The term 'Interpretation' originates from the Latin word 'interpretari', which denotes the act of explaining, expounding, understanding, or translating. In the legal context, interpretation refers to the process of ascertaining the true and accurate intention of the law-making body, as expressed in the form of statutes. This facilitates the identification of the author's intent.

Interpretation of data involves analyzing the available information and arriving at a definitive and lucid opinion. This enhances an individual's capacity to comprehend and articulate the data in their own manner. It also enables the interpreter to uncover alternative meanings of the statute, leading to a novel interpretation that deviates from the conventional understanding.

The primary function of a court is to interpret the law. When a dispute arises, the court is tasked with interpreting the legislature's intent as expressed in the statute. To achieve this, the court must determine the legislature's intention in the language used in the statute. However, the court is not at liberty to interpret the law arbitrarily. Instead, certain principles, known as rules of interpretation, have evolved through the continuous exercise of the courts.

The terms interpretation and construction are often used interchangeably, although they may have different meanings in jurisprudence. Interpretation refers to the process of determining the true meaning of an enactment by giving the words their natural and ordinary meaning. On the other hand, construction involves drawing conclusions based on the true spirit of the enactment, even if this is not apparent from the words used in the statute.

A mandatory statute is a legal provision that requires the execution of specific actions or mandates that a particular task must be performed in a particular manner or format. On the other hand, a directory statute merely provides guidance or permission for a task to be carried out without mandating its execution. In certain instances, the conditions or formats stipulated by the statute have been deemed crucial to the Act or task regulated by it, and their omission has been deemed detrimental to its validity. In other cases, such requirements have been viewed as mere guidelines, and their disregard results in nothing more than a potential penalty for violating the law. A mandatory provision must be strictly adhered to, while substantial compliance with a directory provision is sufficient.

The Need Of Interpretation of Penal Statutes

Ambiguity of the words used in the statute: Sometimes there will be words that have more than one meaning. And it may not be clear which meaning has to be used. There could be multiple interpretations made out of it.

Change in the environment: It is widely acknowledged that societal norms and values are subject to change over time, and new developments may arise that have not been accounted for. This can result in a lack of predictability regarding future events.

Complexities of the statutes: Statutes are typically intricate and extensive, consisting of intricate terminology, jargon, and technical language that can be challenging to comprehend. This level of complexity can result in confusion.

When legislation doesn't cover a specific area: Legislations often exhibit limitations, leaving certain areas unaddressed and creating ambiguous spaces. In such instances, interpretation plays a crucial role in bridging these gaps and providing clarity.

Drafting error: The drafting process may be undertaken without adequate subject knowledge, potentially resulting in the omission of essential words and the use of incorrect grammar. Consequently, the resulting draft may lack clarity and introduce ambiguity into the legislative framework.

Incomplete rules: There exist a limited number of unspoken rules and regulations, as well as certain unmentioned powers and privileges, which are not explicitly outlined in the statute. When these aspects are inadequately defined within the statute, it results in a state of ambiguity.

General Rule of Interpretation of Penal Statutes

Penal statutes are defined as legislative enactments that impose criminal liability on individuals found guilty of committing an offense. The term "penal" denotes the imposition of punishment by the State against the offender. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, a penal statute is one that is primarily intended to be enforced through the imposition of fines, imprisonment, or other forms of punishment. A statute is considered penal if it imposes a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, except for liquidated damages or other civil remedies.

When interpreting a provision in a penal statute, any reasonable doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the individual who would be subject to the penalty. If a penal provision can reasonably be interpreted in a way that avoids punishment, it must be construed in that manner. In cases where there are two reasonable interpretations of a penal provision, the more lenient interpretation should be applied. Punishment can only be imposed on an individual if the plain words of the penal provision clearly include that person. It is not permissible to extend the meaning of the words to impose a penalty. Furthermore, a penalty cannot be imposed solely based on the desired objective of a statute.

Strict Rule of Interpretation of Penal Statutes

It is a fundamental principle that penal enactments should be interpreted strictly and not expanded beyond their intended scope. According to Crawford, criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, meaning they cannot be enlarged or extended through inference, implication, or equitable considerations. In other words, the language of the statute cannot be stretched beyond its ordinary meaning in order to achieve the general purpose for which it was enacted.

The rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statute be interpreted in a way that no case should be considered within its scope unless it falls within a reasonable interpretation of the statute. It has also been established that when interpreting a penal statute, the principle of favorability to the subject should be applied in cases of doubt.

However, these rules do not undermine the fundamental principles of interpretation, which state that the primary criterion is the language used in the Act, and when the words are clear and unambiguous, the court is obligated to uphold the expressed intention of the legislature.

Basis of Strict Rule of Interpretation of Penal Statutes

The principle of strict construction of penal statutes is rooted in the law's concern for protecting individual rights and the fundamental principle that the authority to define a crime and establish its punishment lies with the legislature, not the judiciary. It is reasonable to expect that the legislature will clearly express its intent in penal statutes. It is not within the court's jurisdiction to create an offense through interpretation, as this could potentially ensnare unsuspecting and uninformed individuals and jeopardize the rights of the general public. The rule of strict construction in penal statutes originated in England during a time when English law imposed excessively severe penalties and extreme sentences for minor offenses.

For example, pickpocketing was punishable by public hanging, cutting down a cherry tree in an orchard was a capital offense, and flicking a handkerchief could result in deportation to Australia. The purpose of strict construction was to mitigate the severity of such harsh sentences and broad condemnations. Although the circumstances that necessitated this rule have changed over time, the distinction in approach between penal statutes and other statutes remains. However, the application of this rule is now limited and only comes into play when there are two or more reasonable interpretations to choose from.

According to Maxwell, the rule of strict construction of penal statutes manifests itself in four ways:

• Express language is necessary for the creation of criminal offenses, therefore, no act is to be deemed criminal unless it is clearly made so by words of the statute concerned. However, it is not necessary that a particular penalty be specified in order that an act or omission may constitute an offense.
• The words setting out the elements of an offense are to be strictly construed. And if there is any reasonable doubt or ambiguity it will be resolved in favour of the person charged. A reasonable interpretation that will avoid the penalty must be adopted. If there are two reasonable constructions, the court must give the more lenient one. The court must always see that the person to be penalized comes fairly and squarely within the plain words of the enactment.
• Punishments can be imposed only if the circumstances of the case fall clearly within the words of the enactment.
• Similarly, statutes dealing with jurisdiction and procedure are, if they relate to the infliction of penalties, strictly construed.

The principle mandating the strict construction of all penal statutes has been elucidated by Lord Justice James in a case representing the Privy Council:
The Court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omissus; that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been included if thought of. On the other hand, the person charged has the right to say that the thing charged, although within the words, is not within the spirit of the enactment. \

But where the thing is brought within the words, and within the spirit , there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any other instrument , according to fair common sense of the language used, and the court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity which would clearly is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity which would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other enactment" (London Railway Co. v Be& N. Eastern Berriman, 1946 , I ALL ER 255, p 270 HL)

Procedure of Strict Rule of Interpretation of Penal Statutes

The principle of strict construction of a penal statute dictates that it should be interpreted narrowly, with a bias towards the person being prosecuted. This rule reflects a preference for protecting the individual's freedom when there is ambiguity in the language of the statute. It is a well-established principle that if the words used in a criminal statute can reasonably be interpreted in two ways, the interpretation that benefits the accused should be favored. However, it is important to consider the context in which the relevant words are used when constructing their meaning.

In the absence of clear language within a statute indicating criminality, it shall not be interpreted as such. In instances where the wording outlining the elements of an offense is ambiguous, creating doubt as to whether the act or omission in question falls within the statutory language, any such ambiguity will be resolved in favor of the accused. The court will only impose punishment upon an individual when the circumstances of the case unambiguously align with the letter of the law.

In Seksaria Cotton Mill Limited Company v State of Bombay, (AIR 1953 SC 278)
In accordance with a notification issued under the Essential Supplies Act 1946, it was mandatory for every manufacturer to provide accurate and truthful information regarding their transactions. Furthermore, the act defined delivery as the physical transfer of goods. In this case, the appellant had sold some bales to a purchaser who, due to a dispute with the appellant, did not take physical possession of the goods.

Instead, the appellant instructed their agent to store the bales in a warehouse until the dispute was resolved. However, the appellant recorded these bales as delivered in their return book. As a result, the High Court convicted the appellant for failing to provide actual physical delivery.

However, upon appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant. The Supreme Court stated that when a penal statute allows for multiple reasonable interpretations, the one that favors the accused should be adopted. In this instance, it was determined that since the goods were indeed physically delivered to the appellant's agent, the requirements of the Act were satisfied without distorting the language.

Beneficial Construction

In cases where there are two potential constructions, the court is obligated to consider the interpretation that exempts the individual from penalty, rather than the one that imposes penalty in situations where ambiguity exists and the legislature has not clearly expressed itself. The code demonstrates a preference for the freedom of the individual and resolves any doubts in favor of the individual. The court is not authorized to expand the meaning of an expression to include situations that would not have been reasonably interpreted under the provision.

In M.V. Joshi v M.U.Shimpi (AIR 1961 SC 14940)-,
The appellant was found guilty under section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 for the sale of adulterated butter. The appellant argued that the product sold did not fall under the definition of butter as per the rules established under the Act, as butter is defined as a product made from milk, whereas the appellant had sold butter made from curd. Additionally, the appellant contended that as the Act is a penal statute, the term butter must be strictly interpreted in favor of the accused.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's argument, stating that the strict construction of a penal statute requires that the conduct of the accused must fall within the plain words of the statute without distorting their natural meaning.

If the conduct does not fall within the plain meaning of the words used, and there are two reasonable interpretations, the interpretation that is more lenient towards the accused must be accepted. In other words, the court must ensure that the conduct charged is an offense within the plain meaning of the words used, without distorting the words. The principle of strict construction dictates that the language of a statute should be interpreted in a manner that excludes any case that does not reasonably fall within its scope. Furthermore, it has been established that when interpreting a penal statute, a key principle is to favor the subject in cases of uncertainty.

However, these rules do not undermine the fundamental principles of interpretation, which assert that the primary criterion is the language employed in the Act. When the words are unambiguous, the court is obligated to uphold the expressed intention of the legislature. In the present case, the term "butter" is unequivocal and does not admit multiple interpretations. Therefore, there is no need to consider an interpretation in favor of the subject.

The appellant's argument that butter made from curd is not covered by the rules established under the Act is unfounded, as butter remains butter regardless of whether it is made from milk or curd. The legislature's intention is evident from the language used, leaving no room for doubt.

Purposive Interpretation of Penal Statutes

It is not imperative for courts to consistently favor interpretations that are advantageous to the accused rather than the prosecution. Instead, they may opt for interpretations that align with the objectives outlined in the law.

In Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra, (1977 SCR (1) 1)
When addressing the provisions of the Food Adulteration Act, it was emphasized that the interpretative process should be guided by the social mission of food laws. This approach ensures that legal measures are effectively applied to all individuals involved in adulteration practices. It is important to discourage any narrow, pedantic, literal, or lexical interpretations that may create loopholes for these dangerous criminals to evade legal consequences. The new criminal jurisprudence must deviate from the old principles that favor accused individuals and hinder the enforcement of criminal statutes designed to safeguard public health and national wealth.

Suppression of the Mischief

The language utilized in the penal statute may be subject to interpretation that effectively addresses any gaps and thwarts any potential harm in accordance with the principles established in Heydon's Case.(3 Co Rep 7a)

In Igbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (AIR 2005 SC 2119)-
The Supreme Court has observed that Section 195(i)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) is applicable only when the offenses listed in the provision are committed in relation to a document after it has been presented or submitted as evidence in a court proceeding, specifically during the period when the document is under the custody of the court. It is important to note that the principle of strict interpretation of statutes that establish offenses or impose penalties is not universally applicable and may not be necessary in every case. Instead, penal provisions should be interpreted in a manner that suppresses any wrongdoing and promotes the objectives intended by the legislature.

In Lalita Jalan v Bombay Gas Company Ltd (AIR 2003 SC 3157)-
The Supreme Court has observed that according to section 630 of the Companies Act 1956, the act of wrongfully withholding a company's property is subject to a fine as punishment. However, it is only considered an offense when a court orders the defaulter to return or refund the property, and if this court order is not complied with. Consequently, this provision cannot be classified as a penal provision since it lacks the typical elements of a crime and punishment. Therefore, it should not be interpreted strictly.

Interpretation of Special Penal Statutes

In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v Jitendra Bhimraj-(1990) 4 SCC 76 )

The Court was deliberating on the application of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 in relation to a dispute between two opposing factions in a village. One of the parties had made references to gaining dominance in the criminal underworld by eliminating their rival faction. However, the Court dismissed the application of the TADA in this particular situation and made the following observation:

"The utilization of the Act is unnecessary if the accused's activities can be controlled and regulated under the existing laws of the country. The Act should only be employed in cases where the law enforcement agencies find the ordinary laws insufficient or ineffective in addressing the threat posed by terrorist and disruptive activities. When invoking a criminal statute, such as the Act, it is the duty of the prosecution to demonstrate, based on the case record and collected documents during the investigation, that the facts presented prima facie constitute an offense as defined by the law.

When a statute imposes special or enhanced punishments compared to those prescribed for similar offenses under the regular penal laws of the country, the judge bears a higher responsibility and duty to ensure that there is prima facie evidence supporting the charges brought by the prosecution. Therefore, when a law imposes severe penal consequences on an individual, extra caution must be exercised to prevent those whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the explicit language of the statute from being implicated by stretching the interpretation of the law.

However, this does not imply that the judicial officer tasked with determining whether or not a case warrants framing charges under the Act should adopt a negative stance. If the prosecution demonstrates that the material presented on record and the relied-upon documents give rise to a strong suspicion of the accused having committed the alleged crime, a charge should be framed."

Therefore, even when considering a strict and literal interpretation of a penal statute, it may not always be the preferred approach. Instead, the law should be interpreted in light of the nature of the offense and the intended purpose of the legislation. The purpose of the law is not to allow offenders to evade punishment. Therefore, a penal statute can also be interpreted to fill any gaps, prevent harm, and promote the intended remedy, as outlined in the rule in Heydon's case. Additionally, a common-sense approach to determining the applicability of a penal law is not prohibited by the principle of strict construction. The court cannot limit the broad language used by the legislature, which aligns with the objectives of the statute.

It has been noted that the responsibility of the court is to interpret the statute to the best of its ability, recognizing that statutes are intended to be effective rather than ineffective, and that only in cases of absolute impossibility should a court deem a statute unenforceable.

It is evident that penal provisions cannot be impliedly extended to specific cases or circumstances. There is no presumption of constructive commission of a crime. Penal statutes typically have a prospective application. If there is a reasonable interpretation that avoids a penalty, it must be accepted.

When a provision can be reasonably interpreted in multiple ways, the interpretation that causes hardship or injustice must be avoided. When interpreting a penal statute, it must be remembered that punishment can only be imposed when the accused's conduct clearly falls within the letter of the law. The use of violent language does not permit an enactment entailing penal consequences to be brought within the express words of the Act.

However, a penal statute must not be construed in a way that narrows down its words to exclude cases that would ordinarily fall within its scope. An accused can argue that their conduct, although falling within the express language of the statute, is against its spirit. Nevertheless, if the conduct is both within the letter of the law and its spirit, the court must interpret it like any other statute according to its fair and common-sense meaning.

Thus the rule regarding the interpretation of penal statutes can be summarized as follows:

• As a general principle, penal statutes ought to be interpreted strictly. In other words, if there are two plausible and rational interpretations of a penal provision, the court must favor the construction that absolves the individual from punishment, rather than the one that imposes it. It is not within the court's jurisdiction to expand the meaning of a term used by the legislature to fulfill the legislature's intent. The responsibility of defining a crime and prescribing its penalty lies solely with the legislature, not the court.
   
• In instances where a subsequent penal statute introduces a novel mode of punishment, such as the transformation of a fine into imprisonment, it is deemed that the two statutes operate in a cumulative manner.
• By substituting a distinct penalty, such as increasing a fine from its original amount, an implicit revocation of the preceding legislation is inferred.
   
• Where a later statute gives a new form of procedure, for example when the procedure for trial of a non-cognizable offence is altered to the procedure for trial of a cognizable one, the two Acts are considered as cumulative.
   
• In the event that a deviation occurs in the established procedure, such as the introduction of a right of appeal where none previously existed, it can be inferred that the earlier statute has been implicitly repealed.
   
• In cases where there is a modification in the significance or conditions of a preexisting offense, it can be inferred that the earlier statute is repealed.
   
• Section 26 of the General Clauses Act pertains to the regulation of offences that are punishable under multiple enactments. It stipulates that if an act or omission qualifies as an offence under two or more enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and penalized under any of those enactments, but shall not face double punishment for the same offence.
   
• In a contemporary welfare State, numerous statutes exist to prohibit specific actions. If the legislative body solely declares an act as invalid and offers compensation as a means of rectification for the affected individual, it will be categorized as a remedial statute. However, if the statute additionally includes penalties for non-compliance with the law, such as imprisonment or fines, it will be classified as a penal statute.
   
• A remedial statute should be interpreted in a broad and generous manner. In instances where there is uncertainty regarding its meaning, the interpretation should lean towards favoring the group of individuals intended to benefit from the statute. Conversely, a penal statute should be interpreted strictly. In situations where doubt arises, the interpretation should lean towards favoring the accused.
   
• A statute can possess both penal and remedial characteristics, and these aspects may be present within the same legislation. In such instances, the guiding principle of interpretation is as follows: it is important to remember that while the statute and its accompanying rules aim to provide protection for a specific group of individuals, any violation of these provisions will result in penal repercussions. Therefore, when penalties are imposed, it is not permissible to distort the language of the rule, regardless of its well-intentioned purpose, beyond its fair and ordinary meaning.

Conclusion
Previously, it was commonly held that penal statutes should be interpreted strictly in favor of the accused. However, two opposing developments have since influenced the interpretation of such statutes. Firstly, the reduction of punishments has alleviated the pressure on courts to strictly construe statutes in favor of the accused. Secondly, the modern imperative of crime control has led to a legislative intention for rigorous implementation, prompting courts to emphasize strict interpretation of statutes, regardless of whether it favors the accused.The intention of the legislature is now recognized as the driving force behind statutory interpretation.

References:

• GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, XIII Ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, 212 239-240
• Statute Interpretation: Everything important you should know about - written by Karunashankar K.N.
• The Interpretation Of Statutes - Prof. T. Bhattacharyya
• Maxwell Interpretation Of Statutes, 12th Edition