There is no rule of law that dictates that if the court acquits certain accused individuals based on the evidence of a witness, finding it to be open to some doubt regarding them for a specific purpose, then other accused individuals against whom there is absolute certainty about their complicity in the crime-should also be acquitted.

In a case where the First Information Report (FIR) was filed by a teacher, and the Head Master of the school issued a certificate stating that the said teacher was present in school on the specified date from 10:30 am to 4 pm, performing their duties, and the Head Master was not examined by the accused, the evidence given on oath by the teacher cannot be disbelieved. The teacher left the school in the afternoon after learning about the incident, with the permission of the Headmaster.

It's important to note that the FIR itself is not a substantive piece of evidence. Instead, it can be used for contradiction and corroboration of the statement made by the author of the FIR in court. However, in this case, the defense counsel did not raise this contradiction during cross-examination of the witness, and no opportunity was given to the witness to explain it. Therefore, the appellant cannot benefit from this contradiction.

Regarding the statutory provision, it is specific, precise, and clear. There is no ambiguity in the language employed in subsection (4). If the facts reported to the police disclose both cognizable and non-cognizable offenses, the police would be acting within the scope of its authority by investigating both offenses. The legal fiction enacted in subsection (4) provides that even a cognizable case shall be treated as cognizable in such a situation.

Lastly, the FIR given by a rustic laywoman should not be equated to the summary of the entire prosecution case. Mere omissions, such as failing to mention an incidental fact (like stained clothes), cannot nullify an otherwise prompt and impeccable report.