Contextualising the Court's decision: introduction
About 10 years after the plight of a visually impaired Scheduled Caste woman who was raped reached before the bench of Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and M.R. Shah, the Court analysed intersectionality comprehensively and how gender oppression cannot be understood in isolation. The bench did an in-depth analysis of how such cases should be dealt with and what punishment is to be awarded in such circumstances.

The genesis of the case was rooted in a blind girl belonging to a Scheduled Caste community being raped inside her own house by a person who was known to the family. The accused was convicted by the Sessions Judge under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act[1] and Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code.[2]

The High Court, by its judgement, affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Court, as a result of which an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for an offense punishable under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code; however, conviction under Section 3(2)(v) was set aside on the basis of lack of evidence to conclude that the victim was raped on the ground of her belonging to the Scheduled Caste community as required by the causation standard mentioned in the SC and ST Act.

Prefatory Details
Court: Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
Date of Decision: April 27, 2021
Judges: Justices Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, M.R. Shah

The factual matrix: backdrop of the case and legal progression
In the instant case, the appellant was residing in the same village as the victim and was engaged in carrying out manual work, where brothers of the victim also worked. On 31 March 2011, the mother of the victim was attending to her domestic duties at a nearby public water fountain when the appellant came and inquired about her sons. Her husband and sons were cutting firewood in the vicinity. Upon knowing this, the appellant went to the victim's house, bolted the door, and then gagged and raped her. After hearing the voice of the victim, her mother rushed to the house and called her sons and husband as the door was locked.

The appellant then opened the door and tried to escape but was apprehended there. He was handed over to the police, after which charges were framed against him under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act. The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court under Section 376(1) on the basis of the medical evidence and the testimonies of the victim, her mother, and her brother.

The Sessions Judge, while concluding that an offense under Section 3(2)(v) is committed, observed that the contention of the accused that he did not commit the offense merely on the ground that the victim belongs to a scheduled caste has no merit. It was also contended that the victim's mother did not mention in the police report that the offense was committed on her daughter because she belonged to Madiga of Scheduled Caste. Regarding this, it was said that the mother of the victim was an illiterate village rustic woman, which is why her inability to furnish the said information in the report should in no way be fatal to the case of the prosecution as it would lead to miscarriage of justice.

The Sessions Court, while justifying the conviction, said that in villages where casteism is of profound importance to its people, if the victim would have belonged to an upper caste, then the accused would have never dared to commit such a heinous offense. Hence, the accused had committed the offense in the impression that the victim is helpless and can do nothing against him as she is a woman, blind, and belongs to a scheduled caste. In lieu of this, the Court held that the prosecution has established its case under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act.

This conviction was affirmed by the High Court, after which it was challenged before the Supreme Court, contending that ingredients of the offense under Section 3(2)(v) were not established as the offence was not committed against the victim 'on the ground' that she belonged to a Scheduled Caste. Hence, counsel on behalf of the appellant said that imposition of life imprisonment in respect of an offense under Section 376 of the Penal Code was not in accordance with law. Before analysing this motion, the Court held that offense under Section 376(1) was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Then the Court proceeded towards the question of conviction under the SC & ST Act. While setting free the appellant from the conviction under Section 3(2)(v), the Court talked about intersectionality in detail, i.e., the interconnectedness of discrimination based on multiple social identities such as gender, caste, and disability. Gender violence cannot be studied on its own, as an outcome could be a result of oppression on the basis of multiple identities. The Court said that when the identity of a woman intersects with, inter alia, her caste, class, religion, disability, etc., she can face discrimination or disadvantage due to two or more grounds.

For example, transwomen can face violence because of their heterodox gender identity. Hence, under such situations, it is imperative for the Court to not use a single-axed approach and have an intersectional lens to analyse how oppression of a blind scheduled caste woman can be a result of various identities or sources.

Justice Chandrachud further cites Kimberly Crenshaw's enunciation of the intersectional nature of gender violence.[3] In her study, she has highlighted the intersectional nature of gender violence by stating that the singular focus on rape as a manifestation of male power over female sexuality will eclipse the use of rape as a tool of inflicting racial terror in the minds of black women.

Then in 1991, Crenshaw applied this concept to study violence against women of colour and evaluated the interaction between multiple identities of a person, particularly her race, gender, poverty, immigrant status, and minority status, that placed such a person in violent relationships.[4] Before this judgment, in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India[5], the Court applied the intersectional lens to Article 15(1) of the Constitution.

But the concept was not discussed at length. The Justice J.S. Verma Committee had also suggested reforms in the criminal law, observing that equality of gender must be ensured, which means that a woman should not suffer on account of gender, caste, religion, or any other ground. It substantiated the same by explaining with the help of an example of how a woman suffers a double disadvantage in the form of her being a woman and belonging to a disadvantaged caste, religion, or group.

The Court further delved into the origin of a single-axis model and said that it is a consequence of how historically movements aiming for legal protection of marginalized populations developed. Most liberation movements focused on one sole objective like feminism, queer liberation, anti-caste, etc. Thus, these failed to address the intra-group diversity, leading to a situation where the interests of relatively privileged members within the group were taken into account. The law incorporated these liberation struggles and turned out to be based on a single-axis model.

It developed into mutually exclusive terrains of different statutes dealing with distinct oppressions, failing to take into consideration the intersectional nature of marginalities. The intersectional approach to discrimination challenges the traditional notion of a single-axis model. It centers on the concept of 'intersectionality,' which acknowledges the complexity of an individual's identity.

This perspective recognizes that identity is comprised of various intersecting characteristics such as caste, sex, race, and sexuality. It emphasizes a realistic understanding of identity as multidimensional, rejecting the simplistic view that discrimination stems from one isolated characteristic like race or sex. In this framework, 'integrity' is crucial, signifying that identities should not be viewed in isolation but rather as interconnected aspects of a person's identity.

For instance, a disabled woman cannot be solely categorized as oppressed based on either her disability or gender alone. Each person's identity consists of multiple layers, including race, gender, religion, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, and caste. Consequently, individual experiences of oppression cannot be uniformly generalized, as these layers interact within society.

The interaction of these layers forms a person's identity, and oppression can be exacerbated when these intersecting identities are considered. Therefore, identifying the specific characteristic of identity responsible for oppression becomes challenging in an intersectional context, as multiple layers often operate simultaneously. The consideration of the 'cumulative effect' of marginalized identities on an individual's daily life is essential. It is imperative to treat each person as an integrated whole, devoid of fragmentation. Scholar Shreya Atrey illustrates this concept by referencing the insights of Patricia Monture-Angus, a Mohawk woman from Canada, as given in the judgment.

The Court underscores the necessity of exploring all conceivable permutations to comprehensively understand the intersectional discrimination faced by the victim when comparing their experiences to establish discriminatory behavior. Scholars studying intersectional discrimination further elucidate this concept, demonstrating that in societal contexts, a Black woman seeking redress for intersectional discrimination based on race and gender should not only be juxtaposed with White men but also with Black men and White women. The Supreme Court's embrace of the intersectionality principle acknowledges that identities are socially constructed, fluid, and dynamic, and that power dynamics are distributed differentially across various social identities.

For many disabled women and girls in India, the constant threat of violence severely restricts their freedom of movement and limits their ability to lead fulfilling lives as guaranteed by the constitution. This vulnerability can create a sense of powerlessness and hinder the realization of their rights outlined in Parts III and IV of our Constitution. It's important to reject the notion that persons with disabilities are inherently weak or incapable of autonomy, as this contradicts the progressive understanding of disabled lives in our legal framework and society.

Our focus should be on acknowledging the heightened vulnerability and dependence on others experienced by disabled women, making them more susceptible to sexual violence. Despite inhabiting a world designed for the able-bodied, they are often viewed as easy targets for such violence. Therefore, our legal response must prioritize addressing this vulnerability.

In this judgment, the bench further highlighted the unique factors that make these women more vulnerable to sexual violence, discussed the challenges they face in accessing the criminal justice system, proposed measures to reduce such barriers, and outlined a judicial approach for assessing their testimony.

The Court said that women with disabilities are more vulnerable to oppression or violence. For substantiating the same, it cited several reports. It said that the report by Human Rights Watch of 2018 titled 'Invisible Victims of Sexual Violence: Access to Justice for Women and Girls with Disabilities in India' thoroughly examines the issue of sexual violence against this vulnerable demographic.[6]

The report highlights the experiences of 17 survivors living with various physical, sensory, intellectual, and psychosocial disabilities. It emphasizes that women and girls with disabilities are at a heightened risk of sexual violence due to various factors, like those with physical disabilities who may struggle to escape violent situations due to limited mobility, while those who are deaf or hard of hearing may face challenges in calling for help or communicating abuse.

Additionally, women and girls with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities may lack awareness that non-consensual sexual acts are criminal offenses, hindering their ability to report incidents and seek support throughout the justice process. The Court also highlighted that unfortunately, in India, there is no disaggregated data on the extent of violence against women and girls with disabilities, making it difficult to comprehend the issue and develop appropriate solutions.
Two studies referenced in the report shed light on the scale of the problem: a 2004 survey in Orissa revealed that nearly all women and girls with disabilities surveyed experienced domestic violence, with 25% of women with intellectual disabilities reporting rape. Similarly, a 2011 study found that 21% of women with disabilities faced emotional, physical, or sexual violence from individuals other than their intimate partners.

The report also presents distressing examples where survivors' disabilities were exploited by perpetrators of sexual violence, such as the case of a visually impaired woman from Bhubaneshwar, Odisha, who struggled to access legal aid after alleging rape in June 2013. Despite assistance from a residential shelter home, she encountered difficulties finding a free-of-cost lawyer, affecting the progress of her case.

Following the Nirbhaya rape incident that deeply impacted the nation, significant changes were made to Indian criminal law under the guidance of the Justice J.S. Verma Committee. Recognizing the need to empower women with disabilities to report cases of sexual violence and access appropriate redress, the Committee emphasized the importance of creating an enabling environment. This led to amendments in the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, introducing special provisions for survivors with disabilities.

These changes include recording FIRs in the presence of special educators or interpreters, accommodating statements during trials, and facilitating participation in test identification parades under judicial supervision. However, challenges persist as survivors with disabilities face barriers such as communication difficulties, lack of support, and unfamiliar court environments.

The Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has highlighted these challenges, emphasizing the need for a conducive environment for survivors to express grievances and seek justice. Additionally, concerns raised by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities regarding the lack of measures to prevent violence, limited availability of shelters, and inadequate remedies further underscore the need for comprehensive reforms.[7] While legal amendments represent progress, effective implementation and awareness-raising efforts are crucial. Recommendations include sensitizing judicial officers, appointing trained educators and interpreters, maintaining disaggregated data on gender-based violence, providing regular sensitization training to police officers, and conducting awareness campaigns for women and girls with disabilities.

These measures aim to ensure a more inclusive and responsive criminal justice system that upholds the rights and dignity of survivors with disabilities. It's important to note that these suggestions are not a critique of the handling of the instant case but rather a reflection of broader systemic reforms needed to address such cases effectively.

The court further extensively examined the testimony of the prosecutrix in the case. The session judge emphasized that although identifying the accused solely based on voice might be considered weak evidence, the blind prosecutrix could effectively recognize the accused through his voice. The judge referenced corroborating evidence from other witnesses and the accused's own admission, dismissing doubts cast on the prosecutrix's testimony. However, in the High Court, the defense attempted to discredit the prosecutrix's testimony due to her disability, although this argument wasn't pursued further.

Nonetheless, the court reaffirmed the session judge's conclusion and clarified the legal standpoint on this matter. It highlighted instances where the testimony of disabled prosecutrices was not taken seriously, as happened in the case of Mange v. State of Haryana.[8] The Court said that this underscores the importance of understanding how disability operates.

Such presumptions of incapacity reflect societal stereotypes and may lead to miscarriages of justice by devaluing crucial testimonies. The court stressed that the legal personhood of disabled individuals should not be based on inferiority stereotypes, emphasizing that their testimonies should be treated with equal weight if they meet judicial standards. Acknowledging the different ways in which disabled individuals interact with the world, the court emphasized the importance of considering the context of their testimony. In this case, for example, the blind prosecutrix relied on sound for identification, warranting equal consideration of her testimony.

Furthermore, the Court stated the manner in which sexual violence against women from SC and ST communities occurs on social and economic grounds and thus emphasized the adoption of a contextualized legal analysis that is sensitive to the nature of evidence likely to be presented in cases where various marginalities intersect.

The offense took place in 2011, before the amended provisions of 2015 came into effect. The accused and the victim hail from the same village, with the accused regularly visiting the victim's home due to his acquaintance with her brothers. Despite the accused's awareness of the victim's caste, the pre-amendment scenario required more than mere knowledge to establish guilt.

While the absence of mentioning caste identity in the complaint was deemed irrelevant, separate evidence was crucial to proving the charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, which was lacking in this instance. The court's decision aligned with the principles of ex post facto law, recognizing that the amended provisions, introduced by the 2015 amendment, could not retroactively apply to the benefit of the victim in this case.

Therefore, the accused was acquitted due to insufficient evidence, with the court acknowledging the potential for intersectional analysis facilitated by the post-amendment scenario, where mere knowledge or acquaintance with the victim's family suffices to attract charges under Section 3(2)(v) of the amended 1989 Act.

In the case under consideration, the Supreme Court acknowledges the compounded vulnerability of the victim due to her disadvantaged social background and visual impairment, which left her particularly susceptible to the actions of the accused. Affirming the findings that the accused had frequented the victim's residence and was well aware of their social circumstances, the court emphasizes that while there is no evidence demonstrating that the offense was committed specifically based on the victim's Scheduled Caste status, her caste identity remains relevant in the sentencing process under Section 376 of the SC and ST Act.

Recognizing the severity of the offense and the unique challenges faced by the victim, the Supreme Court upholds the Sessions Court's decision to impose a life sentence, considering it appropriate given the circumstances. Additionally, the court confirms the fine of Rs. 1000/- and default imprisonment of six months, as initially prescribed by the Sessions Judge and upheld by the High Court.

Dissecting the final judgment: a critical examination of its key elements
Although the judgment's ratio seems to be predicated on sound logic, it still suffers from marked shortcomings. Upon dissecting the judgment, it can be deduced that the Court has given progressive obiter but regressive ratio. While the Court's textual interpretation led to setting aside the conviction under the SC & ST Act, I contend that given the social background and severity of the crime, a more prudent interpretation of the law was warranted, considering its broader implications. Despite the accused's conviction under Section 376, it's essential for courts to acknowledge caste-based violence and recognize the intersectionality of factors such as gender, caste, and disability that compound the victim's distress.

Women from scheduled castes facing physical disabilities not only endure societal marginalization but also lack representation in mainstream law and policy. Although the Court recognized intersectionality in the Patan Jamal Case, its failure to apply this principle in the context of prevalent sexism and casteism in India is a contradiction. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act enhances the punishment of an offense if it is committed "on the ground" of the victim belonging to the SC or ST community.

The Act was amended in 2015 to ease the burden of evidence, shifting from proving 'on the ground' to demonstrating mere knowledge of the victim's caste identity. However, as the incident occurred in 2011, the Court did not apply the amended law. Regrettably, the Court opted for a narrow interpretation of 'on the ground', ruling that insufficient evidence existed to establish that the accused committed the rape based on the victim's caste identity, thus precluding an offense under the SC & ST Act.

The Sessions Court Judge's observation in the verdict is particularly noteworthy and seems more apt in the current context. The evidence suggests that the accused regularly visited and was closely associated with the victim's family. Hence, it can be reasonably inferred that the accused was cognizant of the victim's caste. It was pointed out that in rural settings, had the accused not known about the girl's scheduled caste status, he would not have ventured to assault her, especially by intruding into her home while her mother was nearby.

This indicates that the accused perceived the girl's disability and caste as factors rendering her vulnerable, motivating him to commit the violent act. Thus, understanding the power dynamics within a specific context is vital for identifying the various forms of discrimination or oppression it fosters.

Under the heading titled "Different Hues of Intersectionality," in the judgment, the Court emphasized that the discrimination experienced by a woman from a scheduled caste differs significantly from that encountered by an upper-caste woman. Consequently, relying solely on a single-axis framework of law fails to adequately address the challenges confronted by women marginalized on multiple levels within the societal hierarchy. By adhering to the prevailing interpretation of the law, which often reflects the experiences of privileged individuals, the legal system overlooks the issues faced by those marginalized across various dimensions.

The Joseph Shine[9] case extensively discussed the romanticization of female chastity, emphasizing the longstanding perception of women as prized possessions, bringing pride when retained and shame when lost. Consequently, rape and other forms of sexual violence have commonly been employed to subjugate women and tarnish their perceived purity.

However, it is imperative to consider the predicament of women historically labeled as 'impure' and marginalized within society. Sexual violence against lower-caste women cannot be solely attributed to a desire to restrict their freedom; it is compounded by the entrenched caste hierarchy and its associated history of violence. This hierarchy exacerbates the vulnerability of Dalit women, subjecting them to sexual violence from both men within their own caste and those of upper castes seeking to assert dominance.

A similar dynamic is evident in cases like Vishaka[10], where sexual violence serves not only as an act of vengeance but also as a means to reinforce power dynamics and suppress dissent. Just as black feminism argues that sexual violence against black women cannot be viewed solely through a racial lens, acts of sexual violence against women of scheduled castes must also be understood as attempts to perpetuate caste biases and maintain power hierarchies.

The Court, in the judgment of the present case, referenced previous cases such as Khuman Singh v. State of MP[11] and Ashrafi v. State of Uttar Pradesh[12] to emphasize that dismissing a claim under the SC & ST Act solely because the crime was not committed 'only' on the basis of the victim's caste overlooks the pervasive nature of social inequalities. However, in the present case, the Court found the prosecution's evidence insufficient to establish that the crime fell under Section 3(2) of the SC & ST Act, thereby setting a high evidentiary threshold for addressing deeply entrenched social biases that lack tangible proof. The court's requirement for evidence essentially amounts to proving an 'intention' to harm the dignity of a person based solely on their caste.

Despite the necessity for legislation like the SC & ST Act to combat caste biases within the system, the court has consistently failed to recognize this need. At each stage of inquiry and investigation, the dignity of those seeking justice is compromised, undermining the very purpose of the Act. Furthermore, individuals for whom the SC & ST Act was enacted often lack the means to meet the court's demanding evidentiary standards, further exacerbating the obstacles they face in seeking justice.

The Court's choice to overlook the interaction between caste and power in rural politics, where caste biases are openly present, is unfortunate. It underscores how the prevailing societal conditions do not serve as adequate evidence for a woman to establish her caste-based disadvantage, alongside her gender. In a moment where the Supreme Court could have embraced a judicious and more practical approach for incorporating intersectionality into Indian legal practice, it instead established yet another precedent regressive in nature.

The criticisms of the old SC & ST Act and past judgments constitute obiter and do not change the position of law as the matter was not referred to a larger bench, whereas the additional restrictions [like separate evidence for proving guilt under Section 3(2)(v)] it introduces are part of the ratio, as they constitute the core of the Court's decision. Although there are pitfalls in the judgment, but those do not undermine its importance as a whole because of the explicit recognition that it gave to intersectionality. Hence, credit to this judgment should be given for inculcating the concept of intersectionality in our jurisprudence.

Encapsulation of the findings: conclusion
In this landmark judgment the Supreme Court of India has made a significant contribution to the discourse on intersectionality within the Indian legal context. By meticulously analysing the complex interplay of caste, gender, and disability, the Court has emphasized the necessity of adopting a nuanced approach to understanding and addressing multifaceted discrimination. The decision to uphold the conviction under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code reflects the Court's recognition of the gravity of sexual violence, particularly in cases involving vulnerable victims. The judgment also underscores the importance of acknowledging the compounded disadvantages faced by individuals with intersecting identities, such as a Scheduled Caste woman with a disability.

However, the Court's rejection of the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act, due to insufficient evidence of caste-based intent, highlights the challenges in applying legal standards to cases of intersectional oppression. While the Court's refusal to apply the amended 2015 provisions of the Act, which lowered the evidentiary threshold, reflects adherence to ex post facto principles, it simultaneously reveals the limitations of a rigid legal interpretation in addressing the nuanced realities of caste-based violence.

Despite these limitations, the judgment's embrace of intersectionality represents a progressive step towards a more inclusive and comprehensive understanding of discrimination. The Court's acknowledgment of the broader socio-economic and identity-based factors influencing the victim's vulnerability marks a significant advancement in Indian jurisprudence.

In conclusion, Patan Jamal Vali serves as a pivotal case in reinforcing the importance of intersectional analysis in legal adjudication. It compels future courts to consider the complex interplay of multiple forms of discrimination and underscores the need for legal reforms that better address the multifaceted nature of oppression. This case not only highlights the judiciary's evolving sensitivity to intersectional issues but also calls for ongoing efforts to ensure that legal frameworks effectively address the diverse and compounded vulnerabilities faced by marginalized individuals.

References

1. Patan Jamal Vali v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2021 SC 2190, available at: https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/patan-jamal-vali-vs-state-of-andhra-pradesh-ll-2021-sc-231-392524.pdf (last visited on August 31, 2024).
2. Indian Law Institute, ILI Summer Law Review (ILI, Delhi, 2021).
3. Patan Jamal Vali v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2021 SC 2190, available at: https://theamikusqriae.com/patan-jamal-vali-vs-the-state-of-andhra-pradesh-2021-jc-sc2856/ (last visited on August 31, 2024).
4. Patan Jamal Vali v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2021 SC 2190, available at: https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2021/04/29/a-blind-scheduled-caste-woman-raped-supreme-court-explains-intersectional-oppression-and-how-it-needs-to-be-addressed/ (last visited on August 31, 2024).

End Notes:

1. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India).
2. The Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860.
3. K. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of anti-discrimination doctrine, feminist theory, and anti-racist policies, 4 UNI. OF CHICAGO L.F. 149 (1989).
4. K Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against women of color, 43 SLR 1241, 1246-50 (1991).
5. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.
6. Invisible Victims of sexual violence: Access to Justice for women and girls with disabilities in India, Human Rights Watch (April 3, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/03/invisible-victims-sexual-violence/access-justice-women-and-girls-disabilities.
7. Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of India, COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (Oct. 29, 2019), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3848327?ln=en.
8. Mange v. State of Haryana, (1979) 4 SCC 349 (India).
9. Joseph Shine v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2018 S.C. 4898.
10. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 (India).
11. Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 2019 S.C. 4030 (India).
12. Ashrafi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 2017 S.C. 5819 (India).

Award Winning Article Is Written By: Ms.Gunseerat Kaur

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