Within the framework of criminal law, justification and excuse serve as benchmarks for both dictating and prohibiting behavior in general and determining guilt or innocence in a given instance. They play a crucial role in both defining the specifics of crimes and ensuring that they are applied with morality. It is not hyperbole to say that a morally sound system of criminal laws requires a morally sound knowledge and application of justification and excuse.

General or affirmative defenses are arguably the most explicit way that the criminal code expresses reason and excuse. When used in this way, justification and excuse offer a defense that absolves a performer of guilt even when they have engaged in all relevant behavior and have a state of mind.

Four Distinctions between claims of justification and of Excuse Warrant Emphasis

First, justifications are always made. They apply to everyone who is aware of the conditions that make the alleged legal infraction acceptable. When someone is in a position to defend himself from unlawful action, they can legitimately intervene on behalf of the victim who is being threatened. On the other hand, excuses are private and unique to the particular person entangled in the complex web of events.

This restriction results from the necessary component of involuntariness in behavior that is excused. Excuses are sometimes interpreted to allow intervention on behalf of "relatives or other people close to the actor" in case they face immediate danger. The actor's intervention on behalf of this small group of individuals in danger may have been sufficiently involuntary to be justified.

Second, justification claims depend, in different ways, on the assessment that the justified behavior advances the greater good (or lesser evil) and the weighing of interests. It is not apparent that excuses require a balance of interests. However, indirectly, evaluating the relationship between harm incurred and harm averted could help us determine if the wrongdoing was sufficiently involuntary to be forgiven.

Perjury committed with the intention of preventing serious bodily harm would probably be forgiven, while murdering multiple people in order to prevent minor injuries to oneself would probably not. The evaluation of the actor's capitulation to outside forces gets more exacting as the distance between the competing objectives grows. This subtle consideration of competing interests clarifies the normative foundation for labeling certain behaviors as "involuntary."

Third, there are many kinds of criminal law principles from which justification and excuse claims originate. Justifications rely on standards that are aimed at the general public and which make exceptions to the criminal law's restrictions. Excuses are not the same. Excuses originate from guidelines that not to the general public, but to jurors, judges, and legal authorities who evaluate the responsibility of individuals who unjustly break the law.

A specific infraction being excused does not change the legal ban. Acknowledging an error in law as a justification does not alter the law; in the event that the justified party left the courtroom and recommitted the offense, he would undoubtedly be found guilty. Recognizing insanity, involuntary intoxication, or personal necessity does not change the rules prohibiting the behaviors that are justified under these conditions.

When someone breaks the law expecting an explanation (for example, because he didn't know the law or because he was being threatened), that expectation itself makes a strong case against absolving him of responsibility. The presumption of an explanation and the alleged involuntariness of excused behavior are at odds.

Last but not least, justification defenses center on the act rather than the actor; they absolve otherwise illegal behavior if they serve society or are otherwise deemed to be socially beneficial. Excuse defenses center on the actor rather than the act; they absolve an actor of responsibility even in cases when their actions may have caused harm to society since they do not view the actor as being at fault. If a mother trespasses into a store to take tools to rescue her son who is trapped in a house fire, she would be justified and therefore not need an excuse; if her son's kidnapper begs her to rob the store in exchange for her son's safe return, she would be excused but not justified.

Mistake as a General Exception

"The act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law," according to Section 76 of THE INDIAN PENAL CODE: Nothing that is done by someone who considers themselves to be bound by law, either in good faith or due to a factual error rather than a legal error, is considered an offense.

For instance, an officer A has not committed a crime if he fires a mob at the direction of his superior officer and in compliance with the law. "Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified, by law," according to Section 79 of THE INDIAN PENAL CODE.

Nothing that is done by someone who is justified by the law, or who, in good faith but due to a factual error rather than a legal error, thinks they are justified by the law in doing so, is considered an offense.

For instance, A witnesses Z doing what looks to A to be a murder.In the process of using the legal authority granted to anybody to catch murderers in the act, A uses his best judgment to apprehend Z and bring him before the appropriate authorities. Even if it turns out that Z was defending herself, A has done nothing wrong.

The common principles of ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of law is not an excuse) and ignorantia facti excusat (ignorance of fact is an excuse) have been embodied in sections 76 and 79 of the IPC.

Section 76 deals with those class of cases where a person by reason of a mistake (or ignorance) of fact, in good faith, considers himself bound by law to do an act, whereas, section 79 deals with that class of cases where by reason of a mistake of fact a person

considers himself justified by law to do an act in a particular way. The purpose of this section is to provide protection from conviction to persons, who are bound by law or justified by law in doing a particular act, but due to mistake of fact, commited an offence. The mistake must be in good faith and after exercise of due diligence. The difference between the two provisions is shown in the examples.

Therefore, if facts are true, a sincere conviction in their existence would render an action harmless. No matter how sincere it may be, ignorance of the law does not serve as a defense against an accusation of criminality. To put it another way, everyone who lives in a nation—foreigners or subjects alike-is subject to its laws.

The reason for this is that it is considered that every man should be aware of the laws. Ignorance of the law is not a defense as, in that case, any accused person may argue that he was not aware of the law, making it difficult for the prosecution to establish that the accused person knew the law. It will be nearly impossible to administer justice under such circumstances.

Written By: Akanksha