay seeking employment opportunities. Due to Bombay's high cost of living, they were forced to live on the pavements. Therefore, they could not be characterised as "trespassers" as it was out of necessity and not a deliberate intent.[5]

The petitioners further contended that the eviction drive violated their Right to reside and settle in any part of India as under Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution. The BMC's actions also violated their Right to freedom of profession of trade or business as under Article 19(g).[6]

The petitioners' urged that Sections 312, 313 and 314 of the B.M.C. Act must either be read down or struck down. They argued that the act was made at a time when the migration of workers to cities was not significant. They further contested that the eviction process was arbitrary as they were not given any prior notice before the demolition of their hutments and their forceful eviction. This, they claimed, violated the principles of natural justice and the due process of law as mandated under Article 21.[7]

Finally, the petitioners asserted that the state was responsible for providing alternative housing for those it sought to evict. They urged the government to adopt a more humane approach and develop policies and programmes to protect the rights of the urban poor while also addressing the concerns of public health and civic order.

Respondents' Arguments: Defending Public Health And Order

The Bombay Municipal Corporation's primary concern was protecting public health and civic order. They argued that the presence of slums and pavement dwellings created unsanitary conditions, posing a risk to public health. They stated that the dwelling lacked proper sanitation facilities, leading to the accumulation of waste and the spread of diseases. Hence, it was necessary to demolish these settlements and evict those living there.[8]

The corporation's second contention was that such occupation obstructed pathways and hindered the free movement of pedestrians and vehicles in the city, creating inconvenience and safety hazards for the general public. Therefore, to ensure a smooth traffic flow, it was essential to clear such encroachments.

The BMC contended that it is their statutory right to remove unauthorised encroachments from public property. In response to the petitioners' argument of violating their right under Article 21, the BMC opposed by stating that while the right to life encompasses the right to livelihood, it did not imply that individuals could occupy public spaces and disrupt public order and health.[9] Dissenting the petitioner's arguments about the lack of alternative housing arrangements, it argued that they had initiated various schemes and programmes to accommodate those evicted.

Judgment: A Legal Safety Net
Led by Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, the 5 judge-bench gave a landmark verdict that expanded the scope of Article 21 to include the right to livelihood within its ambit. In his judgement, Justice Y.V. Chandrachud stated, "The right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along." He opined that the right to life is not limited to mere animal existence. It is not just the protection of the bare body with no concern for shelter, sanitation and other needs.

It was held to be wrongful of the BMC to forcefully evict the pavement dwellers without giving prior notice and without providing them with adequate housing facilities. In the words of Justice Chandrachud, "The eviction of pavement dwellers without notice or opportunity to be heard violated the principles of natural justice."

While it recognised the petitioner's Right to livelihood under Article 21, the court also acknowledged the concerns regarding public health and civic order. Justice Chandrachud stated that the corporation had a legitimate interest in maintaining public health and order, but this interest must be balanced against the fundamental rights of the individuals affected. Therefore, although the court allowed the evictions, it also held that such evictions could be carried out only if the state provided alternative housing facilities to the petitioners and if just and humane treatment to the individuals being evicted was ensured.

The court held in favour of the BMC and permitted the eviction drive. It also upheld the provisions of the BMC Act. It ruled that no one has the right to occupy public property. After receiving several assurances from the Corporation to provide alternative accommodation and equal treatment to those being evicted, this decision was arrived at.

Conclusion: Continuing Relevance and Judicial Echoes
The judgment has set a precedent for future cases involving the rights of the impoverished sections of society and has profoundly impacted urban policymaking. The ruling ensured that the right to life, which was expanded to include the right to livelihood, could not be curtailed without following the procedure established by law and making adequate provisions for the rehabilitation of those affected. Even after four decades, the judgment in the Olga Tellis remains significantly relevant as urbanisation continues to grow, and migration into cities remains a critical issue.

The ruling in the Olga Tellis case expanded by interpreting the scope of Article 21 to include the right to livelihood, laying down a foundation for including socio-economic rights in Part III of the Constitution. It also emphasised the importance of procedural safeguards, leading to a more cautious approach by authorities. The judgment is a guardian of the rights of slum dwellers and urban poor, ensuring a balanced and humane approach towards them by the city's authorities. It has also led to the government's development of housing schemes for the urban poor.

In accordance with the Olga Tellis case, the Supreme Court went a step further in Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Totame, a case concerning the allotment of flats to the weaker sections of society, to emphasise the significance of a minimum standard of accommodation. Interlinking it with the quality of life, the Supreme Court differentiated between the need for an animal and a human being for shelter. For an animal, it is the bare protection of the body, while for a human being, it has to be a suitable accommodation which would allow him to grow in every aspect, physical, mental and intellectual. The Court opined that every citizen must be ensured a roof over his or her head, a reasonable home.[10]

The Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation judgment is, therefore, a testament to the judiciary's role as a guardian of human rights. It underscores the importance of viewing the law through humanity's lens, ensuring that the rights of a few do not trample over the sustenance of others. This judgment significantly impacted Indian Jurisprudence to lead to the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Indian Constitution. As Benjamin Franklin stated, "Instead of cursing the darkness, light a candle." the judiciary, in this case, concurred and urged the civil authorities to develop schemes and programmes to accommodate the urban poor rather than seeing them as a threat to public health and civic order.

Bibliography
Books:

• Mody, Z. (2013). 10 Judgments that Changed India (14th ed.). Penguin Books India.

Cases

• Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180
• Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Totame AIR 1990 SC 630

End Notes

1. The Expansive Interpretation of the Right to Life: An Analytical Discourse on Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Its Jurisprudential Impact
2. Inclusion Of Second-Generation Rights: The Column of Curae
3. Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180 ¶1
4. Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180 ¶21
5. Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180 ¶22
6. Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180 ¶20
7. Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180 ¶25
8. Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180 ¶14
9. Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180 ¶11
10. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Totame AIR 1990 SC 630