Facts and Timeline of Proceedings
Facts and Timeline of Proceedings
The case is that of corruption, where one Sita Soren, a member of the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly, elected from the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM Party), was indicted for accepting a bribe for casting a vote in favour of a specific candidate in the Rajya Sabha Elections. Interestingly, she didn’t vote for this candidate but voted for some other person who belonged to JMM only. When charged with corruption, Sita Soren resorted to the obvious option of approaching the High Court for quashing the charges, where some tweaking of the interpretation was witnessed. But before we fathom this source of contention, a bit of Narsimha Rao’s decision becomes ancillary.
The situation till the date of this decision was that the judiciary was plagued with one of its earlier decisions of the PV Narsimha case (P.V. Narasimha Rao etc. v. State (CBI /SPE) etc., 1998, SC, Five-Judge Bench, Majority of 3:2), wherein the Court mistook the privileges under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution and handed a solid shield to the ministers against the case of bribery under such circumstances. Now, this kind of blanket protection is something which cannot be countenanced by the modern-day development of socio-economic offences, which operate not only superficially but rip apart the facades of culprits as well.
What became relevant to pin in the judgment was the immunity given to the ministers for any speech or vote in Parliament under Articles 105(2) and 194(2). Therefore, if an MP accepts a bribe and then actually votes or speaks in Parliament, he cannot be prosecuted. The words “actually votes or speaks” carry with them considerable weight for the non-fulfilment of the promise would pierce the said protection. To put it simply, if a Minister was bribed to vote in favour of A and voted for A only, then he has the leeway from criminal liability, but if he actually cast his vote for B, then he was amenable to being prosecuted and therefore, could not be regarded as the subject of the highlighted provisions of the Constitution.
The Jharkhand High Court pegged its decision on a similar line of reasoning, dismissing the quashing petition of Sita Soren. Eventually, an appeal by way of SLP was filed before the Apex Court before a Division Bench, which referred the case to a three-judge bench. Stressing the underlying facet of public importance, the matter was again transferred to the Constitution Bench. Owing to the doctrine of stare decisis, the case was referred to a seven-judge bench for the ultimate clarification on the question of whether a legislator enjoys immunity from prosecution under Article 105(2) or Article 194(2) of the Constitution for accepting bribes to vote in Parliament or an Assembly.
Supreme Court’s Observations
The outcome was clearly untoward for such infructuous protection can never subsist with the prestigious rule of law concept. The then Mr. Chief Justice, D.Y. Chandrachud, speaking for the Bench, delineated that the intent behind the protection enshrined under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) was to open the halls of the legislature or assemblies to the lawmakers so that they can raise their voices to lambast or extol others’ opinions. This expression or voice has different faces and can be in the form of reports, votes, deliberations, etc.
But the very idea was put to rest in the graveyard in Rao’s case, for it was misinterpreted and was understood as a medium to rejig the process of putting criminal liability on the ministers. Article 105(2) envisages that defence is given to “anything said or any vote given”. The majority opinion of three judges held that such acts of the Ministers of accepting a bribe with the motive to vote in favour of a particular candidate was something that is in the nexus of free speech and expression and is a branch of this “anything said or any vote given” only, provided that the concerned minister shall vote for that person only. If he deviates from the commitment, then he would be subjected to criminal prosecution. However, the bribe giver has always remained vulnerable to prosecution.
The Supreme Court in the present case parted ways from the majority opinion of the earlier decision and subscribed to the minority dissent, reiterating the settled principle of law that no protection can be provided without any exceptions. There exists no type of cloak of immunity, and every such immunisation has to be qualified through two tests followed:
- The act for which immunity is claimed must be related to the collective functions of the House.
- The immunity sought should have a “functional relationship” to the discharge of the duty of an individual legislator.
Now, in no manner can bribery come under the purview of these collective functions of the House. Therefore, a legislator does not enjoy immunity from prosecution if involved in bribery. The Bench clarified that “accepting a bribe constitutes an offence that has no connection with their right to vote or the manner in which they exercise that vote.” The Court observed that under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the offence is complete the moment a person “obtains,” “accepts,” or even “attempts to obtain” an undue advantage in exchange for acting, or refraining from acting, in a particular manner. It is not necessary that the act for which the bribe is offered is actually carried out.
