Historical Prelude
India's judicial appointment system has been a crucible of evolution and debate since the nation achieved its sovereign status. The country, in its post-independence fervor, initially envisioned a collaborative approach towards the appointment of judges, aiming to strike a balance between the Executive and the Judiciary.

In this envisaged system, the President of India was endowed with the responsibility of nominating Supreme Court judges, but not unilaterally. The President was to do so in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, ensuring a dual check and maintaining the sanctity and independence of the judiciary. Similarly, when it came to High Court judges, the President was to confer not only with the Chief Justice of the respective High Court but also with the governor of the concerned state[1].

The system seemed to be working smoothly, with a widely accepted practice in place till 1973. It was customary for the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court to be anointed as the Chief Justice of India. However, in 1973, this well-entrenched tradition faced a jolt. The government, in a move that took many by surprise, sidestepped the three senior-most judges, choosing instead the fourth in line for the Chief Justice's role[2].

This move wasn't just a departure from convention; it ushered in a wave of concern and skepticism. The rationale given by the government revolved around the President's discretionary power, but the decision nonetheless attracted significant critique, not just from legal circles but also from the public at large[3]. It was a decision that many perceived as an encroachment upon the independence of the judiciary, a cornerstone of India's democratic ethos.

The Emergence of the Collegium System

The appointment mechanism of India's higher judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, has always been deeply intertwined with the nation's constitutional interpretations and precedents. Over time, as India sought a judicious balance between the roles of the Executive and the Judiciary, the Collegium System came into being[4].

This system, deriving its legitimacy not from direct legislative acts but from a series of Supreme Court verdicts, is rooted in the trilogy known as the "Three Judges Cases". Central to these landmark decisions was the interpretation of the term 'consultation' in Article 124 of the Indian Constitution[5]. The pivotal question was: does 'consultation' merely suggest a dialogue or does it infer a binding consensus?

In the First Judges case of 1980, the Supreme Court opined that the Chief Justice of India's (CJI) recommendation to the President did not necessarily hold primacy[6]. However, the equilibrium shifted with the Second Judges Case of 19934[7], when a larger bench pronounced that recommendations made by the CJI, in consultation with the two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, indeed held precedence.

Further consolidation of the judiciary's role in the appointment process emerged with the Third Judges Case in 1998,[8] which posited that appointments to the higher judiciary should be a collaborative decision of the CJI and a collegium comprising the four senior-most judges5.

While these judicial determinations structured the Collegium's modalities, they also catalyzed a longstanding debate on the equilibrium between the Executive and the Judiciary in India's judge appointment mechanism.

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers

The principle of Separation of Powers is a cornerstone in the architecture of modern democratic governance. Its essence lies in the distribution of authority and responsibilities across different branches of government, ensuring that no single entity holds unchecked power[9]. This doctrine serves as a safeguard against potential autocratic tendencies, promoting checks and balances within the state machinery.

In the Indian context, the Constitution doesn't explicitly delineate a strict separation of powers. Nevertheless, its ethos permeates through various articles and provisions, shaping the dynamic between the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary[10]. The principle is further supplemented by the Directive Principles of State Policy, with Article 50 asserting the need to distinguish between the Judiciary and the Executive[11].

While countries like the United States adopt a more rigid interpretation of this principle, ensuring a watertight division between different branches of government[12], India's approach is nuanced. In the Indian polity, certain overlaps are constitutionally permitted, reflecting the country's unique historical, cultural, and social fabric.

The interplay between the Executive and the Judiciary, particularly in the realm of judicial appointments, has remained a contested domain. It underscores the necessity to strike a balance: ensuring that the judiciary remains insulated from potential executive interference while upholding the democratic principle of representative governance.

Checks, Balances, and Pre-Amendment Procedures

The intricate dance of power between various organs of the state is underscored by the principle of checks and balances. Rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers, this concept ensures that no single branch of government monopolizes authority, thereby maintaining a democratic equilibrium[13]. Prior to the 99th Constitutional Amendment, the process of judicial appointments in India reflected this balancing act.

The President of India, as the head of the Executive, was vested with the authority to appoint judges to the Supreme Court. However, this power was not unilateral. The President was required to consult with the Chief Justice of India (CJI). In case of appointing other judges of the Supreme Court, the President was obligated to consult the CJI, but the appointment of the CJI did not necessitate consultation with anyone[14].

This consultative mechanism aimed to ensure collective decision-making, pooling in wisdom both from the Executive (the President) and the Judiciary (the CJI and other relevant judges). The rationale was to secure the independence of the judiciary while ensuring its accountability to the constitution and, by extension, to the democratic polity[15]. However, this landscape of judicial appointments underwent significant shifts, particularly through interpretations and rulings by the Supreme Court, leading up to and following the 99th Constitutional Amendment.

National Judicial Appointments Commission and its Controversies

The Collegium system, despite its constitutional underpinnings, was not without criticisms. Recognizing the concerns about transparency and possible inefficiencies in the process, a new mechanism, the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), was conceptualized[16]. Introduced by the 99th Amendment of the Constitution, the NJAC sought to replace the Collegium system[17].

It was brought into existence with an aim to streamline the appointment and transfer of judges in the higher judiciary of India. Envisioned as a comprehensive solution to several shortcomings of the Collegium, the NJAC was operationalized on 13th April 2015[18].

The composition of the NJAC was designed to incorporate members from the Judiciary, the Executive, and the general public. This included the Chief Justice of India, two of the Supreme Court's most senior judges, the Union Minister of Law and Justice, and two eminent individuals from the public sphere[19]. The roles and responsibilities of the NJAC were delineated in Article 124B, which detailed its functions, ranging from recommending individuals for appointments to transferring judges between High Courts[20].

However, its constitutionality was soon challenged. In the landmark judgment of "Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India," the NJAC was declared unconstitutional, thereby reinstating the Collegium system[21]. The Supreme Court's verdict hinged on preserving the independence of the judiciary and upholding the doctrine of separation of powers, deeming the composition and functioning of the NJAC as potentially infringing upon these principles[22].

The Collegium System: Strengths, Shortcomings, and Criticisms

The Collegium system, having withstood tests of constitutional scrutiny and remaining in place after the NJAC episode, has evoked mixed reactions within legal and academic circles. While its foundation lies in the pursuit of judicial independence, concerns about its functionality have been raised over the years[23].

A principal criticism directed at the Collegium system is its alleged lack of transparency[24]. Critics argue that the processes within the Collegium remain veiled, resulting in occasional appointments that might not seem meritorious to the outside observer. The closed-door nature of its proceedings has occasionally given rise to allegations of nepotism, where personal preferences might influence appointments[25].

Another criticism revolves around the politicization of the judiciary. The principle of separation of powers emphasizes the need for an independent judiciary, distanced from executive influence. However, the opacity of the Collegium system has sometimes led to suspicions of political interference, albeit indirectly.

Interestingly, while the Collegium system itself emerged from judgments and not direct legislative acts, its constitutionality has been a matter of debate. Critics argue that since the system is a product of judicial interpretation and not a direct provision of the Constitution, it rests on tenuous ground[26].

On the flip side, proponents of the Collegium argue that the system, with all its imperfections, still offers the best mechanism to ensure an independent judiciary. They believe that any other mechanism, especially those involving significant executive say, might compromise the independence of the judiciary6.

The Law Commission, in its 214th report, also weighed in on this issue, highlighting the word 'collegium' not being originally present in the Constitution and noting the distinctions between the Constitutional mandate and subsequent judicial interpretations[27].

Conclusion and Suggestions
The journey of India's judicial appointment process showcases a constant tug-of-war between autonomy and inclusivity. The shift from presidential consultations to the collegium system, and then the short-lived experiment with the NJAC, reveals a broader narrative: the struggle to find a balance between preserving judicial independence and maintaining transparency, accountability, and democratic representation[28].
Transparency and Accountability:

• The opacity of the Collegium system has been a focal point of critique[29]. Transparency is not just about upholding democratic values but also about reinforcing the public's faith in the judiciary. A more transparent procedure, with published reasons behind each selection and transfer, can mitigate concerns and promote greater trust.

Consultation:

• While the NJAC faced challenges related to its constitutionality, the underlying premise of broader consultation should not be discarded. Engaging external experts, perhaps even the public, in a non-binding capacity can make the process more comprehensive[30].

Institutional Reforms:

• The creation of a permanent administrative body to support the Collegium might enhance its efficiency. This could involve preliminary screenings, thorough background checks, and consistent documentation[31].

Feedback Mechanism:

• A confidential system where legal peers, academicians, and colleagues provide insights about potential appointees might ensure a more thorough evaluation. This would add depth to the selection, ensuring that only the most deserving candidates ascend to the bench[32].

In conclusion, the debate surrounding the judicial appointment system in India is not about choosing between the Collegium and the NJAC. Instead, it's about drawing from both models to create a process that is transparent, inclusive, and true to the tenets of the Constitution. A process that respects the judiciary's autonomy, while also ensuring its decisions resonate with the aspirations of the nation.

End-Notes:

1. The Constitution of India, Art. 124, provides the mechanism and consultation process for the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court.
2. George H. Gadbois Jr, "Judges of the Supreme Court of India: 1950–1989", Oxford University Press, 2011. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the Supreme Court's history, including the appointment processes.
3. Shukla, V.N. "Constitution of India", 12th Edition, Eastern Book Company. This is a standard commentary on the Indian Constitution and has discussed various landmark events pertaining to the judiciary.
4. B. Chakrabarty and R. Pandey, "Indian Government and Politics", SAGE Publications, 2008. This book explores the evolution of Indian governance structures, including the judiciary.
5. The Constitution of India, Art. 124. The Article provides the process and mechanisms for the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court.
6. S.P Gupta vs. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149. This landmark judgment, commonly referred to as the First Judges Case, explored the nuance of 'consultation' in the context of judicial appointments.
7. Supreme Court Advocates-on Record Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 412. This judgment, known as the Second Judges Case, overturned the precedent set in the First Judges Case.
8. In re Advisory Opinion, AIR 1999 SC 1. This case, often termed the Third Judges Case, further elucidated the framework of the Collegium system.
9. Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, baron de. "The Spirit of the Laws."
10. Durga Das Basu. "Commentary on the Constitution of India." Lexis Nexis, 8th Edition. A comprehensive commentary on the Indian Constitution that discusses the nuances of the separation of powers in the Indian context.
11. The Constitution of India, Art. 50. This article, as part of the Directive Principles of State Policy, emphasizes the need to separate the judiciary from the executive.
12. K.C. Wheare, "Modern Constitutions," Oxford University Press, 1951.
13. James Madison. "Federalist No. 51." The Federalist Papers
14. The Constitution of India, Art. 124(2). This article delineates the procedure for the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court.
15. M.P Jain. "Indian Constitutional Law." LexisNexis, 7th Edition.
16. A.G Noorani. "The Collegium Controversy." Frontline, 2015.
17. The Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014.
18. Rajya Sabha Debates, "Constitution (121st Amendment) Bill, 2014," Rajya Sabha, New Delhi, August 14, 2014.
19. The Constitution of India, Art. 124A.
20. The Constitution of India, Art. 124B.
21. AIR 2016 SC 117.
22. S.P. "Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits.
23. Jayanth K Krishnan., and Vrinda Bhandari. "Judicial Appointments in India: A Case Study.
24. Rajeev Dhavan,. "The Collegium Controversy: Too Much Noise, Too Little Substance.
25. Pratap Bhanu Mehta. "The inner workings of the Collegium." Indian Express, 2018.
26. Durga Das Basu. "Commentary on the Constitution of India.
27. Law Commission of India, "214th Report on Proposal for Reconsideration of Judges cases I, II and III", 2008.
28. S.P. "Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits.
29. Pratap Bhanu Mehta. "The inner workings of the Collegium." Indian Express, 2018.
30. Madhav Mehta. "The Indian Constitution,"
31. Uday Chandra, "Strengthening the Indian Judiciary: Institutional Perspectives.
32. Radhika Malik. "360-Degree Evaluation: Feedback Mechanisms in Judicial Appointments." Law Today, 2020.