The elements which must co-exist to attract the operation of Section 4 of the Partition Act are first, that the dwelling house should belong to an undivided family; secondly, that a share thereof should have been transferred to a person who is not a member of such family; and thirdly, that the transferee should sue for partition.In simple words, before 2005 amendment in respect of the provision of section 23. A bar was there for the woman to apply for the partition of the dwelling house until the male heir does not decided and filed for the partition in respect of the same.

Introduction
The Dwelling House in Hindu Law has traditionally been seen through a patriarchal perspective. Prior to the Hindu Succession Act of 2008, Hindu women were not allowed to divide up and claim their portion of the dwelling. Subsequently, this area was eliminated. However, in a cultural setting where the Dwelling House is still seen as a place where the son and his family should live, a simple repeal does not ensure rights. Secular statutes like the Transfer of Property Act are consequently still interpreted in a concentric manner. The widow, children, and elderly family members who are the most defenceless are not adequately protected by this.

Hence, there is a need for a reconceptualization of the dwelling house as a unit that serves the interests of the most vulnerable. This must be done by analysing where the laws and the judiciary are failing, as well as by taking a fresh look at newer social legislations such as the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007.

It is widely acknowledged that one of a person's fundamental needs in life is to have a roof over their head. This fundamental need is met by a dwelling home, which is a shared household shared by a family. However, if one were to critically consider the rights that different family members have historically possessed in relation to the dwelling house, this straightforward construct raises a plethora of issues and controversies. The issue that divides the privileges of male and female family members is the most contentious. The home we live in is a social construction. Physically speaking, it is identical to any other property held by people or families.

However, personal laws as well as secular laws have looked at the dwelling house as an institution that must be protected in the interests of the family. With 'family' itself being un-definable in absolute and uncoloured terms, law has either been drafted or interpreted in ways that privilege a patriarchal view of 'family'.

It is argued in this paper that the law inadequately protects the rights of women, children and the elderly to the dwelling house and that prevalent conceptions of the dwelling house as an institution to "preserve the family" must be challenged. An alternative model is proposed, where the dwelling house is seen as an institution that protects the livelihood interests of the vulnerable sections of the family, such as the deserted wife, the widow, the aged parents and the minor children.

A comparison is made with other countries on this front. A significant part of the paper focuses on Hindu law, as the 2005 Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act has attempted to bring about a revolution in female heirs' rights to the dwelling house. Whether this amendment changes ground realities is also a question that will be considered.

I will also look at the Transfer of Property Act 1882, the Partition Act 1893, and some provisions of social legislations such as the Domestic Violence Act 2005, and the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act 2007 while analysing the present patriarchal set-up that the dwelling house has been tangled in. Primary and secondary sources of information have been referred to, and a uniform mode of citation has been used.

Co-parcener
The term "coparcener" has been incredibly frequently used in reference to Hindu law and the HUF. A coparcener is a person who has the right to request partition in HUF property and who gets a right in the ancestral property through birth.

Only male family members were known as coparceners because they had a right to the ancestral property by birth and had the only right to request partition in the HUF Property prior to the changes made by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.

Basic concept of dwelling house as per Section 4 of the Partition Act
The following conditions must be met in order for Section 4 of the Partition Act to apply: first, the dwelling house must belong to an undivided family; second, a share of it must have been transferred to a person who is not a member of such family; and third, the transferee must file a partition claim. The fact that the plaintiff, who was not a family member, had acquired not only a share of the house but also a share of additional lands, which he attempted to partition in the suit as it was originally written, does not make the provisions of Section 4 inapplicable.

The word 'family' as used in the Partition Act, ought to be given a liberal and comprehensive meaning, and it includes a group of persons related in blood, who live in one house, or under one head or management. It is not restricted to a body of persons who can trace their descent from a common ancestor.

It is not necessary to constitute an undivided sfamily for the purposes of Section 4 that the members of the family should constantly reside in the dwelling house; nor is it necessary that they should be joint in mess.

The word "house" includes not only the actual structure or building but also any nearby structures, the yard, the garden, the court yard, the orchard, and everything else required for a comfortable occupation of the home�but not items that are only for the owner's personal use and convenience. It also encompasses the property on which the dwelling-house is built.

Evidence must be used to decide whether or not a specific parcel of adjacent land is required for the enjoyment of a house.

Meaning, Effect and essence of partition
Partition is an eventuality in Hindu Joint family through which the joint status of a family comes to an end. Partition gives rise to new joint families or nuclear families. For partition, there must be at least two coparceners in the Hindu joint family because then only there will be a state of jointers amongst the coparceners which will come to an end by partition. It implies that until and unless a coparcenary exists in a family, partition cannot take place.

The concept of coparcenary is an innate part of the Hindu joint family property. Each coparcener has an inherent title to the joint property and all the coparceners together own the whole property. Partition generally means that joint ownership has transformed to separate ownership of the individual coparceners. Thus partition is also defined as "the crystallization of the fluctuating interest of a coparcenary property into a specific share in the joint family estate."

The concept of partition is applied with different rules under the two schools of Hindu law.

Dayabhaga School: Under Dayabhaga School, partition means division of property in accordance with the specific shares of the coparceners i.e. partition by metes and bounds.

Mitakshara School: Under Mitakshara School, partition not merely means division of property into specific shares. It basically means severance of joint status. Essential of coparcenary is important but existence of joint property is not essential for demanding partition. It is a law by which the joint family status terminates and the coparcenary comes to an end. All that is necessary to constitute a partition is a definite and unequivocal declaration of the intention by a coparcener to separate himself from the family.

Effect of Partition
Partition leads to separation from the joint family. After partition, a person is free from the rights, duties and responsibilities towards the joint family thereof. On partition the shares of the coparceners get defined and stop fluctuating further due to births and deaths in the family. Property acquired by a coparcener after partition is treated as his self-acquired separate property which devolves by succession.

Essence of Partition
Partition must not be confused with the de facto division of property and allotment of the shares. Partition by metes and bounds is not mandatory ingredient for completing the process of partition. The physical division of the property affects the mode of enjoyment and management only and not the nature of its tenure. Strictly speaking, a partition is said to be completed the moment the severance joint status takes place.

Types of Partition
Coparcenary is a creature of Hindu law. The concept of coparcenary encompasses community of interest and unity of possession. Each coparcener's right extends to the whole joint family property; though each one of them has an interest in the whole family property, he has no definite share therein. Partition can take place in two ways:

De jure Partition: When the community of interest is broken or divided and converted into a fix share leaving no scope for the application of doctrine of survivorship, this type of partition is known as de jure partition or in other words, the severance of the joint status.

De facto Partition: Unity of possession can be maintained even after a severance of joint status. The shares might get fixed but no coparcener can claim any property as falling into his exclusive share. It is not clear that which property will go to which coparcener. When this unity of possession is broken by an actual physical division of the property and replaced by exclusive possession, it is called as de facto partition or partition by metes and bounds.

Dwelling house: If we consider the ancient view, the dwelling house should not partitioned. But according to the modern perspective, the law does not consider this ancient rule as sacrosanct. A partition of a dwelling house can be done through a decree by court. The court will put all its effort to make such an arrangement so that all the coparceners are equally benefited. If the court fails to make equitable agreement, the dwelling house will be sold and the value will be divided equally among all the coparceners.
The Partition of Property

Voluntary Partition
Voluntary partition involves a written agreement through which the property is relinquished a co-owner. All the property's owners must be involved and all must sign the agreement. If there's no way to achieve the partition on a voluntary basis, a judge will have to order it.

If a court orders a sale, no co-owner can call it off - although owners are allowed to bid on the property if it goes through a sheriff's sale. The court may have provisions for owners to bid using credit based on their vested interests in the property.

But a forced partition action is contentious and costly and long. It's best avoided. A court-ordered sale is unlikely to happen at the optimal time for anyone. It will involve steep legal fees and, probably, a low sale price. If there's a mortgage, the owners will still have to pay whatever part of the loan the sale proceeds don't cover.

Court-Ordered Partition
If it's impossible for the co-owners to work through their differences, then the county court must effect a partition. Because the law does not want to force a person to co-own property who doesn't want to, the partition should be granted if the plaintiff meets the state criteria.

There are very few exceptions to this general rule. In rare cases, a provision in a will could bar partition, or a written agreement could exist in which the co-owners expressly agreed not to partition the property. But if there are no exceptional situations, a court should grant the partition.

There are two ways for the court to order the partition.

A partition in kind (actual partition) divides the actual property among the multiple owners. The court may forgo appraisals, assess the property's value, and assign the parties a specific portion of the parcel. Then, the individuals record their portions as their own properties with the county recorder of deeds. Of course, it can be difficult to divide real estate into equal sections. Moreover, it can leave the people holding parcels right next to each other � people who disagree so strongly that they just had a major showdown in court.

The alternative is the partition by sale. State law typically states that partition by sale should happen it the actual parcel cannot be split up without substantial detriment to anyone involved. In this case, the court will order a sale of the entire property sale, possibly on the open market, but typically at a sheriff's auction. Sale proceeds will be distributed to the owners, and taxed just as other real estate sales would be.

Expect the court to request surveys and appraisals if the property will be sold. In any case, the co-owners will need to show an accounting of their income from the property and any contributions they have made to the mortgage debt, the insurance and taxes, and the repairs and improvements, to ensure a fair distribution after partition.

Hindu Succession Act 1956
Generally succession refers to succeeding or following but in the context of hindu succession act it means succeeding or passing of rights of property from one to another.
Hindu succession act, 1956 enforced and enacted from 17 june,1956. Also amendment has been done in 2005 as Hindu Succession amendment act 2005 introducing the concept of notional partition (daughter rights under succession of property). Under Hindu law, there are four types in which property among Hindu being divided.

For Example:

• Joint Family Property (Concept Of Karta And Hindu Undivided Family)
• Separate Property (No Ancestral Property)
• Testamentary Succession (Will)
• Intestate Succession (Without Will)

But, under Hindu succession act 1956 act it deals with the rules and regulations relating to intestate succession among Hindus.

Right of dwelling house of a Hindu - Hindu succession act 1956
Dwelling house meaning:
Generally, Dwelling house means a place where a person has to be regarded as his fixed permanent home to which whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning moreover a place where he used to live from long time or we can say a person residence.

There is no specific definition of the expression dwelling of house and is not described and explained anywhere than in section 23 of Hindu succession act 1956.

For example:
In Fatime Begum v. Sakina Begum, the allahabad high court in their decision held that the Dwelling or Residence both the words are synonymous with Home or Domicile.

In Commissioner of Income Tax v. K.S. Ratnaswamy [1980 (2) SCC 548 at 553] the court quotable saying,
The expression "dwelling place" means "residence", "abode" or "home"
In other words, a place where an individual is supposed to live and sleep.

In Ford v. Barnes case
It is being described that the word "inhabitant" would seem to bring about more fully the meaning of the word dwelling house.

Before Amendment of 2005 Under Hindu succession act it defines:
Section 23 of the Act

• Disentitles a female heir to ask for partition in respect of a dwelling house wholly occupied by a joint family
• Until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein.
• In simple words, before 2005 amendment in respect of the provision of section 23.
• A bar was there for the woman to apply for the partition of the dwelling house until the male heir does not decided and filed for the partition in respect of the same.

For example:
In respect of the dwelling house as per section 23 a daughter was not entitled to file a suit for partition in the absence of any partition suit filed for dwelling house by a son or any male member of the joint family.

However, the prior provision of the section 23 did not lead to the contrast that female heirs deny the right to claim partition in respect of the dwelling house but their right is postponed till the male files the suit for partition.

After amendment to Hindu succession act in 2005

• Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act,2005 (39 of 2005)
• The act came into force-9.september.2005
• The act is prospective in nature.
• After coming into force of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005)
• The amendment came up with the procedure referring that it does not create any substantive right in claiming the relief of partition in respect of the dwelling house
• Further As being procedural in nature therefore same can be applied even to a pending suit
• The amendment with the omission of section 23 from the act generates certain rights that is being given to female members in the ancestral property.

Resulted in:
A female member is entitled to claim partition even in respect of the dwelling house even in the absence of any partition suit filed by the male member.

For example: daughter to claim partition in respect of the dwelling house even in the absence of any partition suit filed by the son

Therefore, having regard to the omission of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act,2005 (39 of 2005) the bar which was operative against the female members to claim partition of the dwelling house was removed

The female members are entitled to claim partition in respect of the dwelling house also along with other members

Summary
Section 23 of the Hindu succession act 1956 defined as When a Hindu male dies without will and has left surviving both male and female heirs specified in class I heirs and his or her property includes a dwelling-house wholly occupied by members of his or her family then the right of the female heir to claim partition of the dwelling-house shall not arise until the male heirs decided to file suit for partition to divide their respective shares but with amendment of 2005 of Hindi succession act.

The section 23 with giving right to female in ancestral property deleted the provision in regard to the section 23 of the Hindu succession act which resulted that female heirs have right to claim partition without the bar of whether the male heir choose partition or not.

Locating The Dwelling House In Hindu Succession Law

In classical Hindu Law, the widow and the daughter did not receive any property through succession or survivorship. With a few exceptions such as in the Bombay state, women only received a 'limited estate'. This meant that they could enjoy their portion of the property to a certain extent, but upon their death, it would go back to the next heir of her husband or father. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 changed this by conferring full heritable capacity on female heirs.

Hindu society was largely exogamous, which meant that daughters in the family commonly married outside the village to a different family. Hence, it was feared that granting female heirs absolute rights in her natal dwelling house would result in uncomfortable situations where the daughter's 'new' family could partition and reside in the dwelling house.

Therefore, although the Hindu Succession Act gave female family members inheritance rights, Section 23 of the Act limited these rights with respect to the dwelling house. According to Section 23, where a Hindu intestate leaves behind him a dwelling house with both male and female heirs, the female heirs may not ask for partition of the house until the male heirs choose to do so.

Additionally, the female heirs may be granted a right of residence in the dwelling house only if she is unmarried, has been deserted or separated from her husband, or is a widow. This provision was also justified by the fact that the property of married women was largely controlled not by them, but by their husbands (who are usually complete strangers to the woman's family in an exogamous setting), and disruptive influences would operate if he can effectuate a partition in his wife's family dwelling house.

In patriarchal societies, the death of the male "head of the family" often renders the remaining members helpless and destitute. It cannot be denied that an impartible dwelling house therefore serves as a vital form of protection for the widow and children of a deceased Hindu male. It has been reiterated in various Court decisions that S. 23 of the HSA must be interpreted keeping in mind the importance of preserving the institution of the dwelling house.

But in Narasimha Murthy v. Susheelabai, the Supreme Court made it clear that the objective behind this section was really to privilege the comfort of male heirs over female heirs. It was held that the object behind S. 23 was to "prevent the fragmentation and disintegration of the dwelling house at the instance of the female heirs to cause hardship to the male heirs in occupation of the house".

This leads to two situations which demonstrate that Section 23 was more about reinforcing female subordination than anything else. First, when a Hindu man dies leaving behind a widow and daughters, some married and others unmarried; the married daughters can ask for partition7 as there are no male heirs who will be inconvenienced. This will clearly inconvenience the most vulnerable members of the family, but is not addressed by the section. Second, the son of a predeceased daughter may ask for partition.8 Even though the property devolved to him from his mother in the first place, this gives him a right that his mother never had.

The other discriminatory aspect of S. 23 is that it provided rights of residence only to unmarried, deserted, separated or widowed daughters. This, again as a consequence of exogamous marriage practices, legitimized the belief that married women are not a part of their natal families. Such a practice only ends up justifying the differential treatment of male and female children in the household, as the girl-child is seen only as a liability and a 'temporary' member of the family. While it is important for laws to respect customary beliefs and practices, the law should not ideally be reinforcing a custom that has lead to the systematic discrimination of a section of the population.

In the 174th Report of the Law Commission of India, it was recommended that along with making women coparceners in ancestral property,9 S. 23 of the Hindu Succession Act must be deleted.10 These changes were subsequently made in the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005. Hindu females now formally enjoy an equal right to partition their ancestral home.

The question of right of residence is not mentioned in the Act, but it can be presumed that all daughters, regardless of marital status, now enjoy equal right of residence in their natal homes. While this move is commendable, it must not be given more credit than is due. The changes in law may formally grant women rights over the property, but these rights are meaningless without the option of exercising the rights and the ability to control any property she may receive.

Cultural norms have an important role to play in determining the efficacy of a law. Presently, dominant Hindu cultural norms are still patriarchal, where women 'leave' their natal families on marriage, which may make the woman herself believe that she does not 'belong' to her natal home after marriage.

The norm of the bride's family paying dowry at the time of marriage also has a role to play in a woman not exercising her right over her natal property, as male heirs may argue that she has already taken her "share" of the family wealth. This is reinforced by sexual norms which mandate that being feminine implies being sacrificial and passive to the interests of male care-takers. The sum total of this complex set of norms is that a woman will often not claim her share of property from her natal home, and when she does, it is often not out of her own volition as much as the volition of her husband or his family. The ultimate consequence is that the dwelling house is an institution that primarily protects the already powerful (male) members of the family.

S. 44 OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT & S. 4 OF THE PARTITION ACT
Apart from the above analysis of succession laws and gender roles, the conclusion that the dwelling house is an institution that primarily serves patriarchal interests can also be reached from another angle - by looking at the secular laws of property and partition. S. 44 of the Transfer of Property Act prevents the intrusion of strangers into the family residence when a share in the house has been transferred to a stranger.

In such cases, the 'stranger' may not claim joint possession or any common or part enjoyment of the house. His remedy is to file a partition suit. When such a suit for partition is filed, if a member of the family is willing to buy the third party's share, S. 4 of the Partition Act mandates that a sale be made to such member.

It is evident that these provisions of law that 'family' is considered an important institution to preserve. However, neither section defines what family is, paving way for the judiciary to interpret what it thinks a family should be. Before the Hindu Succession Act was enacted, the judiciary consistently took a liberal stance of interpretation. In the year 1929, in the case Pakija Bibi v. Adhar Chandra, it was contended by the petitioners that two sisters living together cannot constitute a 'family' under Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, as they are not a Hindu undivided family.

The Calcutta High Court held that family need not mean a Hindu undivided family- any persons living under one roof under one head or management can constitute a family. In 1930, in Mantripragada Sivaramayya's case, a family had formally partitioned the dwelling house, but were still living together under one roof. When a third party who was transferred one-third of the property sued for partition, the Madras High Court gave the family the benefit of S. 4 of the Partition Act. It was held that the phrase 'undivided family' is sufficiently ambiguous to justify the construction that is most in consonance with the object of the Act.

However, almost fifty years later, after the Hindu Succession Act, Ram Bilas Tewari's case came into consideration before the Allahabad High Court. The dwelling house in question belonged to Ram Bali, who before his death had executed a gift deed in favour of this daughter Mahdei. On Mahdei's death, the property devolved to her mother, Mangla.

On Mangla's death, it devolved on to the remaining two children, Ram Charan and Saheb Dei. After Ram Charan's death, Saheb Dei sold her share of the dwelling house to a third party, Ram Bilas Tewari. Shiv Rani, a widow who resided in the house, claimed protection under Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act. Here, the Allahabad High Court took a narrow interpretation of "undivided family" to hold that the lone surviving widow cannot claim protection as she is not an undivided family. Such an interpretation is problematic, as the objective behind Section 44 is to protect residents of a dwelling house. A narrow view such as the one taken by the Allahabad Court fails to protect the widow, who is the most vulnerable dweller of the house.

A similar view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in the year 1984, in Dhirendranath Sadhukan. Here, a woman lived with her husband and his brother. On the death of the husband, the brother sold his share to a third party. When the third party claimed joint possession, the widow, again, was not granted the protection of S. 44. It was reasoned that there was "no common bond or cementing factor bringing both of them (the widow and her brother-in-law) within the fold of an undivided family".

There is also conflicting authority regarding whether Section 44 creates a positive right for members of the family to evict a third person. It appears intuitive that without such a right, S. 44 would serve no purpose. While Courts have recognized such a positive right in some decisions, in Jogendra Nath Mondal v. Adhar Chandra Mondal, the Calcutta High Court differed and held that a co-sharer can grant amicable possession to another co-sharer who is a stranger to the family, and the family members cannot restrain the third party from enforcing his possession. This virtually renders S. 44 an empty provision, as the implication is that once the stranger has already taken possession of the property, the family has no remedy.

It is found that when such a narrow interpretation of the law is taken, S. 44 does little to protect vulnerable members of the dwelling house such as the widow or the daughter. One can take advantage of such a lacuna in the law to drive out widows from their marital homes, either by seeking joint possession or by partition. This is unfortunate, as given the societal stigma around widowhood that still persists in India; a house to live in is of utmost importance to the widow.

Therefore, there is a great need to re-conceptualize the dwelling house as an institution that performs the important social function of protecting vulnerable members of the family. If the law and the Courts keep in mind such a framework, some headway can be made in detangling it from a patriarchal set-up.

Re-Conceptualizing The Dwelling House- Protecting The Vulnerable

So far it has been demonstrated that though the gender discriminatory Succession Law has been struck down and that existing partition law is prima facie gender neutral, the notion of the Dwelling House remains mired in a patriarchal understanding of what constitutes a family.

Such an understanding, in turn, creates pockets of power and vulnerability within units of the same family. However, recognizing that a generalization of certain members of the family as de-facto vulnerable would reinforce gendered stereotypes, it is important to unpack the concept of vulnerability itself. The 'dominance' approach, propounded by noted feminist scholar Katherine Mackinnon, provides some insight in this regard.

Gender neutrality of a law can ignore deeply-rooted power structures in two ways: by emphasizing on 'sameness', or on 'difference'. Under the 'sameness' standard, the law would assume that all categories of people are equal and prescribe the same rules for them. The striking down of S. 23 of the Hindu Succession Act to make it 'gender neutral', ignoring existing cultural norms that make its applicability near-impossible is an effect of such a standard. The problem with the sameness standard is obvious, as demonstrated earlier in the paper.

Under the 'difference' standard, the law recognizes the innate differences in different categories of persons and makes special provisions for such persons. Affirmative action is born out of such a standard. Allowing for legal reform in the law of the dwelling house to protect the widow, for example, would be a manifestation of the 'difference' principle (it recognizes that widows are specially placed, as opposed to widowers). However, a legal recognition of such an inherent difference reinforces stereotypes and harmful cultural norms about women and their vulnerability

To avoid the pitfalls of either approach, Mackinnon propounds the 'Dominance' approach, which constructs vulnerability not on preconceived categories, but based on the distribution of power. Cultural norms in a Hindu family reproduce power in familiar patterns- a male 'head' of the family, dependent spouse, children and elderly parents.

However, a dominance approach to analyzing vulnerability can also be expanded to protect other persons as well, such as Tran's members of a family, partners in homosexual relationships, etc. With respect to the Dwelling House, reform in the law must recognize the mitigation of the suffering of vulnerable persons seen through the lens of dominance. In this regard, three approaches are analyzed: the homestead model, a re-reading of social legislations specifically meant to protect women and the elderly, and existing rent-control law.

Conclusion
From an analysis of Hindu Succession Laws as well as the secular Transfer of Property Act, it is evident that the law around the dwelling house is currently tangled up in a patriarchal conception of family and women's autonomy. The consequence of this is that on the death of the male 'head' of the family, the dwelling house does not serve the vital function of protecting vulnerable members such as the widow, the daughter and the aged parents.

The 2008 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act repealing Section 23 tried to undo this patriarchy. The move is welcome and commendable, although its efficacy is hindered by the juxtaposition of prevalent cultural and sexual norms that dictate women's attitudes towards claiming their share of property.

Hence, apart from waiting for the elusive organic change to take place in society, there are some other measures that the Legislature and the Courts can undertake so that laws reflect non-patriarchal attitudes. Laws relating to the dwelling house must be interpreted with the object of protecting those members who have the most to lose if they lose their rights over the house, rather than with the object of preserving vague notions of family.

Two ways to do this have been suggested. First, the patriarchal, narrow view of "family" that Courts have adopted while interpreting Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act must be changed.

Second, law and policy must consciously work towards securing the interests of the most vulnerable members of the family. This can be done by taking lessons from the homestead model that is followed in the West, and by a creative reading of social legislations such as the Domestic Violence Act and the Senior Citizens' Act. The Rent Control regime in some states also provides useful hints on how vulnerability is to be constructed, as it provides tenancy rights to the dependent family members upon the death of the tenant.

Award Winning Article Is Written By: Mr.MD Rezaul Haque

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