The Analysis Of the Sub-Classification Judgment
On dated August 1st 2024, the seven judge bench of the Supreme Court delivered its verdict on the issue of sub-classification within the scheduled castes with the 6:1 majority. Wherein the majority judgment was delivered by the Chief Justice and 6 other honorable judges while the dissent judgment was delivered by the Honorable Justice Bela M. Trivedi.

The issues
The issues before the 9-Judge bench in the present case were:

1. Is sub-classification within reserved categories essential?
2. Whether Scheduled Castes a uniform category?
3. Whether the states have the authority to establish sub-categories within reserved categories?
4. Whether the five-judge Bench ruling in E.V. Chinnaiah (2004) accurate?
5. Whether a caste listed in the Presidential List be considered a backward class under Article 16(4)?

The judgment
Majority judgment (6-Judges)
Honorable the Chief Justice DY Chandrachud, in his judgment authored with Justice Misra, acknowledged historical evidence indicating that scheduled castes are not a homogeneous group. He opined that sub-classifying these castes does not violate the equality principle enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, nor does it contravene Article 341(2). Chandrachud J. emphasized that Articles 15 and 16 do not restrict the State from creating sub-categories within scheduled castes, provided such classifications are supported by quantifiable and demonstrable data showing under-representation.

He emphasized that the State's decisions on sub-classification must be based on objective criteria and are subject to judicial review, cautioning against arbitrary or politically motivated actions.

Honorable Justice BR Gavai, concurring with the judgment, emphasized the State's obligation to prioritize more backward communities within the scheduled castes and tribes. He highlighted that only a small fraction of these groups benefit from reservations, noting the enduring oppression faced by certain sub-groups over centuries.

Justice Gavai criticized the understanding in the EV Chinnaiah judgment that linked reservations solely to Article 341, clarifying that Article 341 is primarily for caste identification, not reservation eligibility.

Regarding the creamy layer concept, Justice Gavai advocated applying it to scheduled castes and tribes, asserting that excluding affluent individuals from reservation benefits is essential for achieving true equality.

Justices Vikram Nath and Pankaj Mithal J. echoed this sentiment, suggesting that the creamy layer principle, akin to its application in OBC reservations, should also extend to scheduled castes and tribes. Justice Mithal additionally proposed limiting reservation benefits to one generation, arguing that subsequent generations who have achieved higher status through reservations should not continue to receive these benefits.

Justice Satish Chandra Sharma supported these views, emphasizing the need for equitable policies within reservation frameworks.

Dissent judgment (1-judge)
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Trivedi opined that the list of Scheduled Castes designated by the President under Article 341 cannot be modified by individual States. Changes to this list, including inclusion or exclusion of castes, can only be made through legislation enacted by Parliament. Justice Trivedi cautioned that any attempt at sub-classification would effectively tamper with the Presidential list, which she believed was intended to prevent political influences from influencing the SC-ST categorization.

She emphasized the importance of adhering to a strict and literal interpretation of the law.

Justice Trivedi also warned against granting preferential treatment to specific sub-groups within the Presidential list, arguing that this would unjustly deprive other groups within the same category of their rightful benefits.

According to her, in the absence of authority from the executive or legislative branches, States lack the jurisdiction to sub-classify castes and allocate benefits reserved for all Scheduled Castes. Allowing States to do so, she contended, would amount to an improper exercise of power.

Analysis
The whole judgment primary focused on the determining the procedure of sub-classification in the Scheduled castes. In accordance to Article 366 Clause 24 of the Constitution of India, Scheduled castes means- 'such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes as are deemed under Article 341 to be the Scheduled Castes for the purposes of the Constitution'.

Article 341 lays down the procedure for specifying and classifying Scheduled castes. It reads, that the power to specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes is constitutionally vested in the President of India who may with respect to any state or Union territory, and where it is a state after consultation with the Governor, specify by 'public notification' for the purposes of this constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be.

Further the Clause 2 to the same Article provides an unique power that it shall be the prerogative of the Parliament which may by law 'include of exclude' from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in notification issued under clause 1 castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes, subject only to no variation in the inclusion or exclusion list by subsequent notification.

Of Majority Judgment
Having regard to the above analysis of the position of the Constitution, the majority judgment while giving liberal interpretation to the above procedure of specification based its judgment on the premises that Scheduled caste is not a caste in itself, but a notified caste held that:

1. Since the Parliament and president, in the former case for inclusion and exclusion and in the latter for specification are only vested with the powers to do the desired, the states are not barred from doing sub-classification within the scheduled castes.
2. The words 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' and 'specification' cannot be read literally so to bar the process of sub-classification in the schedules castes, because for the latter, the social stigma of under representation still exists.
    

Of Dissent Judgment:

Expressing the dissent to the majority view the judgment is based on the premises that:

1. Liberal interpretation cannot be given to the provisions of the Constitution by the Courts, especially in such cases where the intention of the Constitutional framers and essence of the provision does not reflect the otherwise.
2. Sub-classification in scheduled castes in literal mode of interpretation would mean, 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' and 'specification' and which again on the literal interpretation of the Constitutional provision, in the present case, the power is which is only vested with the Parliament in the former procedure and in the President in the latter procedure.

Conclusion
I subscribe to the observation made by Honorable Justice B.R Gavai that 'Political democracy stands in half way in absence of social democracy'. The majority judgment gave liberal interpretation to said provision holding that- Sub-classification based on empirical data does not mean inclusion' and 'exclusion' and 'specification', but only sub classification within the same heterogeneous groups.

While, the dissent view is the literal interpretation of the provision. Weather literal interpretation or Liberal interpretation must be given to the provisions of the Constitution, this question is been thrown by the Honorable Apex Court through this judgment the answer to which the prospective debates have to answer.

I respectfully do not subscribe to the approach which the majority judgment has taken in the said judgment in the background of achieving Social and economic justice. But I do respectfully agree with the opinion rendered by the majority judges that-

"State must evolve a policy to identify creamy layer among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes category and exclude them from fold of affirmative action. In my view, this is the only way to achieve real equality as enshrined in the Constitution."[1]

End Notes:

1. Justice B.R Gavai opinion in the matter of State of Punjab and ors. vs. Devender Singh and Ors. C.A. 2317/2011