In India there was a demand for the removal of the fundamental right to property from part III of the Constitution. It was argued that the retention of it as a fundamental right leaves it to the judges rather than to the Parliament to decide the quantum of compensation payable when property is acquired for public purposes. Secondly, it was argued that the implementation of the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution is rendered impossible by the right of property in India.

Property under Indian Constitution means any proprietary interest that can be acquired, disposed or taken possession of. It is not only tangible but also includes any bundles of right which the owner can exercise to the exclusion of others. Article 19(1) f defines Right to Property. Earlier Supreme Court was of the view that it is an abstract right only and not concrete but later in Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments v. Swamiar [1] , it accepted right to property as a concrete right also.

So in the text ahead we would finally trace that how the above two arguments have actually amounted to the deletion of right to property form Part III and it becoming a legal right.

Article 31A

Article 31 A saves laws providing for acquisition of estates , temporary management of any property by the state in public interest , amalgamation of two or more corporations either in public interest or for their proper management , extinguishment or modification of any rights of managing directors , directors or managers of corporations , or of any voting rights of shareholders thereof , or the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement , lease or license for the purpose of searching for , or winning , any mineral or mineral oil , or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement .

These powers of the state have two provisions:

Any such laws made by a state legislature shall have to secure the assent of the President of India.
If the state acquires any land under personal cultivation of a person, the compensation paid against such acquisition shall not be lower than at the market rate.

Article 31B

Article 31 B a ninth schedule to the constitution was created in order to exclude certain legislations from the scope of judicial review. Originally the acts put there related to land reform. Some of the later legislations, included in the ninth schedule, related to other kinds of property too. But , when the Tamil Nadu Backward Classes , Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes (Reservation of Seats in Educational Institutions and appointments or posts in the Services under State) Act, 1993 , was added to the schedule as entry no. 257 A , the inclusion was challenged and the Supreme Court , in 2007 , decided to examine the entire ninth schedule .

Article 31C

Article 31C had a worse fate. This article , inserted by the 25th amendment in 1971 , to mitigate the effect of the Supreme Court judgement in the bank nationalization case of 1970 , provided that, notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to any of the directive principles of state policy would be void and no court could call in question any such law. In the Keshavananda Bharti v state of Kerala [2],the Supreme Court declared void that portion of the 25th amendment that precluded judicial review of such law.

Constitutional Amendments

The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
The introduction of the First Amendment bill was witnessed by the Provisional Government because general elections took place in 1952, the bill basically centered on the 'certain difficulties that had been brought to light by the judicial decisions and pronouncements especially in regard to fundamental rights'.

After the independence India's Political Leaders and planners embarked on social and economic reconstruction of Indian society by first of all removing the evils of zamindari system .The First Five year plan was in support of this ad it excluded the presence of intermediaries and had given the land to tiller. Consequently land reforms were enacted in UP, Bihar and elsewhere.

But at the same junction of time the apex court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar[3] held that the Bihar State Management of Estates and Tenures Acts, 1949 void on the ground that compensation provided was no compensation. So as to nullify the effect of this judgment and also to uphold the validity of Zamindari Abolition Regulation first Amendment was done and Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru the then Prime Minister had enunciated the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy during the constituent assembly debate on compensation. He declared:

'No Supreme Court and no judiciary can stand in judgment over the sovereign will of the Parliament representing the will of the entire community. If we go wrong here and there it can point out ultimate analysis, where the future of the community is concerned, no judiciary can come on its way, and ultimately the whole Constitution is a creature of Parliament.'

Therefore his first amendment added to art 31 two explanatory clauses 31-A and 31-B to fully secure the abolition of zamindari.

The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955
In 1954 when the Parliament adopted a resolution for the establishment of "socialistic pattern of society" in India the State started assuming the role of a welfare state and were vitally concerned with reducing disparities in income, to prevent monopolies and concentration of economic power in a few hands.

Consequently in furtherance of the above objective it started regulating and controlling the private business of several commercial companies and undertakings as done in Sholapur mills Case, Subodh Gopal's Case and Belle Banerjee's Case, the Supreme Court was of the view that words 'taken possession of or acquired' amounted to deprivation hence compensation must be paid even though merely state took the possession and not acquired it. And according to Bella's case the compensation should be equivalent to what the owner is deprived of.

Thus the above judgment of the court stood as a brake in the regulatory power of the state and property was given a very wide connotation. So it became necessary that the power to fix ceilings on land holdings, to distribute excess of land and lastly to remove the jurisdiction of the judiciary from fixing the compensation.

This led to Fourth Amendment which brought a change in the substantial character in 31(2) and also inserted (2-A). This way the State acquired the right to pass any law restricting, modifying and curtailing the right of ownership in property without being liable to pay compensation .It also provided that there can be no taking or acquisition till the time the title is transfer to the state.

In Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras and another[4], the Supreme Court accepted the amendment to the effect that equivalence (compensation) could not be questioned , but held that 'if a law lays down principles which are not relevant to the property acquired , it may be said that they are not principles contemplated by Article 31(2) of the constitution'.

The Constitution (Seventeen Amendment) Act, 1964
It appeared that notwithstanding the amendments, certain other legislative measures by different States for the purpose of giving effect to agrarian policy were effectively challenged. So thus the Parliament thought that it was necessary to make amendment in Art 31-A and Art 31-B . Accordingly, the expression 'estate' in At 31-A was amended retrospectively by a new definition given in Art 31-A (2) and another proviso was added to 31 –A (1) . In article 31-B instead of 13 acts 44 amendments act were added to the schedule.

The validity of the above amendments were challenged in Golak Nath's case though the amendments were upheld but it was held that any amendment made under art 368 is a law under art 13 due to which state can take no action which infringes or abridges fundamental rights due to which j. Hiddayatulah said that the constitution needs to be amended as putting right to property as a fundamental right was in his opinion an error. But this defect was resolved by the 24th Amendment 1971 and the basic reason for the initiation of this bill was a conflict between the fundamental rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy. And from then onward amendment under art 368 was not considered to be a law any longer.

The Constitution (twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971
By this amendment a new clause was substituted for Art 31(2) replacing the expression 'Compensation' by the for 'Amount' and making the amount and mode of payment for takeover of property non –justiciable .And also by this time the conflict between the fundamental rights and Directives was over and Directive Principles of State Policy gain precedence over fundamental rights conferred under Art 14, 19 and 31. It had made special provision with regard to law intended to give effect to the directive principles contained in art 39 (b) and 39 (c) of the Constitution.

Again Kesavananda Bharati's Case the validity of 24th and 25th Amendments were challenged along with the judgment of Golak Nath. Golak Nath was overruled and the Doctrine of Basic Structure was propounded by which any constitutional amendment has to pass the test of basic structures that means if it contravenes the basic structure the amendment is not valid though an exhaustive list stating what all is there in basic structure was not given.

Supreme Court Approach To The Right To Property

The Supreme Courts approach to the right to property can be divided into two phases:

1. Pre 1978 the Fundamental Right to Property
2. Post 1978 the Constitutional Right to Property

Pre 1978 the Fundamental Right to Property
The Ninth Schedule was inserted in the constitution by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 along with two new Articles 31 a & 31 B so as to make laws acquiring zamindari unchallengeable in the courts. These steps were felt necessary to carry out land reforms in accordance with the economic philosophy of the state to distribute the land among the land workers, after taking away such land from the land lords.

By the Fourth Amendment Act, 1955, Art 31 relating to right to property was amended in several respects. The purpose of these amendments related to the power of the state to compulsory acquisition and requisitioning of private property. The amount of compensation payable for this purpose was made unjustifiable to overcome the effect of the Supreme Court judgement in the decision of State of West Bengal v. Bella Banerjee[5]. By the constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, article 31 A was amended with respect to meaning of expression estate and the Ninth Schedule was amended by including therein certain state enactments.

During this period the Supreme Court was generally of the view that land reforms need to be upheld even if they did strictly clash against the right to property[6], though the Supreme Court was itself skeptical about the way the government went about exercising its administrative power in this regard[7]. The Supreme Court was insistent that the administrative discretion appropriate or infringe property rights should be in accordance with law and cannot be by mere fact[8]. The court however really clashed with the socialist executive during the period of nationalization, when the court admirably stood up for the right to property in however a limited manner against the over reaches of the socialist state.

In Bank Nationalisation case[9] has clearly pointed out the following two points:

1. The constitution guarantees the right to compensation which is equivalent in money to the value of the property has been compulsorily acquired. This is the basic guarantee. The law must therefore provide compensation and for determining compensation relevant principles must be specified if the principles are not relevant the ultimate value determined is not compensation.
    
2. The constitution guarantees that the expropriate owner must be given the value of his property (the reasonable compensation for the loss of the property). That reasonable compensation must not be illusionary and not reached by the application of an undertaking as a unit after awarding compensation for some items which go to make up the undertaking and omitting important items amounts to adopting an irrelevant principle in the determination of the value of the undertaking and does not furnish compensation to the expropriated owner.

Post 1978 the Constitutional Right to Property
It was at this period the Supreme Court had gone out of its way to hold against the right to property and the right to accumulate wealth and also held that with regard to Article 39, the distribution of material resources to better serve the common good and the restriction on the concentration of wealth[10].

The court however is also responsible in toning down the excesses on the right to property and wealth by the socialist state[11]. During the period of Liberalisation, the Supreme Court has attempted to get back to reinterpret the provisions which give protection to the right to property so as to make the protection real and not illusory and dilute the claim of distribution of wealth[12]. However, this has been an incremental approach and much more needs to be done to shift the balance back to the original in the constitution.

This means that the acquisition of property is not merely temporal but to be accepted as valid it must conform to spiritual guidelines as well as the Indian conceptions recognize quite clearly that though property can be enjoyed which has not been acquired strictly in terms of the law, it cannot be called real property of the person concerned. Property therefore is not merely an individual right but a construction and part of social and spiritual order[13].

The basis of conception of property in the societies of India is not a rigid and clear demarcation of claims belonging to an individual but is a sum total of societal and individual claims all of which need not be based on clear individual legal demarcation.

Article 31 in its first two clauses deals with the deprivation of property and acquisition of property. The Supreme Court held in a series of decisions viz. State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bella Banerjee[14], State of W.B v. Subodh Gopal[15], State of Madras v. Namasivaya Muralidar[16], that Article 31, clauses (1) and (2) provided for the doctrine of eminent domain and under clause (2) a person must be deemed to be deprived of his property if he was substantially dispossessed or his right to use and enjoy the property was seriously impaired by the impugned law.

According to this interpretation, the two clauses of Article 31 dealt only with acquisition of property in the sense explained by the court, and that under Article 31(1) the state could not make a law depriving a person of his property without complying with the provisions of Article 31(2). It is worth mentioning in this context that it was the decision in the Bella Banerjees case that actually induced the government to resort to the Fourth Amendment.

Then came the Seventeenth Amendment Act, 1964 by which the state extended the scope of Article 31-A and Ninth Schedule to protect certain agrarian reforms enacted by the Kerala and Madras states. The word estate in Article 31-A now included anyjagir or inam, mauf, or any other grant and janmam right in state of Kerala, Madras and also Ryotwari lands.

It also added consequentially, the second proviso to clause (1) to protect a person of being deprived of land less than the relevant land ceiling limits held by him for personal cultivation, 4 except on payment of full market value thereof by way of compensation. It also added 44 more Acts to the Ninth Schedule. The Supreme Court by various judgments considered the said amendments and restricted their scope within reasonable confines.

The Supreme Court in Kocchuni vs State of Madras[17], did not accept the plea of the state that Article 31(1) after amendments gave an unrestricted power to the state to deprive a person of his property. It held that Article 31(1) and (2) are different fundamental rights and that the expression ʺlawʺ in Article 31(1) shall be valid law and that it cannot be valid law unless it amounts to a reasonable restriction in public interest within the meaning of Article 19(5).

While this decision conceded to the state the power to deprive a person of his property by law in an appropriate case, it was made subject to the condition that the said law should operate as reasonable restriction in public interest and be justiciable. The Court construed the amended provision reasonably in such a way as to salvage to some extent the philosophy of the Constitution. This became necessary as the definition of estate was simultaneously expanded to cover Ryotwari settlements in order to make agrarian reforms more effective.

The Supreme Court in P Vajravelu Mudalier v. Special Deputy Collector[18] and also in the Union of India v. Metal Corporation of India[19] considered Article 31(2) in the context of compensation and held that if the compensation fixed was illusory or the principles prescribed were irrelevant to the value of the property at or about the time of acquisition, it could be said that the Legislature had committed a fraud on power and therefore the law was inadequate.

The Supreme Court in three other decisions confined the bar of Article 31-An only to agrarian reforms. In Kochunni case the Court held that requirement of Article 31-A bars and attack on the ground of infringement of fundamental right only in the case of agrarian reforms, pertaining to an estate.

In Ranjith Singh v. State of Punjab[20], it was held that the expression ʺagrarian reformʺ was wide enough to take in consolidation of holdings as it was nothing more than a proper planning of rural areas. In Vajravelu decision the Supreme Court explained that there is no conflict between the said two decisions and pointed out that the latter decision includes in the expression of agrarian reforms, the slum clearance and other beneficial utilisation of vacant and waste lands.

In a Ghulabhai v. Union of India[21], the Supreme Court did not accept the contention of the state that the expression ʺEstateʺ takes in all waste lands, forest lands, lands for pastures or sites of buildings in a village whether they were connected with agriculture or not but ruled that the said enumerated lands would come under the said definition only if they were used for the purpose of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto.

The result of the brief survey of the provisions of the Constitution and the case law thereon as it stood then may be stated in the form of the following propositions:

• Every citizen has a fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of the property
• The state can make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the said right in public interest.
• The said restrictions, under certain circumstances, may amount to deprivation of the said right.
• Whether a restriction imposed by law on a fundamental right is reasonable and in public interest or not, is a justiciable issue.
• The state can by law, deprive a person of his property if the said law of deprivation amounts to reasonable restriction in public interest within the meaning of Article 19(5).
• The state can acquire or requisition the property of a person for a public purpose after paying compensation.
• The adequacy of the compensation is not justiciable.
• If the compensation fixed by law is illusory or is contrary to the principles relevant to the fixation of compensation, it would be a fraud on power and therefore the validity of such a law becomes justiciable.

Laws of agrarian reform depriving or restricting the rights in anʺestateʺthe said expression has been defined to include practically every agricultural land in a village cannot be questioned on the ground that they have infringed fundamental rights.

It all began when the question whether fundamental rights can be amended under Article 368 came for consideration of the Supreme Court in Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[22]. In this case the validity of the Constitution (1st Amendment) Act, 1951, which inserted inter alia, Articles 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution was challenged.

The Amendment was challenged on the ground that it purported to take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III, which fell within the prohibition of Article 13 (2) and hence was void. It was argued that the state in Article 12 included parliament and the word law in Article 13 (2), therefore, must include Constitution amendment.

The Supreme Court, however, rejected the above argument and held that the power to amend the Constitution including the fundamental rights is contained in Article 368, and that the word law in Article 13 (8) includes only an ordinary law made in exercise of the legislative powers and does not include Constitutional amendment which is made in exercise of constituent power. Therefore, a Constitutional amendment will be valid even if it abridges or takes any of the fundamental rights.

In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[23], the validity of the Constitution (17th Amendment) Act, 1964 was challenged. The Supreme Court approved the majority judgement given in Shankari Prasad's case and held that the words amendment of the Constitution means amendment of all the provisions of the Constitution. Gajendragadkar, C J said that if the Constitution-makers intended to exclude the fundamental rights from the scope of the amending power they would have made a clear provision in that behalf.

Transformation From Fundamental Right To Legal Right

The aftermath of the emergency witnessed not only changes in the political environment of the country but also in the realm of constitutional law. The Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 made comprehensive changes in the Constitution primarily with the objective of removing "the impediments to growth of the Constitution". The amendments were to spell out high ideas of secularism, socialism, democracy, to make Directive principles more comprehensive and give them precedence over fundamental rights.

The Act of 1976 widened the scope of 31(c) so as to cover all the Directive Principles to be given precedence over the fundamental rights. Further three new articles 39 A, 43A and 48A were inserted in Part IV. Again it was challenged in Minerva Mills's case and the Act was declared unconstitutional up to the extent of it giving precedence to Directives.

Right to property was originally incorporated in Article 19(1) (f) of the Indian Constitution which declared that all the persons shall have the right 'to acquire, hold and dispose of property' along with Art.31 which provided certain safeguards against the compulsory acquisition of individual properties which was based on English concept of private property and was modelled on basis of Sec 299 of Government of India Act, 1935. As regards the constitutional provision relating to it Art 19 (1) (f) was subjected to reasonable restrictions under art 19(5).

After the Janta Government took over the reins at the Centre, it sought to undo the amendments made under 42nd Amendment Act. It enacted 44th Amendment Act ,1978 which brought about one of the most significant change as it resulted in the deletion of right to property as a fundamental right and provided for its reincarnation as art 300-A to recognize it as a legal right.

The scope of Art 300-A was determined by the Supreme Court in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State Of Gujarat and it was held that right to property does not form the basic structure of the Constitution. And also expression 'property' in article 300-A has to be understood in the context of the sovereign power of eminent domain of the State.

Defects of the 44th Amendment Act:
The amendment was brought out without realizing the following draw backs:

1. The close relation of property with other fundamental rights, which the Janata Party was pledged to restore;
2. The effect of this change on the legislative power to acquire and requisition property;
3. The correlation of fundamental rights to Directive principles of state policy.

Implications:

1. The Right to Property would now be a Constitutional Right and not a Fundamental Right. A legislation violating the constitutional right to property could now be challenged only in High Courts and not directly in the Supreme Court.
    
2. Due to the deletion of Article 31 the Government was no longer under an obligation to compensate persons whose land had been acquired as per a law passed by Parliament.

As of now, it is, beyond the scope of my research and understanding as to whether Proposition (ii) i.e. deprivation of property without compensation is still legally tenable especially in light of the Supreme Court's ruling, in the Maneka Gandhi case, which held that each and every provision of the Constitution had to be interpreted in a just, fair and reasonable manner. Therefore any law depriving a person of his property shall have to do so in a reasonable manner.

It could be argued that the only reasonable manner to deprive a person of his property would be to offer him, reasonable compensation for the same. This discussion however is not completely relevant for the purpose of this post. The only relevant point is the fact that under the Constitution no person can be deprived of their property without the authority of law.

Reason Developments
In P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma[24], the Supreme Court of India has held that the right to property is not just a statutory right but is also a human right. The Supreme Court appears to have approved the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in J.A.Pye (Oxford Ltd).v. UK[25] where the ECHR took the concept of adverse possession very unkindly.

In P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy the Supreme Court held that the right of property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right.

Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789 enunciates right to property under Article 17:
"Since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no-one may be deprived thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it and just and prior indemnity has been paid. Moreover Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 under Section 17(i) and (ii) also recognizes right to property:
"17(i) everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others, (ii) No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."

Human rights have been historically considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc. But now human rights are gaining a multi-faceted dimension.

In Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N. Narasimhaiah[26], it has been held that in the absence of any provision either expressly or by necessary implication depriving a person of his right, the Court shall not construe a provision leaning in favour of such deprivation, since right to property is also a human right. Developing further in Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikabhai Khengerbhai Harijan[27] and looking at the position in other countries, the Supreme Court held that the law of adverse possession as irrational.

In Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals[28] the Supreme Court has held that the right to property is now held to be not only a constitutional right but also a human right. There the Supreme Court has followed the law laid down in P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy and reiterated that property rights are also incorporated within the definition of human rights.

In Lachchman Dass v. Jagatram[29], the Supreme Court reiterated that right to property is a human right. India is a signatory to various conventions on human rights. Article 5 1 (c) of the Constitution requires the state (including the Judiciary) to foster respect for international law and treats obligations in the dealings of people with one another. Therefore, it may be argued that the right to property being a part of human rights as embodied in Article 21.

Any legislation for depriving such right would require the state to provide for full compensation in the event of deprivation of property. Furthermore, even if such law is placed under the IXth Schedule and protected by Article 31 B. For example Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

In I.R.Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu[30] the Apex Court held that even though an Act is placed under the IXth Schedule by a constitutional amendment, it would be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys or takes away or abrogates the basic structure of the Constitution.

The Court held that the justification for conferring protection (not blanket protection) on the IXth Schedule shall be a matter of adjudication, examining the nature and extent of infraction of fundamental right by a statute and such statute sought to be constitutionally protected on the touchstone of the basic structure doctrine as reflected in Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19.

The Court held that Articles 14, 19 and 21 are the basic structure of the Constitution therefore, basic essence of the right cannot be taken away. Essence of the human right (which according to the recent judgments include property rights) would necessarily mean full compensation for acquisition of property right. If the laws affects the basic structure could not be protected even though included in the IXth Schedule.

Conclusion
The outburst against the Right to Property as a Fundamental Right in Articles 19 (1) (f) and 31 started immediately after the enforcement of the Constitution in 1950. Land reforms, zamindari abolition laws, disputes relating to compensation, several rounds of constitutional amendments, litigations and adjudications ultimately culminated first in the insertion of the word socialist in the Preamble by the 42nd Amendment in 1977 and later in the omission of the Right to Property as a FR and its reincarnation as a bare constitutional right in Article 300-A by the 44th Amendment in 1978.

Today, the times have changed radically. India is no more seen through the eyes of only political leaders with a socialist bias. It is India Shining seen through the corporate lenses of financial giants like the Tata's, Ambanis and Mahindras, with an unfathomable zeal for capitalism, money and markets. There is another angle. There is a scramble by industrialists and developers for land all over the country for establishment of Special Economic Zones. Violent protests by poor agriculturists have taken place to defend their meager land-holdings against compulsory acquisition by the State.

In particular, the riots and killings in Singur, Nandigram etc. in a State (of West Bengal) ruled by communists has turned the wheel full circle. Socialism has become a bad word and the Right to Property has become a necessity to assure and assuage the feelings of the poor more than those of the rich. Soon after the abolition of the Fundamental Right to property, in Bhim Singh v. UOI[31], the Supreme Court realised the worth of the Right to Property as a Fundamental Right.

In the absence of this Fundamental Right to property, it took recourse to the other Fundamental Right of Equality which is absolutely the concept of Reasonableness under Article 14 for invalidating certain aspects of the urban land ceiling legislation. Today, the need is felt to restore the right to property as a Fundamental Right for protecting at least the elementary and basic proprietary rights of the poor Indian citizens against compulsory land acquisition.

Very recently, the Supreme Court, while disapproving the age-old Doctrine of Adverse Possession, as against the rights of the real owner, observed that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional right or statutory right but also a human right[32].

Thus, the trend is unmistakable. By 2050, if the Constitution of India is to be credited with a sense of sensibility and flexibility in keeping with the times, the bad word socialist inserted in the Preamble in 1977 shall stand omitted and the Right to Property shall stand resurrected to its original position as a Fundamental Right.

References:

1. 1954 AIR 282, 1954 SCR 1005.
2. (1973) 4 SCC 225
3. 1952 1 SCR 889.
4. 1965 AIR 1017, 1965 SCR) 1) 614.
5. 1954 AIR170,1954 SCR 558
6. Vasanlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 4: Attar Singh v. State of UP,AIR 1959 SC 564
7. Ragubhir Singh v Court of Wards, AIR 1953 SC 373
8. Bishan Das v State of Punjab,AIR 1961 SC 1570
9. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v Union of India 1970 AIR 564,1970 SCR (3)530
10. State of T.N v L.Abu Kavur Bai, (1984)1SCC 515
11. K.R.Lakshmanan v State of TN, (1996)2 SCC 226
12. Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd, (2007)8 SCC 705
13. J.M.D, Religion Law anf State in India; Oxford university press, New Delhi,1999
14. 1954 AIR170,1954 SCR 558
15. (1954) SCR 587
16. (1964) 6 SCR 35
17. AIR 1960 SC 1080
18. (1965) 1 SCR 614
19. (1967) 1 SCR 255
20. AIR 1965 SC 632
21. AIR 1967 SC 1110
22. AIR 1951 SC 455,P.458
23. AIR 1965 SC 845
24. 24 April,2007 6 SCC 59
25. (2005) ECHR 921 (15 November 2005), AIR 2007 SC 1753; (2007) 6 SCC 59
26. 2003 (5)Kar LJ 164
27. 23 September, AIR 2008 SC 1797 ; (2008) 5 SCC 176
28. Appeal (civil) 2530 of 2007, (2007) 8 SCC 705
29. AIR 2007 SC 2458; (2007)8 SCC 705, Appeal (civil) 5947 of 2002
30. AIR 2007 SC 861
31. The Tmes Of India,24th September, 2008

Written By: M.Haritha B.A.LLB (Hons). ,LLM Tamil Nadu Dr.Ambedkar Law University