To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act; to consider, according to Lord Coke:

1. What was the law before the Act was passed
2. What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided;
3. What remedy Parliament has appointed; and
4. The reason of the remedy.

R M D Chamarbaugwalla vs The Union Of India

The petitioners, who were promoting 'and conducting prize competitions in the different States of India, challenged the constitutionality of ss. 4 and 5 Of the Prize Competitions Act (42 of 955) and rr. xi and 12 framed under S. 20 Of the Act. Their contention was that 'prize competition' as defined in S. 2(d) of the Act included not merely competitions that were of a gambling nature but also those in which success depended to a substantial degree on skill and the sections and the rules violated their fundamental right to carry on business

Intention Of Legislature
The object of the legislation is, as stated in the short title and in the preamble, " to provide for the control and regulation of prize competitions ". Section 2(d) of the Act defines "prize competition" as meaning "any competition (whether called a cross-word prize competition, a missing-word prize competition, a picture prize competition or by any other name), in which prizes are offered for the solution of any puzzle based upon the building up, arrangement, combination or permutation of letters, words or figures ". Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are-. the provisions which are impugned as unconstitutional, and they are as follows:

4. No person shall promote or conduct any prize competition or competitions in which the total value of the prize or prizes (whether in cash or otherwise) to be offered in any month exceeds one thousand rupees; and in every prize competition, the number of entries shall not exceed two thousand.

5. Subject to the provisions of section 4, no person shall promote any prize competition or competitions in which the total value of the prize or prizes (whether in cash or otherwise) to be offered in any month does not exceed one thousand rupees unless he has obtained in this behalf a licence granted in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.

Arguments
Petitioner
The argument in support of the petitions is that prize competition as defined in s. 2(d) would include not only competitions in which success depends on chance but also those in which it would depend to a substantial degree on skill; that the conditions laid down in ss. 4 and 5 and rr. II and 12 are wholly unworkable and would render it impossible to run the competition, and that they seriously encroached on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on business; that they could not be supported under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution as they were unreasonable.

Respondent
Respondent disputes the correctness of these contentions. He argues that 'prize competition' as defined in s. 2(d) of the Act, properly construed, means and includes only competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial degree on skill and are essentially gambling in their character; that gambling activities are not trade or business within the meaning of that expression in Art. 19(1)(g), and that accordingly the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the protection of Art. 19(6); and that even if the definition of 'prize competition' in s. 2(d) is wide enough to include competitions in which success depends to a substantial degree on skill and ss. 4 and 5 of the Act and rr. 11 and 12 are to be struck down in respect of such competitions as unreasonable restrictions not protected by Art. 19(6), that would not affect the validity of the enactment as regards the competitions which are in the nature of gambling, the Act being severable in its application to such competitions.

Mischief Rule Application
Earlier Situation
Turning first to the history of the legislation, its genesis is to be found in the Bombay Lotteries and, Prize Competitions Control and Tax Act (Bom. LIV of 1948). That Act was passed with the object of controlling and taxing lotteries and prize competitions within the Province of Bombay, and as originally enacted, it applied only to competitions conducted within the Province of Bombay. Section 7 of the Act provided that "a prize competition shall be deemed to be an unlawful prize competition unless a licence in respect of such competition has been obtained by the promoter thereof." Section 12 imposed a tax on the amounts received in respect of competitions which had been licensed under the Act.

Mischief
With a view to avoid the operation of the taxing provisions of this enactment, persons who had there to before been conducting prize competitions within the Province of Bombay shifted the venue of their activities to neighbouring States like Mysore, and from there continued to receive entries and remittances of money therefor from the residents of Bombay State.

Remedy
In order to prevent evasion of the Act and for effectually carrying out its object, the legislature of Bombay passed Act XXX of 1952 extending the provisions of the Act of 1948 to competitions conducted outside the State of Bombay but operating inside it, the tax however being limited to the amounts remitted or due on the entries sent from the State of Bombay.

Analysis
having regard to the history of the legislation, the declared object thereof and the wording of the statute, we are of opinion that the competitions which are sought to be controlled and regulated by the Act are only those competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial degree on skill.

If the State legislatures felt that there was any need to regulate even those competitions, they could have themselves effectively done so without resort to the special jurisdiction under Art. 252(1)

If it was intended that Parliament should legislate also on competitions involving skill, the word, control' would seem to be not appropriate. While control and regulation would be requisite in the case of gambling, mere regulation would have been sufficient as regards competitions involving skill.

The use of the word control' which is to be found not only in the resolution but also in the short title and the preamble to the Act appears to us to clearly indicate that it was only competitions of the character dealt with in the Bombay judgment, that were within the contemplation of the legislature.

Conclusion
Nor does the restriction of the impugned provisions to competitions of a gambling character affect either the texture or the colour of the Act; nor do the provisions require to be touched and re-written before they could be applied to them. They will squarely apply to them on their own terms and in their true spirit, and form a code complete in themselves with reference to the subject. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the impugned provisions, assuming that they apply by virtue -of the definition in s. 2(d) to all kinds of competitions, are severable in their application to competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial extent on skill. In the result, both the contentions must be found against the petitioners.

Kanwar Singh vs Delhi Administration
Facts
The members of a raiding party led by the Licensing Inspector of the Delhi Corporation having taken into custody 25 or 30 stray cattle, were, while taking them to the cattle pound, belaboured with lathis by the three appellants and their friends, as a result of which they received injuries.

Arguments
Appellant
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that:

(i) there was no proper delegation 'of authority to impound cattle in favour of the persons forming the raiding party, by the Commissioner, whose personal presence to supervise the exercise of the delegated authority was, in any case, required by the very order delegating the authority;

(ii) the cattle were not "abandoned" in the sense of being "ownerless", and therefore could not be legally impounded; and

A more serious contention is that under s. 418, cattle, which the Corporation can impound, must be ownerless or tethered on any street or public place or land belonging to the Corporation. Admittedly the cattle in question were not tethered on any such place and, therefore, their seizure was not permissible. In support of his contention that "abandoned" implies the complete leaving of a thing as a final rejection of one's responsibilities so that the thing becomes "ownerless", appellant has referred us to the Law Lexicon and Oxford Dictionary. The meanings relied on by him are as follows:

"A thing banned or denounced as forfeited or lost, whence to abandon, desert, or forsake as lost and gone." Wharton's Law Lexicon. "To let go, give up, renounce, leave off; to cease to hold, use or practise."

(iii) that the injuries were inflicted by the appellants in the lawful exercise of their right of private defence of property.

In the Oxford Dictionary the word is also said to mean "to let loose; to set free; to liberate"

Held

1. The order of the Commissioner placed before the Court along with the statement of case proved that the Commissioner had authorised licensing Inspectors to impound stray cattle.
2. In the context in which the word "abandoned" occurred in section 418(1), the meaning which can reasonably be attached to it is "let loose" in the sense of being "left unattended" and certainly not "ownerless".
    
3. It is the duty of the Court in construing a statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature so as to "advance the remedy and suppress the mischief".
4. Intention Of Legislature: The legislature when it used the word "abandoned" in section 418(1) did not intend to say that the cattle must be "ownerless".
5. Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code specifically says that there is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith, tinder colour of his office. The protection extends even to acts which will not be strictly justified by law. In the present case, the act was fully justifiable by the law.

There was thus no right of private defence that could be claimed by the appellants

Rule
The power to impound stray cattle is contained in s. 418(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act,1957 (66 of 1957), which runs thus :

"If any horses, cattle or other quadruped animals or birds are kept on any premises in contravention of the provisions of section 417, or are found abandoned and roaming or tethered on any street or public place or on any land belonging to the Corporation, the Commissioner or any officer empowered by him may seize them and may cause them to be impounded or removed to such place as may be appointed by the Government or the Corporation for the purpose and the cost of seizure of these animals or birds and Of impounding...... or removing them and of feeding and watering them shall be recoverable by sale or by auction Of those animals or birds;"

The proviso which would be relevant in connection with another point runs thus:

"Provided that any one claiming such animal or bird may, within seven days of the seizure, get them released on his paying all expenses incurred by the Commissioner in seizing, impounding or removing and in feeding and watering such animal or bird, and on his producing a licence for keeping these animals and birds issued under the provisions of section.

Abandoned Interpretation
It will thus be seen that the meaning to be attached to the word 'abandoned' would depend upon the context in which it is used. in the context in which it occurs in S. 418(1), the meaning which can reasonably be attached to the word "abandoned" is 'let loose' in the sense of being 'left unattended' and certainly not 'ownerless'.

If, therefore, giving a literal meaning to a word used by the draftsman, particularly in a penal statute, would defeat the object of the legislature, which is to suppress a mischief, the court can depart from the dictionary meaning or even the popular meaning of the word and instead give it a meaning which will 'advance the remedy and suppress the mischief'

In the Act before us when the legislature used the word "abandoned" it did not intend to say that the cattle must be ownerless. This is implicit in the proviso to sub- s. (1) of S. 418 which says that any one 'claiming' an animal which has been impounded under that sub-section can, within 7 days of seizure, get it released on fulfilling certain conditions. Such a claim could only be made by a person who is the owner of the animal impounded or who has at least the custody of the animal.

The Commissioner Of vs Sodra Devi
Issue
The only question which arose for the consideration of the Tribunal was whether the income falling to the share of the three minor sons was liable to be included in the total income of the assessee.

Whether on a true construction of the provisions of section 16 (3) (a) (ii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the income of the three minor sons of the assessee is liable to be included in her total income.

The common question of law is to determine whether the word " individual " in s. 16 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act includes also a female and the income of the minor sons derived from a partnership to the benefits of which they have been admitted is liable to be included in the income of the mother who is a member of that partnership.\

Rule
Section 16(3) of the Act provides:
In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included:

1. so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly:
   1. from the membership of the wife in a firm of which her husband is a partner;
   2. from the admission of the minor to the benefits of the partnership in a firm of which such individual is a partner;
   3. from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to live apart;
   4. from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the minor child, not being a married daughter, by such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration;
2. so much of the income of any person or association of persons as arises from assets transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or association by such individual for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both.

(a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly:

(i)from the membership of the wife in a firm of which her husband is a partner;

(ii)from the admission of the minor to the benefits of the partnership in a firm of which such individual is a partner;

(iii)from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to live apart; or

(iv)from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the minor child, not being a married daughter, by such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration; and

(b)so much of the income of any person or association of persons as arises from assets transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or association by such individual for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both."

Section 3 of the Act may also be referred to in this context and it runs as follows:
Section 3. Charge of Income Tax:
Where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year- of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of every firm and- other association of persons or the partners of the firm or the members of the association individually.

Analysis
The section only talks of " individual " capable of having a wife or minor child or both. It therefore necessarily excludes from its purview a group of persons forming a unit or a corporation created by a statute and is confined only to human beings who in the context would be -comprised within that category.

The Revenue urges before us that the word " individual " as used qua human beings is capable of including within its connotation a male as well as a female of the species and having regard to the context in which the word has been used in s. 16(3), it should be construed as meaning a male of the species when used in Juxtaposition with " a wife " and as meaning both a male and a female when used in juxtaposition with "minor child" so that when s. 16(3) talks of such individual" in sub-cls. (ii) and (iv) of cl. (a) thereof it refers to both a male and a female of the species so as to include within its compass not only a father of the minor child but also a mother.

Arguments
Plaintiff
The assessees, on the other hand, contend that the word " individual " used in s. 16(3) is not used in its generic sense but is used in a restricted and narrower sense as connoting only human being and if it is thus restricted there is ample justification for restricting it still further to the male of the species when regarded in the context of s. 16(3). Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of cl. (a) are specific cases where the income of a wife or a minor child of, such individual" arising directly or indirectly from the several sources therein indicated is to be included in computing the total income of the "individual" for the purpose of assessment and the word could not have been 'Used in a different sense for the purposes of sub-cls. (i) and (iii) and sub cls. (ii) and (iv) of cl. (a). The word " such individual " as used in sub-cl. (a) can only have been used in one sense and one sense only and if that is the sense in which it could have been used " such individual " should be one who is capable of having a wife or minor child or both and that individual can only be a male of the species and not a female.

Mischief Rule
" In construing any statutory enactment, regard must be had not only to the words used, but to the history of the Act and the reasons which led to its being passed. You must look at the mischief which had to be cured as well as at the cure provided"

Earlier Condition & Mischief
Before the enactment of s. 16 (3) of the Act by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1937 (IV of 1937), there was no provision at all for the inclusion of the income of a wife or a minor child in the computation of the total income of " any individual " for the purpose of assessment. Whatever may have been the income of a wife from her membership in a firm of which her husband was a partner or from assets transferred directly or indirectly to her by her husband otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to live apart, her income was not included in the income of her husband in computing the total income of the husband for the purpose of assessment.

Similar was the position in the case of income derived by a minor child from the admission of the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm of which "such individual" was a partner or from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the minor child, not being a married daughter, by "such individual" otherwise than for adequate consideration. The income derived by such minor child could not be added to the income of the father for the purpose of assessment.

The income derived by the wife or minor child could only be included in computing his or its total income for the purposes of assessment and neither the husband nor the father could be made liable for income-tax in respect of such income, whatever may be the reason which actuated them in providing such income for the wife or the minor child.

The position was pregnant with difficulties for the Revenue
Husbands entering into nominal partnerships with their wives and fathers admitting their minor children to the benefits of the partnerships of which they were members.

Remedy
Income Tax Enquiry Report, 1936
This evil was so rampant that the Income Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, recognised the same and made the following recommendations for remedying the situation

1. Wife's Income. Our attention has been drawn to the extent to which taxation is avoided by nominal partnerships between husband and wife and minor children. In some parts of the country, avoidance of taxation by this means has attained very serious dimensions.
2. We recommend, therefore, that the incomes of a wife should be deemed to be, for income tax purposes, the income of her husband,
3. Income of Minor Children. There is also a growing and serious tendency to avoid taxation by the admission of minor children to the benefits of partnership in the father's business.

We suggest that the income of a minor should be deemed to be the income of the father

Legislature
These recommendations were duly considered by the Government and as a result thereof Act IV of 1937 was enacted introducing a. 16(3) in the Act.

Mischief was sought to be remedied by the enactment of s. 16(3) in the Act. If this background of the enactment of s. 16(3) is borne in mind, there is no room for any doubt that howsoever that mischief was sought to be remedied by the amending Act, the only intention of the Legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by the wife or a minor child, in the computation of the total income of the male assessee, the husband or the father, as the case may be, for the purpose of assessment.

Held
The words" any individual" and "such individual" occurring in s. 16(3) and s. 16(3)(a) of the Act are restricted in their connotation to mean only the male of the species, and do not include the female of the species, even though by a disjunctive reading of the expression "the wife" or "a minor child" of "such individual" in s. 16(3)(a) and the expression "by such individual" for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both" in s. 16(3)(b), it may be possible in the particular instances of the mothers being connected with the minor children in the manner suggested by the Revenue to include the mothers also within the connotation of these words.

Such inclusion which involves different interpretations of the words "any individual" or "such individual" in the different contexts could never have been intended by the Legislature and would in any event involve the addition of the words "as the case may be" which addition is not normally permissible in the interpretation of a statute.

Bengal Immunity Co Ltd vs State of Bihar
Facts
The appellant company is an incorporated company carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines. Its registered head officeis at Calcutta and its laboratory and factory are at Baranagarin the district of 24 - Perganas in West Bengal. It is registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and its registered number is S.L. 683A. Its products have extensive sales throughout the Union of India and abroad.

The goods are dispatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against orders accepted by the appellant company in Calcutta. The appellant company has neither any agent or manager in Bihar nor any office, godown or laboratory in that State. On the24th October, 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the appellant company which concluded as follows:

�Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firmregistered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act. Steps may kindly be taken to deposit Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar Treasury atan early date under intimation to this Department�.

Issue
The principal question is whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the appellant company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner mentioned in its petition is leviable by the State of Bihar. The legal- capacity of the State of Bihar to tax these sales is questioned on the following grounds, namely:-

Answers

1. That the sales sought to be taxed having taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and Parliament not having by law provided otherwise, all States are debarred from imposing tax on such sales by reason of article 286(2);
2. That even if the ban under article 286(2) did not apply, the State of Bihar is not competent to impose tax on such sales on a correct reading of article 246(3) read with Entry 54 of List II in the Seventh Schedule and article 286(1);
3. That the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 can have no extra-territorial operation and cannot, therefore, impose tax on such sales by a non-resident seller;
4. That on a true construction of the Act itself, it does not apply to the sales sought to be taxed.

Company Argument
The reason for issuing this notice, as recited therein, was that on information which had come to his possession the Superintendent was satisfied that the appellant company was liable to pay tax but had nevertheless wilfully failed to apply for registration under the Act.

The contention of the appellant company is that the Act which authorises the assessment, levying and collection of sales tax on inter- State trade contravenes and constitutes an infringement of article 286 and is, therefore, ultra vires, void and unenforceable. If, therefore, this contention be well founded, the remedy by way of a writ must, on principle and authority, be available to the party aggrieved.

Parties
In view of the importance of the issues involved in this appeal the States of Madras, Uttar Pradesh) Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa, Punjab, Pepsu, Mysore, Travancore- Cochin and Rajasthan applied for. and obtained leave to intervene in this appeal. Similar leave was applied for by and was granted to Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., and one M. K. Kuriakose. The State of West Bengal, Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd., and M. K. Kuriakose have supported the appellant company while the rest of the interveners have opposed the appeal.

HC View
Before the High Court the question of maintainability of the. petition was raised by the respondents as a preliminary objection and it was answered in their favour by the High Court. In its judgment the High Court noticed that facts bad not been investigated nor had the liability of the appellant company been determined and that in fact no order of assessment had been made.

It pointed out that it was not a case for the Sales Tax Officer usurping a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or acting in excess of his jurisdiction or acting mala fide. The High Court took the view that the Act undoubtedly conferred jurisdiction on the Sales Tax Officer to investigate the question of liability of a dealer to Sales Tax under the Act and accordingly he was acting well within his jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notice.

If on assessment the Sales Tax Officer erroneously holds the appellant liable to any tax, the Act provides for rectifying that error by appeal or revision under sections 24 and 25 of the Act. According to the High Court such a decision, however erroneous, will, nevertheless, be a decision within the ambit of his jurisdiction and the High Court cannot interfere with it by a writ of prohibition or certiorari to quash. The High Court accordingly held that the petition was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed.

SC view
In the Impugned Act there are various provisions laying down conditions which dealers must comply with or submit to, namely, to give only a few instances, compulsory registration of dealers (Section 10), filing of returns (Section 12), attendance and production of evidence in support of the return (Section 13), production, inspection and seizure of books of account or documents and search of premises (Section 17). Section 26 prescribes penalties for contravention of the provisions of the Act. These and other like provisions in the Act undoubtedly constitute restrictions on the fundamental right to carry on business which is guaranteed to every citizen of India by article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Mischief Rule
It appears that this rule is equally applicable to the construction of article 286 of our Constitution. In order to properly interpret the provisions of that article it is, therefore, necessary to consider how the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide and the remedy which has been provided by the Constitution to cure that mischief.

Earlier Law - The position with respect to taxation on sales or purchases of goods that prevailed in the country had better be stated in the language of Patanjali Sastri, C. J. who delivered the majority judgment in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (supra). After expressing the view, based on the authority of the Walk" Brothers' Case, 1948 F.C.R. 1 that in the case of sales tax, it was not necessary that the sale should take place within the territorial limits of the State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale, like the agreement to sell, the passing of title, delivery of the goods, etc., should have a territorial connection with the State and that, broadly speaking, local activities of buying and selling carried on in the State in relation to local goods would be a sufficient basis to sustain the taxing power of the State, provided of course that such activities ultimately resulted in a concluded sale to be taxed.

Mischief - Chaos and confusion that was brought about in inter- State trade or commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing power by the different Provincial Legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus between the respective Provinces and the sales or purchases sought to be taxed

Remedy - to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of inter-State trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the Constitution makers adopted article 286 in the Constitution which runs as follows�

286.

1. No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place (a) outside the State; or (b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India. Explanation. -For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that 2under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.
    
2. Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase -takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce:
   
   Provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which as being lawfully levied by the Government of any St-ate immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day of March, 1951.
    
3. No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax. On the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent".

No law of a State shall impose or authorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place, (a) outside the State or (b) in the course of import or export or (c) except in so far as Parliament otherwise provides, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and lastly (d) that no law made by the Legislature of a State imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.

Decision - The appeal is allowed and an order shall be issued directing that, until Parliament by law provides otherwise, the State of Bihar do forbear and abstain from imposing Sales Tax on out-of State dealers in respect of sales or purchases that have taken place in the course of inter- State trade or commerce even though the goods have been delivered as a direct result of such sales or purchases for consumption in Bihar.

Smith v/s Hughes
Issues
Is the term " streets" was included in section 1(1) of Street Offences Act, 1959

Is soliciting from the balconies of the houses of the common prostitutes amounted to an offence under section 1(1) of Street Offences Act,

Rule
Section 1 (1) of the Street Offenses Act, 1959

"it shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution"

Arguments
Petitioner Argument:
It was argued, with other arguments, that the soliciting was done "in a street" so it comes under the gambit of section 1(1)[1]

Defendant Argument:
Defendant argued, with other arguments, that the balcony is not "in a street" as under section 1 (1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, it does not come under the gambit of section 1(1)[1].

Analysis
On analysing Section 1(1) of Street Offenses Act, 1959, it is analysed that this act was implemented to stop the crime against men passing of the street so that they can walk around the town without being disturbed or harassed or approached by common prostitutes of UK. If we interpreted to meaning soliciting from streets and only streets then the intention of legislature and the purpose of this act is lost.

Conclusion
In this case it is clear that no literal interpretation is done by the judges of Section 1(1) of Street Offenses Act, 1959, but in a way to give more wider approach, meaning and effect to it and convicting the defendants for the offence of soliciting. If it is to be interpreted in its literal sense then as stated by Hilbery J, by applying the mischief it does not really matter if the prostitute is soliciting on the street, at a doorway, on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is closed, open, or partially open; in each scenario, her intent to solicit is directed towards a person walking down the street.

Award Winning Article Is Written By: Mr.Akshat Bhararia, a Seventh Semester student of College MLSU,Udaipur.

Authentication No: OT365647928119-17-1023