It is common knowledge that even after the hearing/arguments are completed, the Courts do not pass the judgment/order within a reasonable time frame. As a result thereof the confidence of the litigating parties tends to be shaken due to the excessive delay in delivery of judgment. The reasons for the same could be lethargy, incompetence, lack of knowledge or any ulterior motives best known to the presiding officer.

This phenomenon is more common in District Courts, Revenue Courts & Officials engaged in Quasi Judicial proceedings. A question therefore arises is to what is the reasonable time within which the order should be passed after due completion of hearing? A corollary to the question is that if an order is delayed, what is the legal consequence and remedy for the same.

It is relevant that our Constitution does not provide anything for this eventuality because the architects of the Constitution believed that Judges would never cause such long and distressing delays. Practically speaking, once arguments in a case are concluded before the Judges and the judgment is not given within a short span, the Judges themselves normally forget the details of the facts and niceties of the legal points advanced and the interest of fair justice gets a lethal blow.

The Apex Court in the case of R.C. Sharma v. Union of India 1976 (3) SCC 574 laid stress on the necessity of expediting delivery of judgments. The Court expressed thus:

The Civil Procedure Code does not provide a time limit for the period between the hearing of arguments and the delivery of a judgment. Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of a judgment, unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is the litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation.

This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments. Justice, as we have often observed, must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done."

The Courts have consistently held that on the ground of delay in rendering the judgment for the period ranging from six months to ten months, such judgments were bad in law and have set them aside. The Courts have reiterated that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment, unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable.

The Courts have maintained that any procedure or course of action which does not ensure a reasonable quick adjudication is manifestly unjust. Such a course is also contrary to the maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit", that an act of the Court shall prejudice none.

It would be apropos to refer to Kunwar Singh v. Sri Thakurji Maharaj 1995 Supp (4) SCC 125 wherein the Apex Court held that inordinate delay in pronouncing judgment may be ground enough for it to be set aside. This delay in pronouncing judgment was accepted as a worthy ground for it to be set aside and the matter required to be reheard. The following observations of the Court are reproduced below.

4. We do not propose to examine the larger question whether long delay, by itself, can as a matter of law affect the validity of the judgment. Appellants' contention is that the appellants, who lost in the High Court, should not have the apprehension that the arguments addressed seven years ago might not have come to be fully appreciated at the time of the writing of the judgment seven years later.

5. There is yet another infirmity urged by the appellants. They contend that the judgment was not notified for pronouncement in the open court. They have appended to the memorandum of appeal the cause-list of the particular Bench for the day indicating that the case was not listed for judgment that day. It is not necessary to pronounce finally on the contention. We are of the opinion that in the facts and the circumstances of this case ends of justice would require that the matter be reheard by the High Court."

It would be relevant to refer to Bhagwan Das Fateh Chand Daswani v. H. P. A. International and Ors. 2000 (2) SCC 13 wherein the Apex Court observed thus:

However, it is correct to this extent that long delay in delivery of judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculations in the mind of parties to a case. Moreover, the appellants whose appeals have been dismissed by the High Court may have the apprehension that the arguments raised at the bar have not been reflected or appreciated while dictating the judgment - nearly after five years.

It would be trite to refer to the landmark judgment of the Apex Court in Anil Rai vs State of Bihar 2001 (7) SCC 318wherein the Court has laid the guidelines on the aspect of delay in pronouncing judgments after the conclusion of arguments. The Court deprecated the tendency of keeping "judgment reserved" for long periods. The Court also chalked out some remedial measures/instructions/guidelines. The following observations are very pertinent:

17. Adverse effect of the problem of not pronouncing the reserved judgments within a reasonable time was considered by the Arrears Committee constituted by the Government of India on the recommendation of the Chief Justices' Conference. In its report of 1989-90 Chapter VIII, the Committee recommended that reserved judgments should ordinarily be pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments.

If, however, a reserved judgment is not pronounced for a period of three months from the date of the conclusion of the arguments, the Chief Justice was recommended to be authorised to either post the case for delivering judgment in open court or withdraw the case and post it for disposal before an appropriate Bench.

18. The intention of the Legislature regarding pronouncement of judgments can be inferred from the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub- section (1) of Section 353 of the Code provides that the judgment in every trial in any criminal court of original jurisdiction, shall be pronounced in open court immediately after the conclusion of the trial or on some subsequent time for which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.

The words "some subsequent time" mentioned in Section 353 contemplates the passing of the judgment without undue delay, as delay in the pronouncement of judgment is opposed to the principle of law. Such subsequent time can at the most be stretched to a period of six weeks and not beyond that time in any case. The pronouncement of judgments in the civil case should not be permitted to go beyond two months.

19. It is true, that for the High Courts, no period for pronouncement of judgment is contemplated either under the Code of Civil Procedure or the Criminal Procedure Code, but as the pronouncement of the judgment is a part of justice dispensation system, it has to be without delay. In a country like ours where people consider the Judges only second to God, efforts be made to strengthen that belief of the common man. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates the people to raise eye-brows, some time genuinely which, if not checked, may shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system.

A time has come when the judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature, respect and regards for the attainment of the Rule of Law. For the fault of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is the policy and purpose of law, to have speedy justice for which efforts are required to be made to come to the expectation of the society of ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted justice.

20. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments which, I am sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the mandate of this Court. Such guidelines, as for present, are as under:

1. The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the court officer concerned.
    
2. That Chief Justice of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/ Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that months.
    
3. On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the concerned Chief Justice shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.
    
4. Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months, from the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the intervening holidays.
    
5. If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as deems fit in the circumstances.

21. We hope and trust that the above guidelines shall be strictly followed and implemented, considering them as self-imposed restraints.

It would be worthwhile to refer to Indrajeet Yadav vs Santosh Singh (2022) 3 S.C.R. 73 wherein the Apex Court reiterated the dictum in Anil Rai (supra) & observed thus:

3. Further, much later but still almost two decades ago, this Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar - 2001 (7) SCC 318 deemed it appropriate to provide some guidelines regarding the pronouncement of judgments, expecting them to be followed by all concerned under the mandate of this Court. It is not necessary to reproduce the directions except to state that normally the judgment is expected within two months of the conclusion of the arguments, and on expiry of three months any of the parties can file an application in the High Court with prayer for early judgment. If, for any reason, no judgment is pronounced for six months, any of the parties is entitled to move an application before the then Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to re­assign the case before another Bench for fresh arguments.

A question arises that the dictum of Anil Rai (supra) is applicable only to the High Courts & the District Courts or is it applicable to the orders of the Income Tax officers, Revenue Officers, Appellate Authorities, various Tribinals, Revenue Courts and all other quasi- judicial authorities. The dictum of the Apex Court is to promote both fairness & justice which are essential ingredients of all orders passed by any Court/Authority. Therefore, the dictum of Anil Rai should be applicable to all Courts/ Authorities.

It is relevant that recently the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Writ Petition no. 18743 of 2024 Smt. Kanwaljeet Singh vs. State of M. P. & Another decided very recently on the 25th of July, 2024 considered this aspect and observed thus:

Although the aforesaid guidelines, which have been made by the Supreme Court, are meant for the High Courts as well as District Courts, but the same guideline can be applied to the Revenue Courts because early disposal of the case is essential and delivery of order, at the earliest after the case is heard is the requirement of law because delay in delivery of order may not only result in fading of memory of Presiding Judge, but may also give some other impression in the minds of the litigants.

From the foregoing it is no longer Res Integra that delay in pronouncement of judgments/ orders is not legally permissible and in cases of inordinate delay the matters should be 'released' and transferred to another Bench/ Judge/ Officer for "Rehearing" & speedy disposal.

Written By: Inder Chand Jain
Ph no: 8279945021, Email: [email protected]