The legal treatment of confessions made by co-accused individuals has been a subject of judicial scrutiny in India. The law governing confessions is nuanced, balancing the rights of the accused with the needs of justice.

This article aims to explore the principles laid down in Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, Section 24), and their interpretation in light of the seminal case Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, while also addressing the constitutional safeguards under Articles 20(3) and 21. The article will elucidate the significance of judicial caution in handling such confessions and review relevant case laws.

Introduction
Confession by a co-accused occupies a unique space in criminal jurisprudence, raising critical questions about admissibility, reliability, and the protection of fundamental rights. Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, allows a court to consider a confession by one accused against another co-accused when they are tried jointly. However, this provision does not elevate the confession to the level of substantive evidence.

The landmark judgment in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952 AIR 159) clarified the evidentiary value of such confessions and the importance of corroborative evidence. Additionally, the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) and the broader right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution must be considered while dealing with confessions of a co-accused.

Judicial Interpretation under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act

Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states that when two or more persons are being tried jointly for the same offense, and a confession made by one of them affects both, the court may take the confession into consideration. However, such confessions are not treated as direct evidence. The law requires courts to exercise caution, ensuring that the confession is corroborated by independent evidence before it can be relied upon for a conviction.

The Supreme Court of India in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh laid down the rule that a confession by a co-accused can only be used as a corroborative piece of evidence. It cannot form the sole basis of a conviction. The Court held that the confession should be used sparingly and must be accompanied by strong corroborative evidence against the accused for it to be considered reliable.

In Kashmira Singh, the confession of a co-accused was initially used to convict the appellant. However, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction, stating that the confession was not corroborated by independent evidence. The Court emphasized that while Section 30 allows the court to consider such a confession, it should not be treated as substantive evidence unless corroborated by other material evidence. This case remains a landmark in determining the admissibility and evidentiary value of confessions made by co-accused.

The Constitutional Safeguards: Article 20(3) and Article 21

The Constitution of India provides robust protections to accused individuals, particularly through Article 20(3), which enshrines the right against self-incrimination, and Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.

Article 20(3): Right Against Self-Incrimination

Article 20(3) of the Constitution provides that no person accused of an offense shall be compelled to be a witness against themselves. This protection forms the bedrock of criminal jurisprudence in India, ensuring that confessions obtained through coercion or compulsion cannot be used against the accused. In the context of confessions by co-accused, Article 20(3) ensures that such statements made by one accused cannot be used to unfairly implicate another without corroboration, as reiterated in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978 AIR 1025).

Although Section 30 permits the court to "take into consideration" the confession of a co-accused, it is essential to differentiate between a confession and a forced admission. If a confession is made under duress, it cannot be used under Section 30 or any other provision, as it would violate Article 20(3).

Article 21: Right to Life and Personal Liberty

Article 21 of the Constitution safeguards the right to life and personal liberty. This broad and encompassing right ensures that every aspect of criminal law and procedure adheres to the principles of fairness, justice, and reasonableness. The Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978 AIR 597) interpreted Article 21 to include the right to a fair trial, which directly impacts the admissibility of confessions, especially those involving co-accused.


In the context of confessions, Article 21 ensures that the rights of all accused individuals are protected during trial. Any confession used must be scrutinized to ensure that it adheres to principles of natural justice and does not violate the personal liberty of the accused. The Court in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010 7 SCC 263) also highlighted that involuntary confessions extracted through narco-analysis, brain mapping, or polygraph tests violate Article 21.

Evidentiary Value and Judicial Precedents

The courts in India have consistently followed the principles laid down in Kashmira Singh regarding the treatment of confessions made by co-accused. The case of Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar (1964 AIR 1184) further cemented the position that a confession made by a co-accused cannot be treated as substantive evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that such confessions could only corroborate other evidence and could not be the sole basis of conviction.

In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003 8 SCC 180), the Court reiterated the need for corroborative evidence and highlighted that a confession by a co-accused should be examined with great caution, especially when it is the primary piece of evidence used against an accused.

In a more recent case, Surinder Kumar Khanna v. Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (2018 8 SCC 271), the Court reaffirmed that the confession of a co-accused must be supported by independent evidence, reiterating the limited evidentiary value of such confessions under Section 30.

Conclusion
The law on confessions by co-accused under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, now reflected in Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam Section 24, is a delicate balance between the need to admit relevant evidence and the necessity of protecting individual rights. The Constitution of India, through Articles 20(3) and 21, ensures that such confessions are handled with caution to prevent the miscarriage of justice.

The landmark judgment in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh remains pivotal in shaping the judicial approach to this issue, ensuring that confessions by co-accused are not treated as substantive evidence unless corroborated by independent and reliable evidence. This legal position serves to uphold the principles of fairness and justice, forming the cornerstone of India's criminal jurisprudence.

References:

• Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 AIR 159
• Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, 1964 AIR 1184
• Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, 1978 AIR 1025
• Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597
• State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, 2003 8 SCC 180
• Selvi v. State of Karnataka, 2010 7 SCC 263
• Surinder Kumar Khanna v. Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, 2018 8 SCC 271