Background:
Mob lynching, although originating in Western culture, has seeped into Indian society, particularly due to heightened religious and cultural sensitivities surrounding cow protection. The rise in incidents where vigilante groups target individuals-primarily from minority communities, such as Muslims and Dalits— under the pretense of cow protection was a significant concern. Mob lynching involves groups of people taking law enforcement into their own hands, often filled by rumours and misinformation. These acts of violence occur under the guise of preserving community principles, where vigilantes attempt to impose authority over others.

One of the primary reasons for mob lynching in India is the issue of cattle slaughter, especially cow killing. This sensitive issue has caused violence and unrest, placing both human and animal lives in danger. A deeply rooted caste system and communal prejudices have further complicated the problem, often leading to unconstitutional acts based on baseless rumours and opinions. Communal tensions, especially concerning cow protection, have been at the forefront of these violent outbreaks.

Disturbed by the escalating violence, three individuals-Martin Macwan, a Dalit rights activist, Mohan Hamir Bhai Bedva, an alleged victim of mob violence, and Tehseen Poonawalla, an activist and lawyer— filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India. The petition drew attention to several high-profile lynching cases, including the infamous Dadri Mob Lynching Case (2015) and the Chatra District Lynching Case (2016). These incidents, among others, highlighted the increasing danger posed by unchecked mob violence and the inability of existing legal frameworks to adequately address the issue.

Tehseen S. Poonawala v/s. Union Of India
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 000754 / 2016
(2018) 9 SCC 501
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon'ble Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M.Khanwilkar
Decision Date: July 17, 2018

Key Cases Highlighted

1. Dadri Mob Lynching Case (2015): In this case, Mohammed Akhlaq and his son Danish were accused of slaughtering a cow and storing its meat for consumption. A Hindu mob, acting on these accusations, attacked and lynched Akhlaq and his son. This case marked one of the first religion-based lynchings in India associated with cow protection, igniting widespread concern.
    
2. Chatra District Lynching Case (2016): In Chatra, a mob of "Gau Rakshaks" (cow protectors) lynched two individuals, Ansari and Imteyaz Khan, on suspicion of smuggling and selling cows and oxen. Both men were part of the Muslim community, and the lynching was based solely on unverified accusations.
    
3. Alwar Lynching Case (2017): In this case, a Hindu mob accused several members of the Muslim community of cattle smuggling and slaughter. It was later revealed that the accused individuals had legal licenses to transport cattle, issued by the government. Despite this, they were subjected to violent attacks.

The petitioner contested the laws and provisions related to cow protection in six major states: Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Jharkhand, and Karnataka. They appealed to the Supreme Court to take action against the unlawful practice of mob lynching. The public interest litigation (PIL) filed in 'Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India' became a landmark case, leading to the creation of laws aimed at both protecting cattle and preventing mob lynching incidents.

Facts In Issue:
The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of several laws, including Section 12 of the Gujarat Animal Prevention Act (1954), Section 13 of the Maharashtra Animal Prevention Act (1976). These laws, in their view, shielded cow vigilantes by allowing them to act "in good faith" in the name of cow protection. The petitioners sought an immediate action plan from the government, as well as victim compensation schemes and the removal of inflammatory content from social media platforms that was being used to incite mob violence.

They argued that these cow protection laws violated fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, particularly Article 21 (Right to Life) and Article 15 (Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of Religion, Race, Caste, Sex, or Place of Birth). The petitioners also called for the establishment of specific legislation to address the issue of mob lynching and prevent further acts of violence.

Issues Presented:

1. Whether the Central and State governments should create an effective action plan to combat violent cow protection mobs and develop a victim compensation scheme for lynching victims.
2. Whether separate laws should be enacted specifically to address the offense of lynching.
3. Whether cow protection laws, such as Section 12 of the Gujarat Animal Prevention Act, which protect vigilantes acting in "good faith," are constitutional.
4. Whether the government should issue directives to remove violent social media content uploaded by cow protection groups.

Rule:
It was contended that individuals should not engage in lynching based solely on a perceived or suspected offense. Additionally, it was emphasized that incidents of mob violence and lynching should not be ignored, and the executive authorities must address them. The argument referred to the precedent set in Vahini v. Union of India 2 , which highlighted the importance of controlling such acts.

It was further argued that legal measures can and should be used to protect individuals from being lynched. Moreover, the Central Government has the authority, under Articles 256 and 257 of the Indian Constitution 3 , to issue directives to the State Governments to ensure compliance with the law and to take action to prevent such violent acts.

Arguments From Petitioner:
The petitioners, represented by advocates including Mr. Sanjay Hegde and Ms. Indira Jaising, argued that mob violence cannot be justified based on mere perceptions or rumours of illegal activity. They emphasized the need for law enforcement agencies to take preventive, remedial, and punitive measures to curb such incidents. Citing Martin Luther King Jr., they argued that the law must intervene to prevent mob violence and protect individuals targeted by vigilante groups.

Ms. Jaising further argued that the pattern of lynching incidents showed that they were targeted acts of violence against minorities, particularly Muslims and Dalits. She urged the Court to direct both the Central and State governments to take responsibility for preventing these violent acts and ensuring that the perpetrators are brought to justice.

Arguments From Respondent:
The respondents, representing the Central and State governments, agreed with the petitioners' concerns but argued that the issue of mob violence was primarily a State matter. The Solicitor General, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, stated that the Central government neither condoned nor supported any form of vigilantism and that legal action had already been taken against the individuals involved in the incidents.

The State of Gujarat and the State of Jharkhand submitted that they had implemented necessary measures to address the issue and were actively pursuing cases against those involved in mob lynching.

Analysis And Judgement:
A three-judge bench, led by Chief Justice Dipak Misra, delivered a landmark judgment in the case. The Court held that it was the duty of the State to protect its citizens and ensure that the pluralistic social fabric of the country was preserved. The judgment emphasized that no individual or group should take the law into their own hands or act as vigilantes in the name of cow protection.

The Court described mob lynching as a grave threat to India's democratic values and expressed concern over the growing indifference of the public to such incidents. The judgment underscored that the government must take immediate and effective action to prevent further occurrences of mob violence.

The Court issued several directives, including:

1. Preventive Measures:
   • State governments were ordered to appoint nodal officers to oversee cases of mob violence.
   • The police were directed to disperse mobs under Section 129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
   • First Information Reports (FIRs) were to be filed under Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in cases involving communal violence.
   • The Central and State governments were tasked with curbing the spread of false information and rumours, particularly on social media platforms, that incite mob violence.
      
2. Remedial Measures:
   • The Court called for the establishment of fast-track courts to expedite cases of mob violence.
   • Victims of mob lynching were to be provided with compensation under a victim compensation scheme.
   • Free legal aid was to be made available to the victims and their families.
      
3. Punitive Measures:
   • Strict departmental action was to be taken against law enforcement officials who failed to comply with these directives.
   • Cases of non-compliance were to be treated as misconduct or negligence, with action to be completed within six months.

The Court also directed the Central and State governments to implement these measures and submit compliance reports within four weeks. The judgment classified lynching as a form of "mob violence" and called for compensation for victims, regardless of their religion, caste, or background.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court's judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla vs. Union of India marked a significant step in addressing the issue of mob lynching in India. The Court's directives to the Central and State governments to take preventive, remedial, and punitive measures were aimed at curbing the rising tide of mob violence, particularly against minority communities. The judgment highlighted the importance of preserving the rule of law and ensuring that no individual or group takes the law into their own hands. The case underscored theneed for more robust legal frameworks to address the issue of mob lynching and protect the fundamental rights of all citizens.

References:

• Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India and Others (2018) 9 SCC 501.
• Vatsa, Aditi, et al. "Three Years after Akhlaq Was Lynched in Dadri, Case Is Stuck in 'Fast-Track' Court." The Print, 25 Sept. 2018, theprint.in/india/governance/three-years-after-akhlaq-was-lynched-in-dadri-case-is-stuck-in-fast-track-court
• Vahini v Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 192.