Section 140(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereon referred to as "the act") provides Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement by the provisions of this section.

Ingredients to be fulfilled for Section 140 of the Act:

In the landmark judgment of New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs Smt. Shanti Devi it was held that:

1. death or permanent disability of any person;
2. death or permanent disability has resulted from an accident, and
3. accident arose out of the use of a motor vehicle if these ingredients are established then the statutory liability of the owner to pay compensation would automatically flow from Section 140(1) of the new Act.

Difference between Section 140 and 168 of the Act:

In United India Ins. Co. Ltd. vs Sukhiabai @ Ramsukhibai And Ors[1]

it was held that the word "specify" is used in Section 168(1) but it is purposefully omitted in Section 140(1), indicating a significant variation in the phraseology utilized by the legislature in these two sections of the Act. On the other hand, the Legislature indeed took care to state that "the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally be liable to pay compensation... in respect of such death or disablement by the provisions of section 140." The Legislature had in mind "no-fault liability" arising from the use of more than one motor vehicle.

Section 92-A and Section 140 of the Act:

In the landmark judgment of Bajaj Allianz General Insurance v/s Champaben,

it was held that the insertion of section 92-A and the embodiment of the same with section 140 of the act makes it plausible for the heirs of the deceased or the injured plaintiff to file for compensation against the owner or owners jointly/severally without proving neglect or default on the part of the owner/owners. Further relying on section 140(4), it is held that the claim for compensation under section 140(1) can't be quashed because of a wrongful act on behalf of the deceased or the injured plaintiff nor the quantum of compensation be reduced due to the contribution of the side of the plaintiff.

The Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, Section 92-A, which imposes an absolute liability on the owner of a vehicle to pay compensation in respect of death or permanent disability resulting from an accident arising out of its use, has established the law in this regard, as evidenced by the Apex Court's decision in K. Nandakumar v. The Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar[2]

Section 140 and Section 163A/166 of the Act:

In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Kadviben Udabhai[3]
a Full Bench of this Court examined the Scheme of Chapter X of the Act of 1988, which contains Section 140 and other related provisions, and found that an application under Section 140 of the Act is maintainable without applying for compensation under Section 166 or 163A of the Act, but if an application under either of those sections is filed, the compensation awarded is reduced. Irrespective of the plant being quashed under section 166 of the act due to the plaintiff's negligence, the compensation awarded under section 140 need not be refunded.

Role Of Insurance Companies and Liability towards Third Parties:
In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd vs Sunita Rathi & Ors,
the Supreme Court held that an insurer is only liable where the insured's liability has been upheld to compensate the insured under the terms of the insurance contract. The Court decided that because the insurance, in this case, started after the accident, the insurance company was not obligated by the terms of the contract to compensate the insured.

Limits of responsibility and policy obligations are outlined in Section 147. The policy of insurance must specifically cover the person or classes of people named in the policy to the extent specified in Subsection (2) against any liability that may be incurred by him in respect of the death or bodily injury to any person, or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, according to Subsection (1) thereof, to comply with the requirements of this Chapter (Chapter XI). In Rikhi Ram And Anr vs Smt. Sukhrania And Ors

it was held that the provisions of Sections 147 and 140 when taken together do impose on the insurer the responsibility to pay compensation in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident, even though the said driver had any alleged share in the responsibility for the accident leading into his death or injury.

Conclusion:
In Samati Dev Barma v. State of Tripura, it was held, "The language of the provisions extracted above is so transparent that legislative intent is not left hidden in any manner; the liability Under Section 92A is made indefeasible, peremptory and total. The question of proof is left apart; it is not required even to be pleaded that the claim for compensation Under Section 92A was justifiable on tortious considerations.

No wrongful act, neglect, or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or any other person has to be pleaded or proved. The mere fact that death or permanent disablement took place in which one or more motor vehicles is or are involved in giving rise to the claim, is sufficient to raise liability in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 92A. This position is rather buttressed by what is to be found in sub-section (4) which negates the concept of contributory negligence.

In Our opinion, therefore, a claim made Under Section 92A cannot be rejected by the Tribunal if it finds that the claim arises out of an accident in which one or more motor vehicles is or are involved resulting in death or permanent disablement of any person. By creating 'no fault' liability the provision subserved a humanitarian object matching social realities."

End-Notes:

1. II (1991) ACC 368
2. 1996 AIR 1217, 1996 SCC (2) 736
3. IV (2006) ACC 345, 2006 ACJ 2019, AIR 2006 Guj 120, (2006) 2 GLR 1257