The Constitution of India has given specific powers to the Legislature, Executive & Judiciary. All the three functionalities of the State are mandated to act in accordance with the powers granted by our Constitution. None of the functionalities can encroach or transcend the powers given to them.

However, the Supreme Court has been given specific & special power under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. This makes the Apex Court super powerful but Article 142 is to be used sparingly to grant substantial justice.

Article 142 of the Constitution is apparently unique as it does not have any counterpart in most of the major written constitutions of the world. Further, Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India gives wide and capacious power to the Supreme Court to do 'complete justice' in any cause or matter, which is significant, as the judgment delivered by Supreme Court ends the litigation between the parties.

It is relevant that Article 142 gives legal authority to the Supreme Court to give precedence to equity over law. This power, like all powers under the Constitution, must be contained and regulated, as it has been held that relief based on equity should not disregard the substantive mandate of law based on underlying fundamental general and specific issues of public policy.

It would be relevant to reproduce Article 142 of The Constitution of India 1949, which reads as under:

142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and unless as to discovery, etc

1. The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or orders so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe
    
2. Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.

Thus, the Constituent Assembly enacted Article 142 on May 27, 1949, and gave the country's highest Court (Supreme Court) plenary power to ensure the secured administration of justice. Article 142 of the Indian Constitution grants extensive power to the Supreme Court that prioritizes equity over law and ensures 'complete justice' in the exercise of the jurisdiction.

It would be relevant to refer to the Apex Court case in Bonkya Alias Bharatshivaji Mane vs State of Maharashtra 1995 SCC (6) 447 wherein the court dealt with the scope of Article 142 of the Constitution & succinctly observed thus:

" The amplitude of powers available to this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is normally speaking not conditioned by any statutory provision but it cannot be lost sight of that this Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution with a view to do justice between the parties but not in disregard of the relevant statutory provisions."

It would be trite to refer to Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 wherein the Court has circumscribed the powers granted under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Court held thus:

"The plenary powers of this court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exists independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers.

This power, exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction, apart from the statutes. It stands upon the foundation, and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties.

This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties while administering justice according to law.

There is no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the court to prevent "clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice". It, however, needs to be remembered that the powers conferred on the court by Article 142 being curative in nature cannot be construed as powers which authorise the court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it.

This power cannot be used to "supplant" substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the court. Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly.....

The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice " between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it." The very nature of the power must lead the court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision covering a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litgating parties by "ironing out the creases" in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute settling. It is well recognised and established that this court has always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute settling.

It is a "problem solver in the nebulous areas". (See. K. Verraswami vs. Union of India (1991 (3) SCC 655) but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject matter of a given case, cannot be altogether ignored by this court, while making an order under Article Indeed, these constitutional powers can not, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in statute dealing expressly with the subject."

The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court dealing with the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 in Prem Chand Garg vs. Excise Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad, (1963) Supp. 1. S.C.R. 885 observed thus:

" In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that the wide powers which are given to this court for doing complete justice between the parties, can be used by this court for instance, in adding parties to the proceedings pending before it, or in admitting additional evidence, or in remanding the case, or in allowing a new point to be taken for the first time. It is plain that in exercise these and similar other powers, this Court would not be bound by the relevant provisions of procedure if it is satisfied that a departure from the said procedure is necessary to do complete justice between the parties.

That takes us to the second argument urged by the Solicitor- General that Art. 142 and Art. 32 should be reconciled by the adoption of the rule of harmonious construction. In this connection, we ought to bear in mind that though the powers conferred on this Court by Art. 142(1) are very wide, and the same can be exercised for doing complete justice in any case, as we have already observed this Court cannot even under Art. 142(1) make an order plainly inconsistent with the express statutory provisions of substantive law, much less, inconsistent with any Constitutional provision. There can, therefore be no conflict between Art. 142(1) and Art. 32."

The discussion would be incomplete without referring to the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of E.S.P.Rajaram & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors (2001) 2 SCC 186 wherein the Court, dealing with the extent & intent of Article 142 observed thus:

"The said provision vests power in the Supreme Court to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any case or mater pending before it. The provision contains no limitation regarding the causes or the circumstances in which the power can be exercised nor does it lays down any condition to be satisfied before such power is exercised.

The exercise of the power is left completely to the descretion of the highest court of the country and its order or decree is made binding on all the Courts or Tribunals throughout the territory of India. However, this power is not to be exercised to override any express provision. It is not to be exercised in a case where there is no basis in law which can form an edifice for building up a super structure.

This Court has not hesitated to exercise the power under Article 142 of the Constitution whenever it was felt necessary in the interest of justice. In the case of M S Ahlawat vs. State of Haryana and another (2000) 1 SCC 278 a bench of three learned Judges of this Court considering the power of the Court to recall its own order in a criminal case referred to the relevant observations in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 and held that under Article 142 of the Constitution the Supreme Court cannot altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a statute and pass orders concerning an issue which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in another statute.

In the case of R.C.Sahi and others vs. Union of India and others (1999) 1 SCC 482 concerning applicability of certain service rules to officers of the CRPF this Court relying on the power vested in Article 142 "for doing complete justice in any cause or matter" issued the following directions:
"There are two petitioners in WP(C) No.211 of 1997. Out of these two, it is stated that one has already retired from the service. In the light of the interim orders dated 19.1.1998 and 27.1.1998, the first petitioner (C.M Bahuguna) is still in service in the promoted post.

In the circumstances, we are of the view that notwithstanding the dismissal of the writ petition, the petitioner, viz. C.M Bahuguna who is still in service in the promoted post, should be allowed to continue in the said promoted post, if necessary, by creating a supernumerary post. However, we make it clear that all further promotions shall be made in the light of this order."

The case of State of Punjab and others vs. Bakshish Singh (1998) 8 SCC 222 is also important. There was a departmental proceeding against a police constable wherein it was contended by the State that the Apex Court could not cure inconsistency because the respondent had not filed any cross appeal. The Court rejected the contention and removed the inconsistency by invoking Article 142 of the Constitution and by referring to Order 41, Rule 33 and Section 107(1)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The Court reiterated the position that while exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution the Court cannot ignore the substantive right of a litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it and can invoke its power under Article 142. However, the Court cautioned that the power cannot be used to supplant substantive law applicable to a case.

It would be apropos to refer to the case of Ram Krishna Verma and others vs. State of U.P. and others (1992) 2 SCC 620 wherein the case related to grant of permit to private operators on nationalised routes. The Apex Court referring to Articles 136, 142 and 226 of the Constitution held that the Court should endeavour to neutralise any undeserved and unfair advantage gained by a party invoking its jurisdiction. The Court observed thus:

"This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO held that the High Court while exercising its power under Article 226 the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised. It was further held that the institution of the litigation by it should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it.

In the light of that law and in view of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction would do complete justice and neutralise the unfair advantage gained by the 50 operators including the appellants in dragging the litigation to run the stage carriages on the approved route or area or portion thereof and forfeited their right to hearing of the objections filed by them to the draft scheme dated February 26, 1959."

It would be appropriate to refer to the Apex Court judgment in Delhi Judicial services Association v. State of Gujarat (1991)4 SCC 406, wherein the Court relying on earlier precedents elaborated the true scope of Article 142 thus:

"The inherent power of the Supreme Court under Article 142 coupled with the plenary and residuary powers under Articles 32 and 136 embraces power to quash criminal proceedings pending before any court to do complete justice in the matter before this Court. If the court is satisfied that the proceedings in a criminal case are being utilised for oblique purposes or if the same are continued on manufactured and false evidence or if no case is made out on the admitted facts, it would be in the ends of justice to set aside or quash the criminal proceeding. It is idle to suggest that in such a situation this Court should be a help- less spectator. 6.3

The Court's power under Article 142(1) to do "complete justice" is entirely of different level and of a different quality. Any prohibition or restriction contained in ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation on the constitutional power of this Court. Once this Court has seisin of a cause or matter before it has power to issue any order or direction to do "complete justice" in the matter. This constitutional power of the Apex Court cannot be limited or restricted by provisions contained in statutory law. [997G] 6.4

What would be the need of "complete justice" in a cause or matter would depend upon the facts and circum- stances of each case and while exercising that power the Court would take into consideration the express provisions of a substantive statute. Once this Court has taken seisin of a case, cause or matter, it has power to pass any order or issue direction as may be necessary to do complete justice in the matter. Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. Allahabad, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 885 and A.R. Antulay v.R.S. Nayak & Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 602, referred to."

Special reference is required for the Apex Court Constitution Bench judgment in Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 574. This is a classic example of the wide powers of the Apex Court in granting compete/substantial justice under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Court explained the legal connotation of the term 'cause or matter' appearing in Article 142 thus:

"The expression "cause or matter" in Article 142 (1) is very wide overing almost every kind of proceedings in Court. In Halsbury's Laws of England-Fourth Edition [vol 37] para 22 referring to the plenitude of that expression it is stated:

"Cause or matter-The words "cause and "matter" are often used in juxtaposition, but they have different meanings. "Cause" means any action or any criminal proceedings and "matter" means any proceedings in court not in a cause. When used together, the words "cause or matter" cover almost every kind of proceeding in court, whether civil or crimi- nal, whether interlocutory or final, and whether before or after judgment."

Any limited interpretation of the expression "cause or matter' having regard to the wide and sweeping powers under Article 136 which Article 142 (1) seeks to effectuate, limiting it only to the short compass of the actual dispute before the Court and not to what might necessarily and reasonably be connected with or related to such matter in such a way that their withdrawal to the Apex Court would enable the court to do "complete justice", would stultify the very wide constitutional powers. Take, for instance, a case where an interlocutory order in a matrimonial cause pending in the trial court comes up before the apex court.

The parties agree to have the main matter itself either decided on the merits or disposed of by a compromise. If the argument is correct this court would be powerless to withdraw the main matter and dispose it of finally even if it be on consent of both sides. Take also a similar situation where some criminal proceedings are also pending between the litigating spouses.

If all disputes are settled, can the court not call up to itself the connected criminal litigation for a final disposal? If matters are disposed of by consent of the parties, can any one of them later turn around and say that the apex court's order was a nullity as one without jurisdiction and that the consent does not confer jurisdiction?

This is not the way in which jurisdiction with such wide constitutional powers is to be construed. While it is neither possible nor advisable to enumerate exhaustively the multitudinous ways in which such situations may present themselves before the court where the court with the aid of the powers under Article 142 (1) could bring about a finality to the matters, it is common experience that day-in-and-day-out such matters are taken up and decided in this court. It is true that mere practice, however long, will not legitimize issues of jurisdiction.

But the argument, pushed to its logical conclusions, would mean that when an interlocutory appeal comes up before this Court by special leave, even with the consent of the parties, the main matter cannot be finally disposed of by this court as such a step would imply an impermissible transfer of the main matter.

Such technicalities do not belong to the con- tent and interpretation of constitutional powers. To the extent power of withdrawal and transfer of cases to the apex court is, in the opinion of the Court, necessary for the purpose of effectuating the high purpose of Articles 136 and 142 (1), the power under Article 139A, must be held not to exhaust the power of withdrawal and transfer."

The Court in the aforesaid case rejected as unsound and erroneous the proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the Apex Court under Article 142(1). The Court widened the scope of Article 142(1) and categorically ruled thus:

"It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are matters of serious public importance. The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the Apex Court under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous.

In both Garg's as well as Antulay's case the point was one of violation of constitutional provisions and constitutional rights. The observations as to the effect of inconsistency with statutory provisions were really unnecessary in those cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on the breach of constitutional rights. We agree with Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Article 142 in so far as quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by Sections 320 or 321 or 482 Cr.P.C. or all of them put together.

The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso-facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might embody and reflect the, scheme of a particular law, taking into account the nature and status of the authority or the court on which conferment of powers - limited in some appropriate way - is contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental considerations of public policy.

Sri Sorabjee, learned Attorney-General, refering to Garg's case, said that limitation on the powers under Article 142 arising from "inconsistency with express statutory provisions of substantive law" must really mean and be understood as some express prohibition contained in any substantive statutory law. He suggested that if the expression 'prohibition' is read in place of 'provision' that would perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such prohibition should also be shown to be based on some underlying fundamental and general issues of public policy and not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern.

It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 arc subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of "complete justice" of a cause or matter, the apex court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public-policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly.

The proposition does not relate to the powers of the court under Article 142, but only to what is or is not 'complete justice' of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise."

The Apex Court thus finally held that the power of the Apex Court to withdraw unto itself cases pending in the district court at Bhopal is justified considering the scope and ambit of the power vested in the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Court finally held thus:

"The contention that the Apex Court had no jurisdiction to withdraw to itself the origi- nal suits pending in the District Court at Bhopal and dispose of the same in terms of the settlement and the further contention that, similarly, the Court had no jurisdiction to withdraw the criminal proceedings are reject- ed. It is held that under Article 142(1) of the Constitution, the Court had the necessary jurisdiction and power to do so."

It would be worthwhile to refer to the case of Ved Prakash and others vs. Union of India and others (1994) 1 SCC 45 wherein the Court noted the piquant situation caused due to inordinate delay in payment of compensation for the property acquired under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Apex Court resorting to Article 142, made the following observation:
"The petitioners because of the delay and inaction on the part of the respondents are in a great predicament. Any amount determined as market value of their lands acquired, with reference to the dates of issuance of notifications under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act i.e. at the rate prevalent 15-21 years prior to the dates of the making of the award, cannot be held to be compliance of the mandate regarding payment of market value of the land so acquired under the Constitution and the Act.

This Court faced with such a situation, where proceedings have remained pending for years after issuance of declarations under Section 6, in order to protect the petitioners concerned from irreparable injury i.e. getting compensation for their lands acquired with reference to the date of notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4, which may be more than a decade before the date of the making of the award, has advanced the date of notification under sub-section (1) of Section, so that market value of the land so acquired is paid at a just and reasonable rate.

Reference in this connection may be made to the cases of Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri (1992) 1 SCC 328; Akhara Brahm Buta, Amritsar v. State of Punjab, (1992) 4 SCC 243 and Bihar State Housing Board v. Ram Bihari Mahato, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2134.

This Court has advanced the date of notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act, in the cases referred to above, without assigning any reason, as to how the date fixed by Sections 11 and 23 of the Act, can be altered for ascertainment of the market value of land. The power of this Court under Article 142 is very wide and can be exercised in the ends of justice. The scope of the said Article was recently examined in the case of Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 584.

In the case of N.A. Mohammed Kasim (Dead) and another vs. Sulochana and others (1995) Supp(3) SCC 128 which arose from a civil suit this Court in the facts and circumstances of the case considered it fit for invoking Court's power under Article 142 for giving equitable relief to the plaintiff-respondents, not on ground on which they claimed relief in the suit but on the ground of promissory estoppel equity and fair play."

It would be apposite to refer to the case of Laxmidas Morarji (dead) by L.Rs. v. Behrose Darab Madan (2009) 10 SCC 425 which dealt with the provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution, wherein the Apex Court held thus:

" ....The power under Article 142 of the Constitution is a constitutional power and hence, not restricted by statutory enactments. Though the Supreme Court would not pass any order under Article 142 of the Constitution which would amount to supplanting substantive law applicable or ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with the subject, at the same time these constitutional powers cannot in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions.

However, it is to be made clear that this power cannot be used to supplant the law applicable to the case. This means that acting under Article 142, the Supreme Court cannot pass an order or grant relief which is totally inconsistent or goes against the substantive or statutory enactments pertaining to the case. The power is to be used sparingly in cases which cannot be effectively and appropriately tackled by the existing provisions of law or when the existing provisions of law cannot bring about complete justice between the parties."

The Apex Court in the case of Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. V. UT Chandigarh (2004) 2 SCC 130, held that discretionary relief under Article 142 cannot be granted on sympathy or sentiments. The Court observed thus:
36..... sympathy or sentiment by itself cannot be a ground for passing an order in relation whereto the appellants miserably fail to establish a legal right. ... despite an extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction contained in Article 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court ordinarily would not pass an order which would be in contravention of a statutory provision.

There are a catena of other cases in the past where the Apex Court has invoked the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. A division bench of Justice MR Shah and Justice MM Sundresh has recently upheld the Bombay High Court judgement quashing the provisions of Consumer Protection Rules, 2020, framed by Central Government u/s 101 of Consumer Protection Act 2019, which prescribe a minimum professional experience of 20 years and 15 years for adjudicating members to the State consumer commissions and District forums respectively and which did away with the requirement of a written exam for appointment.

The order for Cleansing of Taj Mahal and justice to many undertrials are a result of the invocation of article 142.Similarly, the Apex Court ordered a ban for a distance of 500 metres by invoking Article 142 on both the National & State highways although there was no notification by any of the State governments in this regard.

It would be relevant to refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 544, decided recently on 01-05-2023. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution held that the Apex Court has the discretion to dissolve the marriage by passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent, without being bound by the procedural requirement to move the second motion subject to the requirements and conditions laid down under Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, (2017) 8 SCC 746 and Amit Kumar v. Suman Beniwal, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1270. It was also held that in exercise of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, Supreme Court has the discretion to dissolve the marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown.

The Court in the aforesaid case lauded the purpose & intent of Article 142 in the following words:
"This provision, apparently unique as it does not have any counterpart in most of the major written constitutions of the world, has its origin in and is inspired from the age-old concepts of justice, equity, and good conscience. Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, which gives wide and capacious power to the Supreme Court to do 'complete justice' in any 'cause or matter' is significant, as the judgment delivered by this Court ends the litigation between the parties.

Given the expansive amplitude of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, the exercise of power must be legitimate, and clamours for caution, mindful of the danger that arises from adopting an individualistic approach as to the exercise of the Constitutional power."

It is noteworthy that while interpreting Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, in M. Siddiq (Dead) Through Legal Representatives (Ram Janmabhumi Temple Case) v. Mahant Suresh Das and Others (2020) 1 SCC 1 the Constitution Bench of this Court has summarised the contours of the power thus:

"1023. …The phrase 'is necessary for doing complete justice' is of a wide amplitude and encompasses a power of equity which is employed when the strict application of the law is inadequate to produce a just outcome. The demands of justice require a close attention not just to positive law but also to the silences of positive law to find within its interstices, a solution that is equitable and just. The legal enterprise is premised on the application of generally worded laws to the specifics of a case before courts.

The complexities of human history and activity inevitably lead to unique contests "such as in this case, involving religion, history and the law - which the law, by its general nature, is inadequate to deal with. Even where positive law is clear, the deliberately wide amplitude of the power under Article 142 empowers a court to pass an order which accords with justice. For justice is the foundation which brings home the purpose of any legal enterprise and on which the legitimacy of the rule of law rests.

The equitable power under Article 142 of the Constitution brings to fore the intersection between the general and specific. Courts may find themselves in situations where the silences of the law need to be infused with meaning or the rigours of its rough edges need to be softened for law to retain its humane and compassionate face..."

Article 142 encompasses a power of equity, employed when the strict application of the law is inappropriate to produce an outcome. The provision ensures that complete justice is provided and promotes equity as well as fairness. It helps in harmonizing conflicting interests by ensuring a balance between individual rights and societal interests.

It is a unique power that allows the Supreme Court to do complete justice between the parties at times when the statute or law may not provide a remedy. The extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 is broadly exercised in two situations by the Supreme Court either to dispose of 'complete justice' or fill the 'legislative gaps'.

From the conspectus of the views expressed in the decided cases referred to above it is clear that this Court has invoked the power vested under Section 142 of the Constitution in different types of cases involving different fact situations for doing complete justice between the parties.

Written By: Inder Chand Jain
Email: [email protected], Ph no: 8279945021