Review of an order of a Court lies under S. 114 of CPC. The said Section 114 CPC is reproduced as under:

Section 114. Review:
Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved:

1. by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred.
2. by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or
3. by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.

Before proceeding further, it would be trite to reproduce Order 47 Rule 1- Review as it appears in CPC which set out the grounds available for filing a review application against a judgment/order reads as under:

Rule 1: Application for review of judgment:

1. Any person considering himself aggrieved:
   1. by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
   2. by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
   3. by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
   and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment of the Court which passed the decree or made the order.
    
2. A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

Explanation: The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment."

Before deliberating further, it would be appropriate to understand the connotation of the term Review. In simple words, 'Review' of an order, as the very name suggests, means to reconsider/rethink or re-examine/re-evaluate the existing order/judgment. In legal terminology, the term "review" refers to a court's re-examination of a previous decision.

It is relevant that Review is filed before the same judge/ same court which had passed the order. Any party to the case, who is dissatisfied by an order or decree from which no appeal lies or wherein an appeal lies but it chooses not to file the same may file a review petition, if the necessary conditions exist.
From the perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it transpires that a review application would be maintainable only on fulfillment of the following conditions:

1. discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, were not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him when the decree was passed or the order made;
2. on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
3. for any other sufficient reason.

The Apex Court in the case of Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. 1964 SCR (5) 174 held thus:

11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an 'error apparent on the face of the record'. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous.

Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an 'error apparent on the face of the record', for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.

It would be apropos to refer to the case of Sow Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib(1975) 1 SCC 674 wherein the Apex Court categorically observed thus:

''A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. … The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."

It would be trite to refer to Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others 1980 Supp SCC 562 wherein the Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of
the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The Court succinctly observed as under:

12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results
in miscarriage of justice.

It would be appropriate to refer to Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (1995) 1 SCC 170 wherein following Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC 389 the Apex Court reiterated that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

In the case of Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Apex Court held that an error that is not self- evident and has to be detected by the
process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record. In such a case the Court would not be obliged to exercise the powers of review. The Court held thus:

7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit
and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

It would be relevant to refer to the case of Lily Thomas, Etc. Etc. vs Union Of India & Ors.(2000) 6 SCC 224, wherein the Apex Court held that an error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on the face of the record and not one which has to be searched out. The Court discussed the scope and ambit of Article 137 that empowers The Supreme Court to review its judgments and the contours of review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC and held thus:

53. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking; offer something again with a view to correction or improvement. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakersh and Ors. v. Pradyunman singh ji Arjun singh ji AIR 1970 SC 1273 held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication.

The review is also not an appeal in disguise. If cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of Justice. Law has to bend before Justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error.

This Court in S. Nagaraj and Ors etc. v. State of Karnataka and Anr. etc. 1993 Supp.(4) SCC 595 held:
Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made.

Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice.

In Raja Prithwi Chand Law Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords.

The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered:

...nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, by errors have been introduced, these Courts possess, by Common Law, the same power which the Courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in....The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority.

The Lords have however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies. Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under:

It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.

Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution.

Our Constitution makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And Clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order XL VII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice.

The mere fact that two views on the same subject are possible is no ground to review the earlier judgment passed by a Bench of the same strength.

54. This Court in MJs Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi 1980 AIR 674 considered the powers of this Court under Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules and held:

It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan.

For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing. G.L Gupta v. D.N. Mehta. The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice ON Mohindroo v. Dist. Judge, Delhi.

Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article

145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in O. XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. (Order XL, R.1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility'."

The scope of Review differs between Civil and Criminal proceedings. It is relevant that review in a criminal proceeding is permissible only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record. This Court in P.N. Eswara Iyer and others v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (1980) 4 SCC 680 while examining the review jurisdiction of this Court vis a vis criminal and civil proceedings had made the following observations in paras 34 and 35:

34. The rule, on its face, affords a wider set of grounds for review for orders in civil proceedings, but limits the ground vis­a­vis criminal proceedings to "errors apparent on the face of the record". If at all, the concern of the law to avoid judicial error should be heightened when life or liberty is in peril since civil penalties are often less traumatic. So, it is reasonable to assume that the framers of the rules could not have intended a restrictive review over criminal orders or judgments.

It is likely to be the other way about. Supposing an accused is sentenced to death by the Supreme Court and the "deceased" shows up in court and the court discovers the tragic treachery of the recorded testimony. Is the court helpless to review and set aside the sentence of hanging?

We think not. The power to review is in Article 137 and it is equally wide in all proceedings. The rule merely canalises the flow from the reservoir of power. The stream cannot stifle the source. Moreover, the dynamics of interpretation depend on the demand of the context and the lexical limits of the test.

Here "record" means any material which is already on record or may, with the permission of the court, be brought on record. If justice summons the Judges to allow a vital material in, it becomes part of the record; and if apparent error is there, correction becomes necessitous.

35. The purpose is plain, the language is elastic and interpretation of a necessary power must naturally be expansive. The substantive power is derived from Article 137 and is as wide for criminal as for civil proceedings. Even the difference in phraseology in the rule (Order 40 Rule 2) must, therefore, be read to encompass the same area and not to engraft an artificial divergence productive of anomaly.

If the expression "record" is read to mean, in its semantic sweep, any material even later brought on record, with the leave of the court, it will embrace subsequent events, new light and other grounds which we find in Order 47 Rule 1, CPC. We see no insuperable difficulty in equating the area in civil and criminal proceedings when review power is invoked from the same source.

The scope of review jurisdiction has been considered by this Court in a number of cases where well settled principles have been reiterated time and again. It is sufficient to refer to judgment of this Court in Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and others (2013) 8 SCC 320, where this Court has elaborately considered the scope of review. In paras 17, 18, 20.1 and 20.2 following has been laid down:

17. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. held as under: (SCC p. 656, para 10)

10. … In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. The learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court.

If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise.

18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., held as under: (SCC pp. 504­505, paras 11­12) "11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter.

It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases."

The same view was reiterated by the Apex Court in Vinay Sharma vs The State N.C.T. Of Delhi on 9 July, 2018 (2018) 8 SCC 186.

Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court. Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the ground specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC which provides:
Application for review of judgment:

1. Any person considering himself aggrieved:
1. by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which, no appeal has been preferred.
2. by a decree of order from which no appeal is allowed, or
3. by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed of order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

Under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order 40 Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter.

Next it needs to be discussed the legal connotation of the phrase 'any other sufficient reasons' used in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC. The words 'any other sufficient reason' means a reason sufficient on the ground at least analogous to those specified in the rule.


This Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Paulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 have held that words must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the Rule". Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) Through Lrs vs Vinod Kumar Rawat on 3 November, 2020 reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 896.The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.(2013) 8 SCC 337.

Thus, it is undisputable that under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment can be reviewed if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. The Courts have categorically held that an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

In exercise of this jurisdiction under Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. It is relevant that a review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'.

Written By: Inder Chand Jain
Ph no: 8279945021, Email: [email protected]